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This thesis examines extremist Muslim narratives, discourse and ideologies over 
the internet by using content analysis to thematically delineate and reconstruct them for 
the purpose of discovering the argumentation mechanisms through which they become 
persuasive and appealing.  
 
The research problematic is that dominant theories in social sciences and popular 
literature create 'taken for granted' inferences that relegate extremist ideologies and 
narratives to the realm of structural contingencies, psychological pathologies, emotive 
appeal, manipulated religious ideologies, peculiar and unique rationalities or group 
dynamics.  
 
This thesis hypothesizes instead the existence of a ‘logical structure‘ in extremist 
Muslim narratives. This ‗logical structure‘ is predicated on rationally persuasive 
arguments (which employ epistemic and instrumental rationality coupled with inductive / 
deductive reasoning) that appeal to any rational individual but are ultimately leveraged 
on for morally wrong end state choices. Unfortunately much of the counter narratives 
today seldom address this ‗logical structure‘ and choose to address the more ‗traditional‘ 
explanations cited above. 
 
Themes and argumentation mechanisms stemming from an examination of 
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 INTRODUCTION TO THE ‗LOGICAL STRUCTURE‘. 
 
Indoctrination into extremism is something that has been researched and talked 
about ad-nauseum. Incidents in the news constantly remind us that extremism as we 
know it today is not relenting and at most keeps changing its face. We still do not have 
full comprehension of the dynamics leading to extremism despite the wealth of study 
and research that been done over time on this subject and also given that extremism in 
all its forms is not a new phenomenon. Explanations based on particular theoretical 
frameworks get shattered when enough anomalies force researchers to seriously rethink 
their perspectives. A probable reason for this is that dominant studies across various 
disciplines still ultimately revolve around visible surface attributes. By this we mean that 
causality is usually derived from observations that are most visible or the loudest.
1
   The 
aetiologies leading to indoctrination have been usually relegated to the realm of 
pathology, misguided or manipulated rationality (religious or otherwise), group 
dynamics or overwhelming structural factors. The role of human agency when it is raised 
is still confined by the above three realms. 
 
The research problematic in this study is that dominant theories in social sciences 
that choose to explain the rationality and meaning behind extremist Muslim ideologies 
                                                 
1
 This does not mean that in the social sciences, there is no attempt to probe deeper, but the assertion here is 
that such research is easily susceptible to observations that are the most visible. For instance, the most 
visible form of extremism that is prevalently seen in the media is depictions of religious fervor.  Muslim 
extremism then gets easily associated with this surface observation. Or if an extremist is interviewed, if he 




are incomplete as they ultimately base their analysis such surface attributes. Little is 
done in the reconstruction of these ideologies to look at the nature, rationality and 
meanings that they seek to transmit as they are contextualized for a targeted audience, 
the process by which they are framed to gain resonance and the reasons for their appeal 
at the grassroots.  
 
Thus this study is moving away from the 'taken for granted' inferences that 
relegate explanations for the appeal of extremist ideologies to the realm of structural 
contingencies, pathologies, misguided or manipulated rationalities and group dynamics. 
 
Labels and Definitions 
 
 The study of extremism and terrorism is a subject fraught with definitional fracas 
and variations. For the purposes of this study, Ashour‘s work on the De-Radicalisation of 
Jihadists offers a start for disentangling such perspectives. Later in the methodology 
chapter, the term ―extremist‖ will be given thematic parameters by which such 
narratives can be identified for the purpose of analysis.  
 
 Ashour described radical Islamist groups as, ―…those movements that 
ideologically reject democracy as well as the legitimacy of political and ideological 
pluralism. They also aim for revolutionary social, political and economic changes and 
refuse to work within the established state institutions. Radical Islamist movements can 
use violent and /or non-violent methods to achieve their goals. Radical Islamists could 
3 
 
also be called revolutionaries, extremists or exclusivists.‖2 
 
 By this definition there are two components by which this study defines an 
extremist narrative.  The first demarcator is relatively straightforward and that is the 
advocacy of violence. But this becomes problematic when we also include militant 
groups that see their violence as a manifestation of armed conflict or revolutionary war 
against the state and do not outrightly advocate attacks against civilians. This requires 
the use of a second demarcator which as Ashour had mentioned involves the rejection of 
―…ideological pluralism.‖  Now we can include groups that not only advocate the use 
of violence but also have an absolutist view that dehumanizes and vilifies other groups 
to the point of being supremacist. With this in mind, this study has also included in its 
list of groups to be studied, narratives from Muslim activist groups such as the Hizb ut 
Tahrir that have an intolerant, absolutist and exclusionary outlook. Their narratives at 
times allude to the advocacy of violence or support groups that do so. 
 
The intellectual puzzle and research questions 
 
 The following questions form the components of the intellectual puzzle this study 
is attempting to solve.  
 
1. What are the various extremist ideologies / narratives that appear on the internet 
and how are they delineated thematically? 
 
                                                 
2
 Omar Ashour, The de-radicalisation of Jihadists, ( London: Routledge), 2009, 4. 
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2. What is the underlying logic behind the scholarly writings from extremist 
Muslim ideologues of the past
3
 and how have they influenced contemporary 
extremist Muslim ideologues? How are these ‗classical‘ ideologies replicated and 
interpreted in contemporary extremist Muslim narratives and discourses?   
 
3. Most importantly, all this culminates into asking what are the central features 
(themes) and forms of augmentation used to pitch these ideologies / narratives? 
Is there a form of argumentation that takes precedence? 
 
Thematically delineating and reconstructing extremist Muslim narratives over the 
internet will illustrate how Muslim extremists actually interprtete various issues. The 
central question that stems from this is how extremist Muslims are able to pitch their 
message is a manner that resonates with their targeted audience. 
 
Nature and original contribution of study 
 
This study hypothsises the existence of a 'logical structure' underlying all 
cultural, structural and human agency based factors that account for the appeal of 
extremist Muslim ideas and discourses. By this 'logical structure' we are not attempting 
to justify extremist ideas and actions but to discover how coldly logical or cogent 
arguments embedded within extremist Muslim narratives are leveraged upon. There is no 
need to manipulate this 'logical structure' as its raw existence alone can aid extremist 
arguments to be accepted among rational individuals. The ‗logical structure‘ is inherent 
                                                 
3
 E.g. Syed Qutb, Mawdudi, Hassan Al-Banna etc  
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and depending on the agency using it, in this case Muslim extremists, culminates 
towards violent recourses. Literature on this subject has alluded in the past to a kind of 
‗cost –benefit‘ instrumental rationality4 in the actions of extremists. But the extent of 
their rationality has been relegated mainly to this realm of achieving objectives. For 
instance there is an instrumental rationality behind why and how religious scriptures or 
the fears of people are manipulated.
5
  But seldom have studies examined how extremists 
systemically leverage on a universally accepted form of rationality in conjunction with 
other aetiologies to create the entire framing process. This is the critical lacunae existing 
in contemporary studies on this topic.    
  
For instance a valid issue (empirically provable and rational) has to work in a 
systemic manner with other less rational themes (e.g emotive reasons) to produce the 
overall desired effect. We need to understand this system of framing and offer alternate 
solutions to the end state extremists propose instead of just trying to highlight the flaws 
in their argument. At times, some of the issues brought up by extremists can indeed be 
defeated by showing the flaws in the argument. But the arguments extremists employ 
even in a flawed issue is sometimes put across in a rational and convincing manner that 
leverages on empirical fact or universal values that resonate with almost anyone. For 
example, the argument can leverage on valid cases of injustice, repression and other 
                                                 
4
 Robert Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. "Deterring Terrorism It Can Be Done", International Securi-
ty  30, no. 3 (2006): 87-123, http://www.globalcollab.org/projects/non-state-proliferation/1540-
Workshop/Trager%20Deterring%20Terrorists.pdf (accessed August 26, 2011). 
5
 James F Mattil, ―What in the name of God? Religious Extremism, Fear & Terrorism," Global Focus: 





grievances or the actual experiences of individuals. This kind of corroborative rational 
argument forms a 'logical structure' in which other forms of argumention techniques 
(poetic, dialectical, rhetorical or sophistic)
6
 will simply provide a force multiplier effect 
to the logical structure. Predominant theories and studies on this subject have addressed 
many of these other forms of arguments leaving out or just glancing over the 'logical 
structure.'
7
 Not recognising this ‗logical structure‘ and simply resorting to finding and 
attacking the flaws in extremist narratives would amount to an attrition of arguments.  
 
This has relevance to extremist rehabilitation programs that focus predominantly 
on the religious rehabilitation component. While this has had its successes thanks to the 
dedicated work of the counsellors involved, it can be further strengthened by looking 
outside the religious component. For a rational argument behind a misguided approach 
to non-legitimate and perhaps at times legitimate issues is the hardest to defeat. 
 
This is not to say that other explanations from other disciplines such as 
psychology, political sciences and even within sociology is void but rather that they have 
negated or insufficiently factored the ‗logical structure.‘ This study will also show how 
the 'logical structure' operates in an integrated manner with other already known 
aetiologies such as the influence of mutual reinforcement or the influence of charismatic 
authority figures.   
 
The methodology starts with using themes covered in literature to demarcate 
                                                 
6
 These forms of arguments will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
7
 The literature review on current theories on the subject will be described in p 51-79 of the next chapter.   
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extremist narratives. New themes are then identified by analysing the content of 
extremist website postings, ideological narratives and discussion forums. The study will 
then show how these themes connect with each other by the clusters they are grouped 
into and the rational aspects behind them.    
 
The analysis of web content and ideological narratives is very recipient focused 
as it looks at the reactions and feelings that it is meant to stimulate and not the 
motivations and state of mind of the writer. Analysis of this type of data illustrates the 
thematic framing and argumentation techniqiues for extremist Muslim ideologies and 
narratives. On the other hand web discourses and narratives are especially important as 
they look at how these themes resonate back at the grassroots level. They also show how 
ideologies that utilise these themes are transmitted over such discourses.  
 
The entire process behind the ‗logical structure‘ argument is illustrated in figure 
1. This will be elaborated on at the conclusion to summarise the entire argument behind 
the ‗logical structure.‘ It is a process that will be tested through the analysis of extremist 
Muslim ideological literature, narratives and discourse over the internet. It is to be noted 
that the factors that generate influence (the arrows shown in figure 1) are bi-directional. 
This shows how each factor influences and is in turn influenced and reinforced by the 
other.  
 
A very strong caveat needs to be made at this point. By trying to discover and 
show the dynamics of the 'logical structure', this research is by no means trying to allude 
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to justifying the heinous acts committed in the name of a cause. Neither is it meant to be 
another apologist perspective. What it does is that it will attempt to show how the 
'logical structure' is not so much manipulated but is instead the leverage upon which 
extremist ideologies reach their objectives. To counter them we first need to remove this 
leverage in a manner that exposes the flaws in the means and solutions proposed by 
extremists. This is far better than ending up in an argument of attrition that either tries to 
show extremist Muslims as pathological or flawed in all parts of their reasoning which 
includes components that reside within this ‗logical structure‘.  
 
Proposed solutions cannot simply be superficial and placatory as extremists may 
have already critiqued such alternate solutions in a cogent and rational manner to 
highlight their ineffectiveness.
8
 This is why countering the extremist Muslim worldviews 
is better served by first understanding the rational aspects of their critiques and offering 
viable and credible counter alternatives to the extremist solutions they seek through 
critical and open discourse. 
 
                                                 
8
 Ashour 2009 also proposes a similar solution in his book but does not emphasize enough on the critical 





Fig 1. Graphical illustration of the „logical structure‟ process that generates appeal for extremist 
Muslim ideologies and end state solutions. (Bidirectional arrows indicate the two way flow of influence 
and counter-influence.  




































The first chapter in this study presents the key tenets and nature of ‗classical‘ 
extremist ideologies juxtaposed with contemporary ones. This will be followed by 
examining the historical foundations and key tenets of Muslim extremism in the Middle 
East, South East Asia (SEA) and Singapore with a view to demonstrate its instrumental 
nature. It then goes onto describing theoretical literature from sociology that explains 
recruitment into extremist movements. The methodology behind searching, identifying 
and capturing the content of extremist websites and forums is then explained along with 
demonstrating how the theory behind this research is translated into a method for 
ascertaining the themes and argumentation logics used. The study then moves onto 
critically analysing local literature and studies on extremism as this is the most visible 
face of what we see in terms of local explanations to extremism by Muslims. The next 
chapter then illustrates what a framing process for extremist Muslim narratives involving 
argumentation logics, themes and the Habermasian ideal speech situation would entail. 
The bulk of this study is naturally reserved for what extremist Muslim narratives over 
cyberspace reveal. For it is in this unfettered realm that we see the ‗logical structure‘ 
most visibly demonstrated. The findings are broken into three parts in which the themes 
and argumentation forms discovered are categorized into clusters. The first cluster looks 
at themes that are relatively more ideological in nature. The next cluster looks at themes 
that resonate emotively and the last cluster illustrates the persuasive techniques and 
augmentation forms employed. These findings will also incorportate looking at the 
individual repertoire of prominent personalities in Muslims extremism that left this 
lifestyle and who are now the strongest advocates against it. Finally in our conclusion, a 
11 
 


























LITERATURE REVIEW OF ‗CLASSICAL‘ JIHADISTS, ‗NEW‘ JIHADISTS, THE 
TENETS OF MUSLIM EXTREMISM AND THEORIES EXPLAINING 
RECRUITMENT INTO EXTREMIST MUSLIM MOVEMENTS. 
 
 The first part of this chapter will juxtapose ‗classical‘ extremist Muslim 
ideologies such as that of Syed Qutb with some of the contemporary new ideologies 
made famous on the internet. This will demonstrate how new extremist Muslim 
ideologies by virtue of the audibility and visibility of the new generation of ideologues 
such as Awlaki 
9
 isn‘t all that ‗new‘ to begin with.  
 
This sets the stage for probing deeper into the tenets and instrumental appeal 
behind contemporary political Islam. Understanding the influence of political and social 
circumstances behind political Islam‘s development cannot exist without trying to 
understand the nature of the fundamentalist thinking behind it and how it is able to 
transform even the mystical and religious elements behind the ideologies into a cogent 
and logical framework for action. The chapter would then percolate into looking at the 
political instrumentality underlying the forgotten episodes / anomalies of Islamist 
activism against the state in Singapore. This will set the context to do a histographical 
review of Islamist activism and political Islam‘s influence in Singapore. This historical 
analysis will help to illustrate the instrumental rationality behind the aim, carriers and 
                                                 
9
 Awlaki was killed in Yemen in September 2011 during a US Predator drone attack.  Jennifer Griffin, "Two 
U.S.-Born Terrorists Killed in CIA-Led Drone Strike | Fox News." Fox News - Breaking News Updates | 
Latest News Headlines | Photos & News Videos. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/30/us-born-




appeal of political Islam in SEA.  The last section of this chapter will move away from a 
historical analysis and culminate into presenting a literature review of dominant studies 
explaining recruitment into extremist movements. 
 
Qutb, Takfeeris and the „New‟ Jihadists 
 
The ideology of Syed Qutb encompasses the idea of Sharia as the unquestionable 
authority by which all aspects of life including a system of government should be based 
upon. Anything that falls outside this is ―Evil and corrupt...‖10. There is also no middle 
way. No ―half-Islam and half-Jahiliyah‖11 Anything man made is prone to exploitation 
and would result in the self-serving authoritarian dictatorships that Qutb was all too 
familiar with.  Therefore all man-made systems of government and political ideologies; 
capitalism, socialism, nationalism ultimately would result in the situation of 
―enslavement‖ by the one in authority. We need to take note of the foundational 
instrumental logic behind Qutb‘s ideology. Its starting premise to a reader might already 
seem rationally credible as it only has to latch onto mainstream critique of contemporary 
political ideologies.  
 
 His work ‗Ma‘alim Fil Tariq‘ (Milestones) emphasises that Islam being of divine 
perfection would entail that political solutions based on Islam would naturally be perfect. 
This follows the kind of logical argumentation that if point A is true, then anything based 
on A is most likely to be true as well. This becomes problematic. If the emphasis on 
                                                 
10
 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, (Egypt: Kazi Publications, 1964),130. 
11
 Ibid., 130 
14 
 
‗Islam the religion‘ is seen as the basis for extremist thought, then naturally any 
discourse on counter ideologies would focus on the issue of ‗misinterpretations‘. The 
parameters surrounding the essence of the problem then take religious points of 
reference. This results in any logical / rational reasoning to be confined to these 
parameters for discourse by its protagonists.  But if one were to examine the works of 
Qutb from the perspective of a political ideology, changing the parameters away from a 
discussion on Islam, we see the following. 
  
One, Qutb‘s emphasis on the ‗Islamic Vanguard‘ to fight ‗Jahiliyyah‘ society 
whether by preaching or by Jihad
12
 against an opponent that will not ―give up their 
power‖ without strong opposition,13 puts the emphasis on age old notions of political 
resistance. Other rhetorical nuances in his narrative glorify this ‗vanguard‘ as being 
divinely guided as their ultimate goal is not just a change of political systems but to 
propagate Islam ‗throughout the earth to the whole of mankind‘ 14  
 
Such an intention elevates the position of the ‗vanguard‘ from common 
‗resistance‘ to divinely guided agents for change striving towards the greater goal of 
saving humanity through religion. The emphasis of ―this world is not a place of 
reward‖15 puts the emphasis on the struggle and not entirely on whether the goal of 
political change will actually materialise. The latter might be implied as the end product 
of such a sustained struggle that will entail much suffering and persecution on the part of 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 55,59 
13
 Ibid., 58,59 
14
 Ibid., 72 
15
 Ibid., 150, 157 
15 
 
the vanguard to lead ―life until death in poverty, difficulty, frustration, torment and 
sacrifice,‖16  
 
Thus we have elements of glory, sacrifice and nobility of the struggle woven into 
Qutb‘s narrative. The element of liberation is the other source of appeal. Sharia is meant 
to free people from ―servitude‖ as it entails real freedom. This happens as this resistance 
is meant for all as a ―movement to wipe out tyranny and to introduce true freedom to 
mankind.‖ 17 It is no longer human rule with all its arbitrariness that is in control but 
God‘s law which is impartial and incorruptible and where there is ―no vagueness or 
looseness‖18 that is associated with people.     
 
Qutb had a global enemy in mind and that was ―world Jewry‖ which he belived 
was instigating a world Jewish conspiracy to, 
 
...eliminate all limitations, especially the limitations 
imposed by faith and religion, so that Jews may penetrate 
into body politics of the whole world and then may be free 
to perpetuate their evil designs. At the top of the list of 
these activities is usury, the aim of which is that all the 
wealth of mankind end up in the hands of Jewish financial 
institutions which run on interest. 
19
 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 157 
17
 Ibid., 62 
18
 Ibid., 85 
19




One that is aided by the West and its long standing ―enmity towards Islam‖ and 
how all its plans are ultimately a ―well-thought-out scheme...to demolish the structure of 
Muslim society,‖ 20 
 
Syed Qutb also refers to the concept of ‗Haraka‘ (referring to activism)21 in his 
writings. Qutb had stressed how ―there is no faith without action…‖ which accentuates 
the primacy of activism.
22
 The need to act is also elevated to the level of individual 
obligation as a Muslim.
23
 Qutb describes how victimisation is to be expected from this. 
Something Muslims who have a perception of being victimised by society prior and 
during activism can identify with.
24
 Thus demonstrating how Islamism‘s defining 
characteristic and dynamics is centred on activism / struggle founded on a collective 
complex of victimisation
25
 that originates from the individual. Wiktorowicz likewise 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 116 
21John Møller‘s analysis of Qutub‘s work, ―In the Shade of the Quran.‖, in which he cites Carré to explain 
how Haraka (Movement)is referring to activism. See, John Møller Larsen,  ―Art & Activism: The Quranic 
Exegesis of Sayyid Qutb‖, PhD dissertation, Department of the study of religion, The Faculty of Theology, 
University of Aarhus, submitted on 11 April 2006, 89 
22 Ibid 92 in which he cites Qutb,‖In the Shade of the Quran.‖4, 2215, sūra 17. 
 
23 Qutb, ―Milestones‖ 1964, 42, ―When they have no such freedom, then it becomes incumbent upon Muslims to launch 
a struggle through individual preaching as well by initiating an activist movement to restore their freedom, and to 
strike hard at all those political powers that force people to bow to their will and authority, defying the commandments 
of Allah….‖ 
 
Larsen also explains how, ―Activism and the idea of movement is found on an abstract, conceptual level, in the 
commitment to the cause of the individual and in the social dynamics of Muslim society…‖ Larson 2006, 94. This can 
perhaps extend to how personal identification can be formulated based on the reader‘s emotive response to the content. 
  
24 Qutb, ―Milestones‖ 1964,11, in which Muslims who reject Jahili society, ―encountered nothing burdensome except 
torture and oppression of those who rejected Islam.‖ 
25
 Crenshaw, describes academic works on the idea of ―Collective rationality.‖ This paper proposes that a 
collective complex of victimization is likewise a collective rationality founded on the individual‘s complex 
17 
 
supports this argument citing how the activist Da‘wa of al-Muhajiroun in the UK is not 
only about promoting Islam but rather the ―promotion of an ideologically inspired 
interpretation of Islam that demands activism by others.‖ 26  
 
What this all entails is that if one who is indoctrinated in the ideology as 
espoused by Qutb in Milestones, is asked why they fought, the simple answer that will 
first spring to their lips would be - ‗For Islam.‘ Noble reasons will be first to be 
mentioned. Only when we seek answers past this surface response do we get to the heart 
of the appeal behind the ideology. This may arise from a myrid number of reasons 
besides religion like mutually identifying with each other‘s personal grievances or 
experiences with a common persecutor, (either the government or authority figure).  
Then the empowerment that comes with group activism and resistance moves the 
individual from a position of passive helplessness to being able to do something about it.  
A final possible reason may be the promise of change and liberation. But for this change 
to be believable it has to be realisable. The extremist Muslim resolves this by clinging 
onto the notion that since ultimate reward is in paradise, such results need not be felt 
tangibly in this world. It is enough to recurrently fuel motivational ideas that see victory 
as the promised end even if suffering and failure is the tangible end product of resistance 
in this world.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of victimization. ―average citizens may adopt a collectivist conception of rationality because they recog-
nize what is individually rational is collectively rational.‖ Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, ―Ra-
tional Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,‖ American Political Science Review 80 (1986): p 484 
quoted in Martha Crenshaw, ―The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice‖ in 
Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press), (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), 1998, 8-9. 
26 Wiktorowicz 2005, 50 
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Many contemporary ideologues of today, such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Anwar 
Awlaki and Abu Yahya al-Libi in fact reproduce these ‗classical‘ extremist Muslim 
ideological thoughts but apply them to very contemporary contexts to achive resonance. 
This is done to the point they appear to be new ideologues to a modern audience.  
Take for example the "three foundations," of al Qaeda‘s political ideology as 
described by Ayman Al Zawahiri 
27
:  
 "The Quran-Based Authority to Govern." – This refers to a government that rules 
according to Islamic Sharia and does away with "man-made" laws.  
 "The Liberation of the Homelands" and the "the freedom of the Muslim lands 
and their liberation from every aggressor." Which of course rests on the idea that Muslim 
lands are either directly in control of dictators or anti- Muslim governments that ally 
themselves to the West or that the ―Zionist – Crusader‖ alliance  rules by proxy by sup-
porting these regimes. 
 "The Liberation of the Human Being" which comes about by the ―power of the 
sharia based judiciary.‖ This would appeal to anyone who feels that not only are they not 
able to critique their government in tangible and demonstratable ways that can see visi-
ble changes, they are in fact persecuted in many forms for attempting to do this.   
The three principals of al-Qaeda as laid out here are very much in line with 
Qutb‘s idea of ‗liberation‘ through Sahria. Be it of the person or of the collective. The 
                                                 
27
 Christopher M Blanchard,  "Al-Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology in Congressional Research 
Service Reports on Terrorism." Federation of American Scientists. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf 
(accessed April 15, 2008). 
19 
 
face of the enemy is not all that different either. Be it the regime of Gamel Abdel Nasser, 
world ‗Jewery‘, the present Saudi monarchy, the rulers of Muslim nations who are allied 
to and supported by the West and the Western nations themselves. In the case of the 
Saudi monarchy, ruling by Sharia is not enough as they have betrayed Islam by siding up 
to the West.  To legitamise the killing of such rulers, requires leveraging on another clas-
sic Islamic principal exploited by extremists in any era.  That is the idea of Takfeer. 28 
Takfeer: "...the practice of declaring that an individual or a group previously 
considered Muslims are in fact kafir(s) (non-believers in God)" and in some cases 




The Takfeer principal has manifested itself even in the contemporary world as 
epitomized in the words of Osama bin Laden
30
 that to get at the ‗near enemy‘ (corrupt 
and unIslamic Muslim rulers) involves firstly killing their support (‗the far enemy‘, 
Western and colonial powers that support them) But this involves the killing of fellow 
Muslims who ally themselves to the West. This can only be achieved by demonizing and 
relegating them to the status of apostates or heretics. Takfeer here is used strategically to 
excommunicate Muslims who do not conform to their ideas.  
                                                 
28
 Excommunication of those who are deemed to be no longer Muslim. 
 
29
 Irshaad Hussain, "Hermeneutics of Takfeer," Islam From Inside, 
http://www.islamfrominside.com/Pages/Articles/Hermeneutics%20of%20Takfeer.html (accessed April 21, 
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 Takfeer can also take the form of indirect excommunication. Another 





 A prime example of this would be in Osama Bin Laden‘s 
explanation that Muslims that were killed in the 9/11 attacks indirectly deserved to die 
for choosing to stay, work and support the land of the far enemy. That in the first place, 
―the Islamic Shariat says Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for long.‖33 
Therefore in order to allow for such collateral damage, these Muslims must first be 
deemed to be outside the realm of the Ummah (Global community of Muslims) for 
choosing not to withdraw from Western society.  
 
The Takfeer idea was advanced by Sayyid Imam al Sharif who wrote books such 





                                                 
31 Shepard mentions that in Qutb‘s doctrine, ―They must not mix in any other message, such as national liberation 
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themselves from the jahili society to escape its powerful hold over their minds. This  separation is not 
physical but involves ‘mixing while keeping distinct (mukha latamaa tamayyuz)’ and  
‗emotional separation (uzla shuuriyya).‘‖ See:  William E. Shepard, "SAYYID QUTB‘S DOCTRINE OFJAHILIYYA", 
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 This ideology can be seen in Qutb‘s works as well. 
Qutb‘s alluding to Takfeer by the concept of ―Jahilia‖ has been said to have al-
lowed contemporary terror events to take place
37
 as those ‗Jahilia‘ Muslim civilians who 
support such rulers are equally liable to have Takfeer pronounced onto them.   Fareed 
Abdul-Khaliq cites, 
 We have pointed out in what has preceded that the spread 
of the ideology of Takfeer occurred amongst the youth of 
the Ikhwaan who were imprisoned in the late fifties and 
early sixties, and that they were influenced by the ideology 
of the Shaheed Sayyid Qutb and his writings. They derived 
from these writings that the society had fallen into Jahi-
liyyah (of kufr), and that he had performed Takfeer of the 
rulers who had rejected the Hakimiyyah of Allaah by not 
ruling by what Allaah has revealed, and also Takfeer of 
those ruled over (i.e. civilians), when they became satisfied 
with this…38  
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14, 2008). 
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38
 Fareed Abdul-Khaliq (Former Murshid of Ikhwaan), "The Origins of Mass Takfeer of Muslim Societies 
Lie In the Books of Sayyid Qutb", Takfeeris.Com | The Origins of the Takfeeris and Takfeer Movements. 
http://www.Takfeeris.com/Takfeer/articles/ezjol-fareed-abdul-khaliq-former-murshid-of-ikhwaan-the-
origins-of-mass-Takfeer-of-muslim-societies-lie-in-the-books-of-sayyid-qutb.cfm (accessed August 26, 
22 
 
Takfeer thus serves a strategic function. Be in the removal of Muslim rulers as in 
the case of Anwar Sadat or to scripturally legitimize the killing of those who are deemed 
as enemies. This can include Muslim civilians who support rulers the extremists pro-
nounce Takfeer upon. But we have to take the idea of Takfeer a bit further to fully realize 
its strategic and instrumental use by extremists. Often in extremist narratives over the 
internet, the ‗enemy within‘ are alluded to as being the greater threat and the immediate 
source of the problem. For instance in the Iraqi insurgency, contrary to popular belief it 
is not the US primarily that is the enemy. The Islamic State of Iraq (Al Qaeda in Iraq) 
actually said, ―…jihad against the apostates is a priority over jihad against the original 
kuffar …‖ 39  The Shias are portrayed as the primary threat in Iraq as they are seen to be 
collaborating with the US and Iran. Likewise in the Sallafiyah Jadeedah website, the fol-
lowing further espoused the priority given to the enemy within.  




Ibn Taymeeyah said, ―Aboo Bakr as-Siddeeq (Radiyallaahu 
‗Anh) and the rest of the companions, began by Jihaad 
against the apostates before Jihaad against the disbelievers 
from Ahl al-Kitaab. This is because Jihaad against these is 




 Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI): ―A Letter to the Knights of Baghdad‖ By War Minister Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, 
Released on: November 15, 2009; http://www.nefafoundation.org/newsite/file/nefaal-Muhajir1109.pdf 
 
40―Limaadhal-Jihaad? (Why Jihaad?),'Umar Mahmood Muhammed 'Uthmaan Abu 'Umar, known common-
ly as Abu Qataadah al-Philisteeni.{Last four chapters of the book},Statements of the Scholars Regarding 
the Replacers of the Sharee‘ah‖, salafiyyah-jadeedah.tripod.com, http://salafiyyah-
jadeedah.tripod.com/Qital/Part_2.htm#ad-daar, Accessed Nov 16, 2009. 
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a preservation of what has already been conquered from the 
Muslim lands and to force back into the religion those who 
want to leave it. Whereas Jihaad against those who are not 
fighting us amongst the Mushriks and Ahl al-Kitaab is an 
additional manifesting of the Deen. Preserving the capital is 





So the obligation upon every Muslim is to wage Jihaad 
against these rulers until they are removed and eliminated 
from authority over the Muslims. It is also obligatory upon 
all the Muslims to dedicate their efforts to preparing the 
tools of Jihaad as much as possible so as to return the 
authority of the Muslims to the earth which they conquered 
with their blood, then these accursed rulers came along and 
changed the faith and religion, replaced the Sharee‘ah, and 
returned the authority of the Mushriks over the lands.
42
   
 
Also, know that these rulers are spreaders of corruption 
throughout the earth because of their hatred of this Ummah, 
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 Besides the emphasis on the enemy within Islam, the other greater theme is the need to get back lost 
power that Muslims once held and to once again regain the state of supremacy. This seems to be underlying 
much of the extremist religious debates and rhetoric. We thus need to ask ourselves if extremist ideologies 
are inherently supremacist ideologies as well.  
 
42
 The enemy within more than anything else is blamed for causing the downfall of Muslims. This is 
namely referring to apostate rulers who have been bought over by the West. 
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and because of their ruling by the laws of Satan. Allaah 
Ordered the believers to wage Jihaad against the spreaders 
of corruption..... 
 
This is because these rulers with their parties and 
institutions of corruption, plant roots of corruption in the 
societies, and use all their energy to make corruption the 
life, culture and food of these societies. 
 
Do you not see, dear brother, what the media ministers do? 
They spread heresy and apostasy, immorality, vices, 
beautifications of sins and fornication? They call to the 
trash and mindlessness of destructive Shirk beliefs? 
 
Do you not see what the ministry of justice does? 
Legalizing the Haraam and sexual sins? Loss of rights and 
completely changing things over? Where is there a person 
who is sure he can get his rights or fend of an oppression 
from himself through these courts which are run by the so-
called ministries of justice? 
 
Then, do you not see these financial institutions which are 
run by the government? All of its matters are based upon 
25 
 
Haraam interest. Noone (sic) is capable of securing his 
wealth except in these interest based banks. Noone is 
capable of carrying his trade on except through them. And 
all these loans, which they claim are only to improve 
people‘s living conditions, are only performed with interest. 
 
Do not forget to remember and think about the insurance 
plans which are forced upon people if they want to use life 
essentials like cars and other things. 
 
Also, do you not see the ministry of education? See what it 
has done to a generation of youths who have graduated 
from its schools and institutions? What have they taught 
them and informed them about? What, from Islaam, have 
they reared and nurtured them on?... 
 
The idea being propogated in these extremist narratives is that the downfall and 
decline of Islam has been institutionalised by apostate rulers through all the social 
systems they have implemented. This emphasis on the enemy within has not changed 
from the time of the ‗classical‘ extremist Muslim ideologues. In fact the narratives still 
refer back to them as in this case by citing Ibn Taymeeyah. Notice the argument now 
moves away from religious edicts to relating to what is happening in their society today 
and all the related institutions. Such narratives lead the reader to make the necessary 
26 
 
linkages to experiences, institutions and the social context they are personally involved 
in. Any personal grievance with any of the institutions cited, instantly achieves resonance 
with the narrative. This of course links the cause to the source of all institutional 
legitimacy, namely the ruler or the state.  
 
Thus interwoven in many religious debates and narratives on Jihad and religious 
edicts and scripture, are these real world arguements which have natural corroboration 
and can be proven empirically as there is never any institutional entity that is infallible. 
The question is one of degree. The greater the personal grevience with the institution 
cited, the greater the resonance. The greater the resonance, the greater the propensity to 
ascribe the link to the rulers. When reinforced further with religious corroboration, it 
leads to the conclusion that the ruler is an enemy of Islam and the cause of societal 
‗corruption‘ that the reader might have experienced in some form or other.  
When it is seen in this way, we begin to realize that despite the highly visible ac-
tions and loud rhetoric by Muslim extremists against the US and the West, the ultimate 
goal of Muslim extremists is still their own land. The only difference in the rhetoric of 
todays‘s extremist ideologues, as exemplified in the idea of a ‗Global Jihad‘, is that it 
gives a sheen of grandeur, unity in efforts and cohesiveness of those fighting for a strug-
gle that is ultimately local in its attributes.
43
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not have received before but the concerns of the local militant groups concerns are ultimately focsed on their region, 
see Mohammed Ayoob, The many faces of political Islam:  religion and politics in the Muslim world. Singapore: NUS 
Press, 2008, 142-143, 147. 
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Another example of contemporary manifestations of classical extremist Muslim 
ideologies can be seen in how al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi made reference to 
the ―Hukm al-Tatarrus‖ when justifying terrorist attacks where Muslim civilians are 
killed. 
44
 ―Hukm al-Tatarrus‖ provides a utilitarian logic behind situations where civi-
lians are killed for the greater good of Islam. To readers who might empathize with the 
logic behind such cold and rational calculations, this might come across as a persuasive 
argument. Al-Libi in this case has strategically leveraged on such established ideologies 
and applied it to the modern context. Barclay describes how,  
One of al-Libi‘s strengths as an al-Qaeda ideologue is that 
he is able to take obscure and dense theological concepts 
such as al-Tatarrus and re-interpret them for a contempo-
                                                 
44 ―One of the most important contemporary works on al-Tatarrus by a Salafi-Jihadist ideologue is by al-Qaeda leader 
Abu Yahya al-Libi. In his 2008 book Human Shields and Modern Jihad, al-Libi attempts to reinterpret al-Tatarrus for 
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Islamic jurisprudence and was traditionally used to establish the permissibility of a Muslim army attacking a non-
Muslim enemy in situations where one or more of the following has occurred:  
 
• A non-Muslim enemy preparing to resist attack in its fortress is holding other Muslims against their will as human 
shields. 
 
• The Muslims are attacking the fortress of the enemy, inside which are Muslims who are not being held against their 
will but who are engaged in legitimate commercial activities with non-Muslims. 
 
• Muslims are attempting to defeat a non-Muslim enemy who has entered Muslim territory and occupied positions 
around or behind them, and where the Muslims must recapture that territory or fight their way through that territory to 
defeat the enemy. 
 
• Muslims are attacking a non-Muslim enemy‘s ship on which Muslims are being used as human shields. 
 
While Muslims engaging in jihad are enjoined to protect the sanctity of Muslim life wherever possible, al-Tatarrus 
describes circumstances in which the obligation to fight Islam‘s enemies - and in so doing protect the wider Muslim 
populace - outweighs the threat to those Muslim civilians unfortunate enough to be caught between the two sides.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that Salafi-Jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda have sought to deploy this concept to 
legitimize terrorist attacks that risk large numbers of Muslim civilian casualties. In 2008, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri referred to al-Tatarrus while discussing the Salafi-Jihadist movement‘s stance on Muslim civilian casualties.‖ 
quoted in Jack Barclay, "Al-Tatarrus: al-Qaeda‘s Justification for Killing Muslim Civilians." The Jamestown Founda-
tion Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 34 (2010), 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=36803&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=26&c
Hash=26811dfccf (accessed August 26, 2011).  
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rary setting, but does so in a way that makes these concepts 
more easily accessible to a lay audience. Unless the au-
dience is well-versed in the jurisprudence of jihad and the 
work of classical scholars on this issue, they will be none 
the wiser when ideologues such as al-Libi use the concept 
inappropriately or out of context. 
45
 
 The infamous Anwar Awlaki is no different. After his release from imprisonment 
in Yemen, he wrote a piece called ―Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki reflects on ‗vacation from 
this world‘ ‖ 46 in which he said, ―It was a chance to review Qur'an and to study and 
read in a way that was impossible out of jail. My time in detention was a vacation from 
this world….I still see my detention as a blessing and I believe that I am still enjoying the 
fruits of those blessings until this moment.‖  
 This might seem like a novel statement to anyone who does not have a 
background on the writings of Islamic scholars. But Ibn Taymiyyah while in Prison by 
the Mongols also said, "What can my enemies do to me? For my paradise is in my breast; 
wherever I go, it is with me. My murder is martyrdom. My imprisonment is solitude with 








 Anwar Awlaki, "Imam Anwar al-Awlaki reflects on ''vacation from this world'' - Kavkazcenter.com." 
KAVKAZ CENTER, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2008/10/04/10249.shtml (accessed October 
14, 2011).  
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 This example again demonstrates how, extremist Muslim ideologues of today are 
simply leveraging on the ideas and more importantly the inspirational words and actions 
of ‗classical‘ extremist Muslim ideologues. To contemporary ideologues such as Awlaki, 
it is not simply about the need to emulate the ideologies of the past but to keep alive the 
persona and character of these classical ideologues by living out their roles and ideas in 
today‘s context.  
 
 In summary, the contextual reproduction of classical extremist thought by 
contemporary extremist Muslim ideologues creates the same if not more persuasive 
appeal as it leverages on established rational arguments inherent in these old ideas. 
Narratives that contain either classical and contempory extremist Muslim arguments 
base their rationality on effective concepts. These include established critique and 
problems inherent in contemporary political ideologies, the highly appealing idea of 
liberation or divinely sanctioned struggle for freedom, the idea of the oppressive ‗enemy‘ 
that someone being persecuted can identify with, the empowerment that comes with 
activism and finally the instrumental and strategic logic behind old ideological concepts 
such as Takfeer and the ideas espoused in ―Hukm al-Tattarus.‖  
 
   
The rise and instrumental appeal behind contemporary political Islam 
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An ideology cannot work in a vacuum. The historical conditions that led to the 
rise of contemporary political Islam also need to be taken into cognizance when 
examining the instrumental rationality behind its appeal.   
 
 The political and social history behind the rise of contemporary political Islam 
owes its success to the following factors. Firstly, the failure of old political regimes and 
systems followed by the prevalence of social ills and abject conditions of inquality that 
saw no hope for improvement. Secondly, the unifying force of political Islam against 
oppressive regimes that gave birth to the idea that the individual is not alone in his or her 
suffering. Finally this rising counter-culture also had utilitarian benefits that came in the 
form of Wahhabi sponsorship that created the gateway and impetus to more extreme 




Besides the influence of political and social circumstances we also need to 
understand the nature of the fundamentalist thinking behind political Islam. There are 
three areas in Armstrong‘s analysis of the history of fundamentalism that need 
mentioning. Firstly it is how fundamentalism and its attributes can sometimes pave the 
way for extremism. Secondly, as Armstrong explains it, how the all pervasive mystical 
element in fundamentalist ideologies - the mythos (legend or spirituality) transforms into 
logos (logical reasoning or sayings). Finally, by  looking at Sunni thinkers like Mawdudi 
and Qutb, and especially at the Iranian revolution, how charismatic or prominent 
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thinkers have shaped the form of Muslim and the role played by educated, middle class 
Muslims.  
 
Armstrong when addressing fundamentalism in general states that it is trying to 
create a counterculture to whatever is the accepted mainstream. She saw the 60‘s and 
70‘s as an onslaught by secularism against religious movements. Fundamentalist 
religious movements thus had someone to blame for their ruin and saw themselves as the 
savior for any form of revival. Armstrong mentions how the appeal of fundamentalism is 
that its ideology is simple enough for the masses. Fundamentalism arose as essentially a 
counter revolutionary reaction to the paranoia and somewhat legitimate fear that all 
secularists or liberals want to destroy them. Armstrong mentions how this constant fear 
needs to be stoked every now and then. Fundamentalists feel the need to re-shape their 
religious ideologies to inspire people to rise up. Fundamentalism is thus not just 
revolutionary but also activist.
50
   
 
In the Islamic system of governance, no one person or state is deemed all 
powerful.
51
 We can see why this egalitarian ethos appeals to those in authoritarian 
regimes like during the Nasser era, which was Muslim in name but secular in practice 
and to those in countries with dictatorships which look to enhancing only the privileged 
sections of the populace.  
 
In many ways these Muslims who have endured notions of inferiority against the 
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West for sometime were now presented with just the opposite; where their identity as 
Muslims was supreme and central. Supremacy was in fact a necessary component to 
achieve this revolution. Qutb in fact said that there can only be toleration after the 




In the book, the Islamist, Ed Hussain, remarked upon a speaker who had quoted 
Mawdudi on the objectives of Islam which, 
 
Cannot be realized so long as power and leadership in 
society are in the hands of disbelieving rulers and so long 
as the followers of Islam confine themselves to worship 
rites, which all too often depend on the arbitrary patronage 
and support of those very rulers. Only when power in 
society is in the hands of the believers and the righteous, 
can the objectives of Islam be realized. It is therefore the 
primary duty of all those who aspire to please God to 
launch an organized struggle, sparing neither life nor 
property for this purpose. The importance of securing 
power for the righteous is so fundamental that, neglecting 
this struggle, one has no means left to please God…  
 
…Islam is a revolutionary doctrine and system that 
overthrows governments. It seeks to overturn the whole 
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universal social order. – Abul Ala Mawdudi, Islamist 




There are three tenets that these quotes allude to. One is the primacy and 
superiority of Islamic rule. Secondly any change would require a revolutionary struggle 
against the dominant elite. Finally, it is not just the liberty of Muslims at stake but their 
spiritual salvation in the hereafter as well as this very much depends on pleasing God in 
this world. This in many ways is what Armstrong is making reference to when mythos 
(legend or spirituality) translates into logos (logical reasoning or sayings).  
 
Qutb according to Armstrong saw history; mythically and the ideals of the 
Muhammadean era as a spiritual Eden which is lacking in the modern secular world with 
its worldly focus. To Qutb, reason and science should not be the sole guide. He saw the 
Prophet Mohammed‘s life not just historically but as a symbolic ideal. In converting this 
mythos into a logos for action, his approach became more extremist. For example he 
supported the idea of mafasalah or disassociation with unbelievers to ensure that 
corruption of the ummah is kept to a minimum, but courtesies and minimal cooperation 
with them are maintained except in crucial area such as in education.
54
   
 
Such concepts in Islam when taken out of context provide grounds for extremist 
ideals. But the point here is the importance of the spiritual (mythos) element in Qutb‘s 
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approach and how he had after interpreting Islam according to his social reality, 
converted it into a logos for action. The question that needs to be asked at this stage is 
whether this mystical element, if present in extremist ideologies and to some extent 
fundamentalist Islam, is another source of attraction with individuals who are jaded with 
worldly logic.   
 
In the case of the Iranian revolution, as with Qutb, mysticism and politics was 
inseparable. Ayatollah Khomeini had stressed that there can be no social reformation 
without spiritual reformation. Dr Shariati and Khomeini all believed that a political 
solution could not succeed without religious renewal in Iran. A lot of this mythos was 
employed by Dr Shariarti. He described how Iranians should look beyond the world into 
the spiritual to discover their secret essence (zat) and how likewise they should be on the 
lookout for the ‗hidden imam‘ call for jihad against tyranny.55 How this ‗mythos‘ to 
‗logos‘ transformation would actually work in practice was an entirely different matter.  
 
Another feature of fundamentalism that Armstrong identified is the paranoia that 
accompanies fundamentalism and the need to demonise the ‗other‘ similar to how the 
‗other‘ had done onto them. There is a deep need to make the bogeyman bigger, e.g. the 
idea of a Jewish or Government conspiracy, etc. Armstrong remarked how 
fundamentalist Jewish Kookist‘s symbolic interpreted the initial defeat Israel endured in 
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the Yom Kippur war, as a punishment from God for not expanding true Judaism. 
56
 This 
is similar to how Arabs viewed their defeat to Israel. Nationalism had failed to deliver its 
promises in the initial Arab-Israeli wars. In contrast in 1973 when a religious angle to the 
conflict was played upon, the subsequent initial successes served to highlight and 
provide grounds on how the Islamic ideology as defined subsequently by Qutb‘s Islamist 
philosophy proved to be a superior and more effective option.
57
  This form of attribution 
of national defeat to a lack of spirituality reflects the ―deep fear of annihilation that lies 
at the heart of so many fundamentalist movements.‖ 58  Likewise protestant 
fundamentalism oversimplified the aims of liberalism in a need to demonize the other. 
Protestant fundamentalism also similarly saw secular humanism as the enemy out to 
annihilate them.
59
 Thus the attraction to fundamentalism is largely due to the fears that it 
plays up to.  
 
When instilled notions of supremacy are combined with fear of the ‗other‘ and 
coupled with the assurance given by the mystical, all that is missing for fundamentalism 
to be mobilized is a logical framework for action. Fundamentalist thinking in extremist 
Muslims entails all these components. All of which they try to validate rationally by 
corroborating it with political and social realities where fundamentalist fears seem very 
real.    
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The political instrumentality underlying the forgotten episodes / anomalies of Islamist 
activism against the state in Singapore  
The majority of Singaporeans know little about intermitted episodes of tension 
and conflict between the periods after racial riots to the JI episode, which in many ways 
also set the context for the JI episode. These little known incidents have largely been 
erased from the social memory and collective consciousness of the nation. An 
examination of these incidents will show the congruence or divergence to mainstream 
views regarding the aetiology of such extremism. More importantly it will help shed light 
on who are the real carriers of the extremist Muslim ethic in Singapore.  It will also set 
the context for differentiating between being Muslim and being Malay and whether these 
carriers of the ethic see themselves and their struggle as a Malay or Muslim issue.  The 
historical analysis of these episodes will seek to elicit the aetiology behind Muslim 
extremism experiences in Singapore on the basis of disadvantages arising out of conflicts 
with modernity and competition over social control and power. More importantly in this 
section of the chapter, we will see the inherent instrumental rationality behind political 
Islam‘s aim, carriers and ideological appeal in SEA (South East Asia). 
Communism in some ways offers us a good reference point to understand the 
development of Muslim extremism in Singapore. Communism‘s involvement with 
Islamic political activism manifested itself with the arrests of the editor and assistant 
editor of the Berita Harian, (BH - the Singaporean Malay newspaper.) Hussein Jahidin 
and Azmi Mahmud in June 1976. The mastermind since 1972 was apparently Abdul 
Samad Ismail, the managing editor of the New Straits Times group in Kuala Lumpur, 
37 
 
who was around this time arrested by the Special Branch in Kuala Lumpur.  Samad was 
also the sub-editor of the Malay nationalistic newspaper, Utusan Melayu. Hussein was 
apparently indoctrinated by Samad who lent him pro-communist propaganda books. 
Also interestingly books that talked about the integration of the countries in the Malay 
Archipelago into one major entity known as ―Malayu Raya.‖60  The stance of their 
articles aimed to create animosity with local religious institutions, like MUIS by playing 





Evidence of communal conflict intermingled with the political instrumentality of 
Islam showed in Jan 1982 when the arrest of ten members of a subversive group 
consisting of disgruntled Indian Muslims and Malays calling themselves the Singapore 
People‘s Liberation Organization (SPLO) or Organisasi Pembebasan Rakyat Singapura 




The four core members of the group included the leader, an Indian Muslim called 
Zaiulabiddin Bin Mohamad Shah, 49, a member of the worker‘s party (WP) who had 
contested unsuccessfully in the 1972, 76 and 80 elections. He was also involved with 
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personalities who had plotted against Malaysia during the Indonesian confrontation. 
Zainulabiddin was convinced that the PAP government
63
 was suppressing Malays and 
Muslims in politics, economics and education. Again the issue was focused on domestic 
grievances against Malays primarily and Muslims secondarily as a cultural group rather 
than as an attack on the religion per se. Indian Muslims constituted a great majority of 
the members of the SPLO rather than Malays. Even though this was the case, the 
emphasis of the grievances was still on the Malay identity which acculturated Indian 
Muslims probably identified with.  
 
The group had planned to distribute inflammatory pamphlets that were meant to 
―arouse the sentiments of Malays and Muslims against the PAP government.‖  These 
pamphlets were meant to be distributed at the National Stadium where 24 000 people 
were attending the Prophet Muhammad‘s Birthday celebrations on Jan 9. Zainulabiddin 
and Hashim were arrested at the Stadium before they could do this.  The pamphlet called 
on Muslims to not fear death in overthrowing the ‗PAP fascists.‘ It also said that the 
Government was using Islam to achieve the political ends of the PAP. It accused the 
Muslim Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) of being a lackey of the government 
and for altering the true course of Muslim thinking. It accused MUIS of mismanaging 
Muslim funds and using it to hold lavish conferences at well known hotels. It also 
accused MUIS of doing little and being submissive in stopping the demolition of 
mosques and by accepting low rates of compensation. It also labelled the Malay PAP 
leaders as being ‗puppets‘ of the government being used to achieve the PAP‘s political 
ends.  
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It accused the Government efforts in trying to promote Mandarin as leading to 
Malays not being able to get jobs. It said the PAP insulted Malays by ―stabbing the 
national language in the back‖ and that the PAP‘s policy was to prevent the Malays and 
their culture from getting a good international image. It added, ―The PAP fascists have 
even prohibited students from knowing that Singapore belongs to the Malays and that 
Singapore was handed over to Stamford Raffles by the Temmengong in 1819….Go to 
Empress Place and look at the statue of British Colonist Stamford Raffles trampling on 
the Sultan‘s agreement. The PAP fascists have left it there as a symbol of insult to the 
Malay sultanate and the Malays…if we are complacent we will end up like the Negros or 
red Indians in America.‖64 Even though the arguments were peppered with religious 
lingo the issues as can be seen were more on race.  
 
Some of the literature found in home of SPLO core member, Abdul Rahim, (who 
was also the Barisan Socialis vice-chairman in Singapore) was a collection of 
communist literature including works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao and Hu Yaobang the 




 connection that was seen in the SPLO example resurfaced as a threat 
onto itself in 24 April 1987 when four persons were arrested for spreading rumors of 
racial clashes and actively making preparations for them on the anniversary of the 13
th
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Their main grievance revolved around the idea of the Malays being oppressed by 
the government and the government control of local mosques by MUIS. The reports in 
the press centered on their Silat associations culminating with environment minster Dr 
Ahmad Mattar warning about the twin dangers of Communism and Communalism.
67
  As 
this incident was happening just around the time of the Marxist conspiracy involving the 
Catholic Church in Singapore
68
, (I.e. Tan Wah Piow, Vincent Cheng) Dr Mattar cited the 
manipulation of Islam by Communists in the example of former CPM (Communist Party 
of Malaya) leader ‗Musa Ahmad.‘ Apparently Musa ―used to head a special committee 
to train selected communist cadres in Islamic philosophy and lifestyle so that they, in 
turn could infiltrate Malay/Muslim bodies.‖69  We can see a parallel here in much of the 
established accounts which cite how ‗moderate Islam‘ is being manipulated by radical 
political Islam. 
         
Review of Islamist Activism and Political Islam‟s influence in Singapore 
 
Political Islam‘s main instrumentality is that it simply moves into the political 
space or vacuum created when other forms of opposition have been repressed or 
eliminated.
70
 As shown earlier, there were even instances when Muslims were taking 
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into the Communist agenda. Quite simply Islamist activism at that time was 
overshadowed by other more populist avenues of political activism – namely Marxism 
which held the political space for counter culture activism in the days of the cold war. 
Yet another gap is in terms of identity and what is loosely termed as pride and dignity. 
Muslims who lament at their downtrodden state are reminded about a heyday when 
Islam ruled and things were better for Muslims. Again this serves as evidence used by 





This notion was demonstrated again when examining the episodes where again 
political Islam and its ideas were seen as a means and platform for resistance against the 
ruling elite. The attractiveness of Islam to the common man is its promises of equality 
between all men and the idea that ultimate authority rested not in a capricious or unjust 
mortal ruler but in the divine and only in the divine. Even in the early days of Islam in 
SEA, it ―gave the ordinary man in the Malay world a sense of worth and nobility denied 
him in pre-Islamic times.‖72 It is thus easy to see the attractiveness of Islam to the 
Malays in its egalitarian ethos. It is therefore also possible that this rationale is also 




 also talk about the conquest of the indigenous 
epistemological space which entailed dismantling an ‗an entire indigenous thought 
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system‘ with that advocated by the colonials. This was done through the systematic use 
of ‗investigative modalities‘. These ‗investigative modalities‘ were namely though the 
colonial bureaucracy, judiciary and education.  This ensured that Islam as a system 
remained inferior and subordinate to the secular colonial system of administration. 
Colonialism thus engendered in many ways the separation of ‗Islam‘ and state which set 
the stage for future conflicts when the role played by the Islamic political economy was 
removed. Using Bourdieu, if we see cultural practice as being embedded in a particular 
social milieu (i.e. habitus),
74
 or using Durkhiem, seeing mental categories of these 
individuals presupposing social organizations,
75
 then the conflicts that came make sense. 
This is because the overarching system that was political Islam was removed and along 
with it the corresponding hegemonic structures supporting Malay rule, namely the 
bureaucracy, judiciary and education. 
 
Herein lays the first gap in the approach taken by literature on these episodes. It 
fails to see the conflict as a battle between political ideologies, akin to that of 
communism fighting against capitalist systems. If seen in this manner, religion is merely 
a force multiplier for propaganda and for their argument to gain credence. A force 
multiplier that because of its identity as a religion rather than a political system is able to 
innocuously infiltrate into the political agenda.
76
 Mohammad Ayoob argues that the form 
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of transnational political Islam is determined by local factors and grievances. This 
emphasizes the point that political Islam is not a homogeneous entity. It modifies itself 
according to the local contexts and grievances.  Another school of thought he says is that 
nationalism defines the Islamist agenda. Again we see how political instrumentality 
reigns.  
 
Ayoob also describes how Islamists have taken the mantle of the voice of Muslim 
grievances. When their nation states may take a pro U.S stance, they ‗have become the 
primary vehicle for the expression of most Muslim‘s genuine grievances both 
domestically and internationally.‘77  The evolution of Islamist activism culminating in JI 
in Singapore is a historical case in point about the primacy of domestic variables in its 
genesis but requiring the transnational for its continued survival, propagation and 
expansion. 
 
The psychological profile of JI members done by ISD
78
 as written in their White 
Paper
79
 explained the JI indoctrination process. This sheds light on the probable 
domestic concerns leveraged on by these extremist groups and the social role they 
played. JI recruitment by their spiritual leader Ibrahim Maidin involved throwing in 
discussions about the plight of Muslims worldwide and connecting it with quotes from 
the Quran and Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet). Many stayed on not because of the 
search for religious knowledge but because of the sense of Muslim fraternity and 
companionship that the group provided. The JI members chosen were made to feel a 
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strong sense of exclusivity, belonging and self esteem. Little is said about what are the 
local grievances they citied. Except that the attacks were supposed to (according to 
Hambali, who was akin to the Head of operations for JI) cause ethnic strife, distrust and 
animosity between ‗Muslim Malaysia‘ and ‗Chinese Singapore‘, thus making Singapore 
a fertile ground for Jihad. But these two words ‗Muslim Malaysia‘ and ‗Chinese 





The lesser known episodes involving Muslim political activism and extremism 
highlight the following points. First, before Islamism or political Islam became the 
mainstay of resistance, communism despite its ideology being anti religion was a viable 
alternative. It some of these cases there was a strange fusion between the two as in terms 
of support. For instance the SPLO members reading Marxist literature and turning to 
Vietnam for assistance
81
, the former Singapore Malay newspaper (Berita Harian) editors 
who leveraged on Muslims to incite them towards Communism
82
 and the case example 
of former CPM (Communist Party of Malaya) leader Musa Ahmad who intended to use 
Islam to win Muslim support.
83
 This is very much similar to how Vincent Cheng and 
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Kevin De Souza in the Singapore Marxist conspiracy of 1987 leveraged on religion by 
promoting Marxist literature during Bible study classes.
84
 This alliance between 
Marxism and Islamists was probably because there was a common enemy, the capitalist 
secular state and Islamists ideologies also allude to the Marxist concept of a ‗vanguard‘. 
As in the case of the Iranian revolution, there is evidence to show the existance of 





Secondly, as in the arrests of the BH editors example, Malay nationalism and the 
issues to do with their loss of power and marginalization were more at the forefront than 
the threat to Islam. Long before the JI aim of forming Daulah Islamiah Nasantara 
(Islamic Caliphate in SEA), there was the idea of the ‗Melayu Raja‘, the nationalistic 
precursor to the Islamist version. Thirdly, racial and communal politics were the key 
instigators rather than any intrinsic need to have an Islamic state and to propogate 
Islamist ideals. Wahhabi and Muslim reformist puritan ideas in fact took a backseat in 
the episode involving the extremist Silat groups. A puritan Wahhabi would have balked 
at the syncretic form combining Islam and mysticism as in the Silat ‗magical‘ rituals to 
arm the extremists in the Silat group for racial conflict. Finally the focus of these 
episodes seemed to center on raising and instigating class consciousness. What this study 
postulates is that the carriers of Islamist political activism in Singapore were not always 
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Islamists to begin with. It was more Malay nationalism and communalism that were the 
main drivers of dissent. Political Islam as and when it developed was essentially used as 
the force multiplier.   
 
The Instrumental rationality behind the aim, carriers and appeal of political Islam in 
SEA 
 
The appeal behind Muslim reformist ideas was that in many ways it was 
considered progressive and egalitarian. Take for instance Muhammad Abduh‘s ideas 
about the importance of the intellectual strengthening of the Muslim community which 
the Muhammadiyah association
86
 in Indonesia advocated strongly. Reformists thus place 
little importance on traditional authority, religious (tarekat) or otherwise.
87
 Even in the 
early days of Islam in SEA, it ―gave the ordinary man in the Malay world a sense of 
worth and nobility denied him in pre-Islamic times.‖88 
 
It needs to be clarified that the Kaum Muda (new Muslim reformists in SEA) in 
the early part of the 20
th
 century were primarily against Kaum Tua (traditional Muslim 
religious scholars and elite in SEA) for a variety of different reasons, and not primarily 
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because they were pro-state. Reformist newspapers in the 1920‘s such as the Singapore 
Based Al-Imam advocated ijtihad (informed independent investigation) as compared to 
what they considered the Kaum Tua‘s taklid buta. (Blind acceptance of intermediate 
authority.) Roff, states that Al-Imam‘s attack was not on the British but rather on the 
Malay people themselves.
89
 Attacks were also on the ―orang-orang besar‖ (Malay noble 
class) who were seen as being ‗bribed‘ by the colonial powers. They were also vilified 
for their misdeeds and negative attitudes towards their own people.
90
 Simply put they 
believed that the backwardness of Malay society was because of the abuse of power by 
its own ruling class and the existing institutions that support it. Looking at these 
statements we can see how Muslim activist contentions have not changed much over 
time.  
 
A very clear distinction needs to be made at this stage as to what constitutes as 
social reform as contrasted with political reform. Eliraz mentions how the Malay – 
Indonesian Islamic modernist movements took ideas such as that of early reformist 
Muhammad Abduh which were mainly on religious and social reform to a politicized 
version that challenged traditional authorities. He states that it ‗transcended the Islamic 
Religious Sphere, to include educational, social and political aspects.‘91 This can be 
seen in how the weakness and threats being posed to the Islamic community were 
framed, namely due to a decline and corruption of Islamic values and mode of conduct. 
Therefore social / religious reform was needed. But this could not be achieved until there 
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was political reform.  
 
It is easy to see how Islamic reformists by opposing the traditional Ulema were in 
fact opposing the establishment's local proxy. This has historical roots as to how the 
traditional Ulemas were given positions of power and economic privileges assigned to 
that of an elite class by the Sultans who used them to legitimate their authority through 
theological support.
92
 This arises from the fact that the Ulema were traditionally seen in 
Malay Muslim society as the ‗protectors of the word of God.‘93 The traditional Ulema in 
Malaysia also espoused the ideas by Islamic scholar Al-Ghazali who saw the Sultan as 
‗God‘s Shadow on Earth‘ 94 and chastised any resistance to this authority even if the 
monarch was evil and oppressive. Reform should instead be within their hearts and this 
is only possible when there is no violence and disharmony in the outside world, even if 




Thus in Malaya when Islam was introduced, it is possible that its early form only 
entrenched the idea of kerajaan. (Malay Political system which centers on Kingship and 
pre-Islamic ideas of divine kingship) 
96
 It is also possible that this would seem to the 
reformists and extremists of later years to be replicated with the contemporary state 
sanctioned Ulemas of today. They may be viewed by today‘s Muslim extremists in SEA 
as lackeys who believe it was wrong to oppose the state and who might even be alluding 
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to the old idea of kerajaan, but this time with the secular modern state instead.  
 
While essentially reformist, there were radical elements within the Kaum Muda 
that opposed the state for political reasons. Take for instance the Muslim reformist 
magazine Al-Imam (1906-1908). Its main aim was to critique the un-Islamic practices 
and outdated teaching methods prevalent with the conservative ulema (scholars). In 
particular it highlighted the un-Islamic practices, corrupt lifestyles and values of the 
ruling elite. Its religious focus transcended to covering political, economic and social 




Al-Imam‘s main focus although in religious matters and religious reawakening 
easily flowed into the political sphere as the main tenant of reformists was that Islam 
governed all matters including politics and that it was the cure for all ills of the 
community.
98
 Hamzah quotes William R. Roff in saying that Al-Imam cited the root 
cause of Malay decline to non-compliance and ignorance with regards to the following 
of Islamic laws and doctrine. They saw compliance with the tenants of Islam as the only 
means of competing with those who rule.
99
  But since the reformist agenda did not 
distinguish the religious space from the political, the tenets on its political programs 
were quite direct. Al-Imam clearly says that its political programme is ―to introduce and 
advocate Islamic political philosophy.....to help achieve independence for every Muslim 
Umma (Nation) from both colonial powers and Satanic forces acting behind the curtain 
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in every secular state‖ 100 
 
In pre-Islamic times, kerajaan entailed looking at rulers as something almost 
divine that cannot be opposed. This is almost in the same vein as the Gazalian idea of not 
opposing rulers lest it causes social strife. Thus is it plausible to infer parallels in how 
traditional Ulema (pre-Islamic, Early Islamic, Modern Era) have viewed the ‗ruler‘ and 
in contemporary times, the state. The bottom line of the traditional ulema across the 
various eras is the need to conform. It is again not impossible that the same social and 
political grievances of the past as described have manifested themselves to a 
contemporary Singaporean Muslim counter-culture. In this case, MUIS is seen akin to 
the traditional Ulema who similarly support their ‗ruler‘ which today is represented by 
the state. The traditional ulema are seen as lackeys of the state and the idea of lackey 
rulers continues to this day in Muslim extremist narratives in SEA.  
 
Another replicated grevience is that of ethnic marginalization and lack of 
political representation. There is evidence to show that these same social and political 
grievances of the past have manifested themselves to a contemporary Singaporean 
Muslim counter-culture. Take for example the UK based Islamic Human Rights 
Commission‘s article in the website entitled, ―Singapore, ethnic chauvinism and Malay-
Muslim population.‖ 101 In the article it was quoted,  
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―Detractors of the PAP government within Singapore‘s Malay-Muslim community 
accuse it of Islamophobia and disrespecting minority cultures. This criticism is part of 
the wider concern held by Singapore‘s substantial minority groups as to ethnic Chinese 
hegemony over public and private institutions….‖ 
 
The article then goes onto cite examples of the ruling party PAP‘s prohibition on 
ethinic and religious discussion, how senior political leaders reveal their Islamaphobia, 
discrimination in the education system over the headscarf issue and other incidents of 
Islamaphobia and ethnic chauvinism in Singapore. It concluded by saying  
 
…IHRC calls for a more inclusive Singapore, in which 
diversity and opportunity of equality is afforded to all of 
citizens, irrespective of ethnicity and religion. IHRC further 
calls upon the current Singaporean government to 
acknowledge the existence of institutionalised racism 
within its own structures and throughout wider Singaporean 
society. This has to be accompanied by an end to 
Sinocentric policies and programmes, and parity in the 
allocation of state resources towards the Malay-Muslim and 
Indian populations. 
    
This shows how grievances relating to ethnic marginalization amongst 
52 
 
Singaporean Muslims in this case are still part of the active discourse by some segments 
of this population. Old greviences get reproduced whenever new social and political 
economic policies and narratives create this impression through rationally constructed 
arguments which they corroborate through actual issues and incidents. These are the 
very impressions that extremist Muslims easily leverage upon, especially when such 
rationally constructed components of the argument are not addressed directly.   
 
In summary we see an instrumental rationality behind extremist Muslims in 
Singapore and SEA choosing to adopt political Islam as the vehicle for social and 
political change. The first aspect of this instrumental rationality rests with the notion that 
is it seen as a political system that puts Muslims first and advocates the reclaiming of 
lost hegemony and supremacy. Secondly, political Islam has the capacity to create 
natural resonance with the Muslim masses on the basis of religious identity and because 
of this gains legitimacy.  Finally it was seen as the only viable form of resistance that 
directly confronted those Muslims seen as lackeys to the state, theoretically promised an 
egalitarian future without privileged classes and challenged a social and political system 
that they felt ultimately reproduced their marginalized position.      
 
With this historical context behind political Islam in mind, we can now delve in 
the dominant contemporary theories in social sciences that have attemped to explain 
recruitment into extremist Muslim movements.  
 




The historical development of extremist Muslim ideologies highlights how they 
can also be seen as a form of political radicalism.  Political radicalism has been de-
scribed to refer to the ideological mindset that seeks sweeping restructuring of political, 
social systems and established norms. As such it can represent legitimate political 
thought as evidenced by its historical association with left or right wing political groups 
and even non-violent reformist groups.
102
 But the processes involved in political radica-
lisation can also lead to social polarisation, pose a threat to the democratic legal order 
and sometimes advocates the use of violence.
103
 This can equally apply to either reli-
gious or secular radical political groups as they share the same absolutist model.
104
 Radi-
calization in this sense is characterized by an idea of resistance to the established struc-
ture. This requires taking on an absolutist confrontational worldview that percolates 
down to advocating extreme measures. Radical political activist groups and militant 
groups therefore share this foundational mindset. With this in mind, this section will be 
analysing major theoretical approaches that explain recruitment into social movements 
(militant or otherwise) that share this foundational mindset towards extremism.  
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The current trend in explaining radicalisation allocates it to marginalized individ-
uals looking for a sense of identity and the enormous role played by social / ‗peer‘ pres-
sure. Raghu Rahman in his article quoted Tina Rosenberg, a Pulitzer winning journalist 
who associated combating terrorism to other social ills such as alcoholism and drug 
abuse. Rahman takes an almost medicalisation approach to the problem in that a ‗social 
cure‘ needs to be ‗administered‘ by qualified professionals within society who believe in 
the state ethos of ―country first – caste/religion/self later.‖105    
 
The problem with this dominant approach today is that it almost negates the pres-
ence of any form of rational arguments that point to valid grievances and the lack of re-
course to any viable solution. Most contemporary theories such as those which will be 
highlighted in this section overlook the instrumental rationality of the extremist ap-
proach
106
 and the enormous persuasiveness behind logical / rational components embed-
ded in their arguments.   
 
Furthermore, most explanations cited in the media despite looking at social caus-
es, somehow allude to pathological reasons as an ever present component that might 
vary in degrees. For instance Mohamed Osman Mohamud, the apparently well adjusted 
American teenager who planned to bomb the Christmas tree-lighting ceremony in Port-
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land in November 2010, had apparently felt betrayed by his parents who reported him to 
the authorities when he had increasingly extreme views. The news article also quoted 
Professor of Sociology, Cawo Abdi who attributed his radicalisation to one of ‗looking 
to fit in‘ and akin to joining gangs after being influenced by the internet. Osman was also 
described as doing well in school and being obedient.
107
 While all this might seem like a 
‗smoking gun‘ that points to psychological influences and social peer pressure, nothing 
was ever revealed about the issues and extremist arguments that found resonance with 
him. The other side of this radicalisation equation remained a mystery while alluding to 
his sociopathlogical and psychopathological aspects which were visibly announced in 
the news.  
Any discussion on extremism inevitably spirals down to looking at extremist 
profiles.  There are a number of common preconceptions surrounding this. One of these is 
the idea that poverty leads to extremism. Marc Sageman in his study described how 
poverty was not a dominant feature of extremism but more vicarious poverty in which 
terrorists claim to fight for the poor and forgotten.
108
 Sageman in his study described 
three waves of Jihadists. The first waves were the foreign Muslim fighters from Saudi 
Arabia and other countries that came to fight in the Afgan Jihad in the 80's. Many were 
highly educated and they later formed very close bonds that manifested in the terror 
networks of later years. The second wave in the 90's comprised of those from the middle 
class many of whom were college dropouts who were motivated by the plight of Muslims 
in lands where Jihad was called such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines. 
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The first wave of Jihadists was their inspiration. This wave ended after the post 9/11 
invasion of Afghanistan. The third wave of today is the post Iraq war generation.
109
 
 Sageman then critiqued the myth of brainwashing or how someone adopts the 
ideology that the labeller actually rejects. He cited how the Saudi's associated their 
extremists to this category and blamed misguided religious brainwashing when in reality 
there is no credible scientific evidence for this concept.
110
  
         Another myth is that Muslim extremists come from religious backgrounds or are 
very religious from young. He explains how much of the third wave of Jihadists were self 
taught in religion. A vast majority grew up in a secular environment and was not educated 
in Madrasahs. Much of the third wave also did not come from families who were highly 
religious. But an exception were South East Asian Muslim extremists, namely from 
Indonesia and Malaysia, many of whom were religious as young people and were 
recruited from the best of students of the religious boarding schools (Pondok Ngruki and 




       Sageman also examined the case of the 13 year old Laghriss twins from Morocco 
who were arrested in 2003 for plotting to carry out suicide bombings in Rabat. Far from 
being passive victims of poverty, ignorance and brainwashing, they were active 
participants who even manipulated the men around them and envisioned themselves as 
heroines. They loved the attention they were getting and from being seen as serious 
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adults. They also felt a moral outrage watching the plight of Muslims in Palestine. 
Sageman explained how this framing of moral outrage with one's own personal life 




     Sageman also tacked the educational profile of terrorists and what can be cited as 
the ignorance theory by which lack of education contributes to one taking the extremist 
path. He describes how over 62% of those in the sample he analysed attended university 
and were well educated. In fact many came from the technical fields. (Engineers and 
physicians) 
113
 This observation is important as it shows how the propensity for extremist 
thinking can stem from intuitive thinking based on culturally defined first principals. This 
is coupled with isolated deductive thinking that negates other perspectives, variables and 
context and leads to one making direct logical interpretations. Sageman explains how,  
 
" Engineers, like mathematicians try to build from elementary building blocks. They go 
back to the "drawing board" and construct their arguments from the foundations. The 
structure of the argument is similar to the Salafis: "to build an ideal utopia, return to the 
purity of the first community, that of the prophet." For the Salafis, everything that comes 
after is corrupted and polluted by Greek philosophy, and therefore is no longer the word 
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     Sageman also addressed other explanations that ranged from explanations that 
attributed extremism to a lifestyle devoid of responsibility to sexual frustrations. All of 
which had little basis of support.
115
 
 Finally he examined pathological explanations that looked at ASPD (anti-social 
personality disorder). He found that terror groups did not want such members as they 
were not suitable for a culture that requires discipline and a sense of altruism which re-
quires one to sacrifice for the greater good. These are qualities that someone with ASPD 
would not naturally have and interestingly are universal values that are accepted in any 
society. 
116
 Terrorists he observed were not narcissistic but rather altruistic for positive 
reasons such as how their sacrifice will advance their cause. It was a culture that was 
reinforced by the fact that bonds of friendship and kinship strengthen the group and 
create recruitment from those in their social inner circle. This is a bond that is further 





There have been attempts to present an amalgamation of theoretical approaches 
to explain radicalisation. For instance, Staun adopts an approach of methodological indi-
vidualism in which radicalisation of collective entities can only be explained by under-
standing how individual behaviour emerges as a process of socialization.
118
 His frame-
work of aetiologies rests on causes and catalysts. It is a concentric approach that has ex-
                                                 
115
 Ibid., 60-62. 
116
 This concept of universal values is a theme that the findings reveal. See Chapter 6 under the theme of 
―Appealing to Universal Values.‖ 
117





ternal factors (cultural, economic, political) on the outer rim, social processes that relate 
to the individual in the middle rim (social identification, network dynamics and relative 
deprivation) and in the innermost core rests individual factors such as personal expe-




Trigger factors such as trigger events and recruitment influences reside in the in-
ner core but are not causes in themselves but influencing factors for individuals already 
in an advanced phase of radicalisation.
120
There is thus radicalisation prior, during and 
after recruitment. But for recruitment to occur that has to be prior radicalisation and it 
can only accelerate an already initiated process.
121
 Radicalisation is then a complex in-
terconnection between factors at the external, social and individual level.  Extent of the 
influence of these factors, how they relate to each other and how they combine to cause 
radicalisation is specific to the individual‘s circumstances. 122 
 
Geoff Dean in his ‗Multi-Context Model‘ describes three contextual factors that 
describe the process of joining and becoming an extremist. Namely the causal (socio-
cultural and geopolitical influence), commitment (individual motivations which may or 
may not be as a result of causal factors) and capacity (resulting from associations with 
radical groups) contexts.
123
 Dean explains how the initial stimulus is at the ‗macro‘ 
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causal context which relates to the societal level. The stimulus is multi-factored and 
literature on terrorist indoctrination has narrowed it down to four major categories which 
are namely ‗perceived‘ injustices, encultured violence, political / diplomatic failure and a 




This model and Staun‘s framework show that ultimately there cannot be a 
singular reliance on one particular theoretical perspective as it can only cover one stage 
in the entire process of getting involved in activist or extremist groups. It takes a 
numbers of levels to transcend from the time an individual is placed in a situation where 
he becomes susceptible to extremist thought to becoming an actual participant in acts of 
violence. This is exemplified in the transformation of an individual from the role of a 
sympathiser, to distant activist / supporter, to full fledged participant to becoming a 
source of ideological dissemination. The various sociological theories relating to social 
movements might apply at different stages in this process. But as holistic as such 
approaches aim to be, they don‘t adequately explain the appeal of extremist ideas to 
potential recruits as the persuasive strength and existence of rationally constructed 
arguments is not discussed adequately.  
 
The study by Laila et al. also explains how the group structure of an extremist 
group had different roles and members with different character traits such as the entre-
preneur, his protégé, misfits and drifters. Each ‗type‘ of member had joined the group by 
different means and for different reasons. The entrepreneur and the protégé are usually 
religious idealists who have gone though an intellectual process and their main instiga-
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tors are political grievances and the need for social justice. The misfits are the ones with 
personal problems or join because of loyalty to the group members. The drifters are re-
cruited unconsciously by social networks associated with the group. The ―entrepreneur‖ 
is the one who in fact maintains the group by actively choosing his inner circle and is 
also the politically driven idealist. These varying extremist roles demostrate how there 
are different paths to radicalisation unique to individuals and their experiences.
125
   
 
Likewise Ellis and Walsh cite D.Pearlman to describe three extremist personality 
types. The absolutist, narcissistic and intelligent charismatic leader, the anti social 
personality whose deficiencies are accepted and welcome into the group and the simple 
follower with a deep need for acceptance, a sense of absolutism and susceptibility to 
propaganda. The real motivation for joining may be in what joining such groups is able 
to provide for each of them given their differing individual motivations. Be it an avenue 
for advancement, opportunity for glamour and excitement, demonstration of courage 
and fame or the idea of fighting for a romanticised religious cause. But Ellis and Walsh 
admit that members of some groups defy all these intrinsic traits.
126
 This might entail a 
whole set of other personal reasons specific to the individual. Thus overarching factors 
applicable at various stages in the radicalisation process eventually spread into a myriad 
number of individual contextualisations and motivations.   
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What exactly this process of radicalisation entails is described in Nielsen‘s report 
which lists out the stages leading onto terrorism based on the amalgamation of different 
author‘s views. This encompasses seeing all problems as injustices, moral justifications 
for violence, dehumanising and blaming victims of terror, displacing responsibility by 
citing divine sanctions or citing the more grievous harm that the state or the ‗enemy‘ did 
instead.
127
 Any of these can happen prior to recruitment. Moral disengagement explains 
why those with no pathological or criminal traits can contemplate such violence. 
This requires a process of transformation that removes feelings of guilt and moral 
dilemmas over the act which dehumanises the victim according to their indoctrination 
and belief in the justness of their cause. Thus allowing them to take on innocent victims 
as collateral damage. This involves a process of cognitive dissonance that allows 
attitudes to change instead of behaviour.
128
 Cognitive dissonance is the discomfort 
of knowing that something is morally wrong but results in rewarding behaviour. It is the 





While this may relate more to terrorism, it would stand to reason that radicalisa-
tion which is the mental adaptation that is needed for terrorism would require similar 
attitudinal changes. It is thus possible that the move to action would possibly be de-
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pended on the duration and intensity by which these attitudes become entrenched, oppor-
tunities made available and ability of the individual. This leads to the Resource Mobili-
zation Theory which looks at how social movements actively create support and enlarge 
their network by rationally and opportunistically exploiting opening or closures in politi-




But critics have cited how it is more than this and successful mobilization and 
movement maintenance is dependant upon the extent to which movements are able to 
articulate their cause in terms their targeted population can identify with. This is namely 
referring to the interpretation of grievances. Resource mobilization theory‘s concentra-
tion on social networks for recruitment requires interpersonal processes which would be 





Thus the framing process is individualistic and it involves how the issue is com-
municated to the individual as opposed to a group. The issue in itself plays a lesser role. 
The framing process and its individual contextualisation are more important.
132
 The dan-
ger with this stance is that it marginalizes the important effect some issues have on their 
own. But this intrinsic analysis does not talk about the social forces that create processes 
like moral disengagement. For this, theories relating to social movements, relative depri-
vation, differential association and social control need to be looked at. 
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The social movement theory is essentially looking into why social mobilization 
develops, under what circumstances and its manifestations.
133
 The social movement 
theory also looks into collective behavior as opposed to ideas that seek to identify the 
action of extremists as due to emotional reactions to very provocative stimuli or as a 
failure of societal integration. One theory that stems from this approach is relative 
deprivation (RD), as a result of comparative inequality or expectations not met. A feeling 
of being wronged or seeing injustice in certain situations can also relate to a state of 
RD.
134
 In a social movement, besides material resources other resources such as 
religious ideologies need mobilization to create a movement, support a cause and 




Smelser in his account of six factors that encourage social movement 
development based on the structural-strain theory states that for a social movement to 
propagate you need structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and dissemination 
of a belief / solution, precipitating factors, mobilization and finally breakdown or 
absence of social control. 
136
  To illustrate this, imagine a Muslim society that is 
sympathetic to collective action towards redressing accepted grievances. The strain 
comes from Muslims who experience deprivation in whatever form. Then a solution to 
the problem of Muslims is proposed by the social movement through differential 
association and propagated through the framing process. Social movements ‗frame‘ their 
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cause so as to seek sympathy and identification with whomever they target as their 
audience. (e.g. media and new recruits)
137
 This is followed by precipitating factors where 
the discontent propagated through the framing process receives a catalyst in the form of 
a specific trigger event that gives credence to their claims. This culminates into a final 
stage where the ideas of the movement are mobilised into action, which may involve 
violence. Strict social controls can either contribute or prevent this (albeit temporarily). 
State social control systems and state responses to the conflict can have an overarching 
influence above all the other factors mentioned by mitigating or worsening the situation.  
 
Gurney and Tierney cite that the problem with the (RD) approach is that the 
nature of the relationship between the objective conditions that create this feeling and 
how such perceptions are formed are not covered. The coping mechanism and varied 
responses for such frustrations are also not explored. For instance an individual can 




Furthermore, behaviour may not correspond directly with attitudes arising from 
RD. The idea that everyone in a social movement or group is homogeneous in belief and 
motivation or uniform in their action is another fallacy.  Gurney and Tierney quote how 
recent work on social movement participation has moved away from this notion by 
looking at differential paths to joining such a movement
139
 or significance of 
                                                 
137 Robert D. Benford and David A.  Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment", Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611-639. 
138
 Joan Neff Gurney and Kathlenn J. Tierney, "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical 
Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research", The Sociological Quarterly 23.1 (1982), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106351 (Accessed Mar 17, 2009), 36. 
139
 Orum 1974 in Ibid 37. 
66 
 
interpersonal ties and organizational factors
140
 in getting individuals into such 
movements.
141
 Another point is the direction of causality. Do people with RD gravitate 
to such movements or such movements create perception of RD in individuals to get 
recruitment? Structural inequalities may be present before feelings of RD and such 
perceptions may only be created after the movement propagates its world view. Quite 




Passy and Giugni in their study have examined social networks and individual 
perceptions with a view to explain differential participation in such movements. Intensity 
of participation they say rests on factors like the embeddedness of the social network and 
one‘s perception of participation. The perceived importance of one‘s contribution and 
effectiveness of their participation is an important determinant. Networks on their part 
play the role of structurally creating opportunities to participate while socializing them 
to protest issues and subsequent decisions on their level and type of involvement. They 
cite several studies that summararily factor individual participation on the risks of 
collective action, the behavior towards authorities (i.e. if the individual gives low 
legitimacy to the political authority and conversely gives higher legitimacy to the activist 
group), and personal availability to participate in such activities.
143
 They cite an 
expansion of the rational choice theory that takes into account social and moral 
incentives as there may not be material benefits for engaging in such activities.
144
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They also conversely look at the role of social networks in creating recruitment. 
Increased levels of participation is attributed to strong formal and informal ties, the 
status of the recruiters (how credible, convincing and involved they are) and if these 
social networks have similar cultural or ideological frames
145
 to the movement.
146
  They 
also describe how the group in turn is able to alter perceptions of effectiveness of their 
actions, legitimacy of the authority and even notions of how available the person is. Thus 




Sutherland‘s differential association theory is looking at how deviant behaviour is 
learnt through creating differential conceptions of reality and forming associated 
realities.
148
 Its central tenet rests with learning the behavior through close relations with 
groups. Deviance arises when definitions (worldviews / attitudes) favour rule violation. 
A normative conflict usually leads to this and the individual gravitates to others holding 
such definitions. These definitions are created by the individual by molding them 
according to the person being emulated. Definitions become more entrenched depending 
on the frequency, priority, duration and intensity of association.
149
 Having said this; it 
can be seen how the radicalization process takes time to internalize but speeds up if these 
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factors gather momentum.  
 
These definitions are learnt and relate to Aker‘s social learning theory and the 
idea of positive and negative reinforcement which subsequently entrench the behavior 
according to the social context the individual is placed in.
150
 The flip side of this will be 
social control theories which relate to mechanisms put in place to reduce non-conformity 
and deviance. Besides coercive social controls, the ones that work best are the ones 
society internalizes as being correct.
151
 Herschi‘s social bonding theory talks about the 
emotional aspects of conformity which is dependent on who the significant other is and 
what this person means to the individual. Low commitment to a conforming lifestyle, 
along with non-involvement in conforming activities, beliefs and societal structures that 
function as social controls, leads to deviance (in this case joining extremist groups). 




Differential association might require ‗framing‘ the cause of radical groups for 
transmission. Social control on the other hand might require ‗framing‘ mainstream ideals 
that lead to conformity. Either side has to include the cause of battling injustice into their 
ethos to mobilise individuals.  This ‗injustice frame‖153  is a collection of ideas and 
symbols that illustrate the significance of the problem and what the movement is doing 
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to combat it. Ryan and Gamson explain that facts develop meaning when presented in a 
frame. Individuals carry multiple reference frames in their minds and thus success in 
indoctrination or reframing involves even changing the worldviews of their adversaries. 
A fundamental feature of all these frames according to them is that they contain implicit 
or explicit appeals to moral principles.
154
 Stemming from this, it is possible that issues 
affecting Muslims at a personal level can lead to injustice frames to be subtly self 
formulated by the individual. This may be done by their own interpretation of personal 
experiences and exposure to the media and world events even before contact with 
activist groups or messages. To see where such framing might occur requires looking at 
the process of radicalisation itself. 
 
The NYPD report came up with four phases of radicalisation which exemplify 
the theories mentioned and highlight the approach taken by mainstream scholars and 




a) Pre-Radicalization – This looks at their life situation before adopting what was 
deemed in the report as the ideology of ―Jihadi-Salafi Islam.‖ It could be a situation of 
low social controls and feelings of relative deprivation brought about either structurally 
or through personal experiences. 
 
b) Self - identification – Where these individuals influenced by the overarching ideology 
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of ―Jihadi-Salafi Islam,‖ move away from their old identity and gravitate towards like 
minded individuals. 
156
 The catalyst is usually a crisis or life changing event that shakes 
previously held beliefs and makes the individual open and receptive to new worldviews. 
Such catalysts might be economic, social, political or personal in nature.  
 
c) Indoctrination – The stage where beliefs are intensified and reinforced usually 
though differential association with like minded people.
157
 The charismatic authority 
figure such as a ―spiritual sanctioner‖ usually drives this stage.  
 
d) Jihadization – Planning, preparation and execution of terrorist attacks. A key compo-
nent of this stage is the role of the ―operational leader‖ who controls and keeps the group 
focused while keeping motivation high.  
 
The problem with the report is its sweeping generalizations on Muslims and 
labelling of all activities associated with increase in religiosity, points where Muslims 





Wiktorowicz describes the initial interest in these movements as a result of 
‗cognitive openings‘ which is essentially the self identification stage described in the 
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NYPD report. He recognizes that cognitive openings by themselves are not enough but 
the seeker here reaches out to such movements through social networks and personal 
relationships. This includes both prior and newly constructed ones
159
 which differential 
association theories cover.  
 
Then he questions how these movements and the ideology they espouse gain 
credibility and the impression that the Islam they purport is the authentic version.
160
  
This may have more to do with initial exposure, availability, strong visibility and more 
importantly credibility of alternate discourse. If mainstream religious answers are found 
lacking, this facilitates the ‗seeker‘ to alternatives.161  
 
Lastly he questions the progression to ‗risky activism‘ which extends to militancy 
and violence. He attributes this to socialization. He adds that a divine ideology is 
ultimately self serving as the personal goal of salvation normalizes whatever extremes 
the religious ideology offers. Thus violence as a necessary condition to fulfill divine will 
is perfectly acceptable and internalized through the movement‘s ideology that represents 
divine truth to the individual.
162
 This again relates to the last three stages in the NYPD 
report. 
 
He takes this further by presenting how rationality can apply to such radicalism. 
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The commonly held view he says is that structural strain (e.g. poor economic mobility) 
coupled with arising individual pathologies (e.g. anomie and alienation) causes 
collective action through such ‗irrational‘ behaviour.163 He briefly touches on ideas of 
failed secular modernization programs, the post colonial legacy and the political 




But he later critiques this general stance by quoting Leon Trotsky‘s who said 
―The mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection, if it were, the 
masses would be always in revolt.‖  This supports ideas of social control in which 
societal control measures such as those employed by the state can limit deviance to some 
extent. He cites how economically underdeveloped but authoritarian countries like Syria 




He also asks why some choose activism while others take a more militant path. 
He attributes this to a cost benefit calculation or rationality that formulates in an 
individuals mind. Likewise suicide bombings become rational action when viewed as a 
form of tactic in asymmetrical warfare. Solidarity among the group motivates 
individuals to view sacrifices as symbols of commitment. The idea of a ‗living martyr‘ 
makes leaving very difficult because of the glorification and acceptance one receives 
while alive.
166
 All this point to rational calculations endemic to the situation one is in. 
Wiktorowicz surmises that rational choice models operate on a principal of self 
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 Be it for salvation, altruism, seeking glory or for a sense of worth and 
purpose.  
 
The recruitment dynamics for suicide volunteers support this idea of self-interest.  
Suicide volunteers are usually in a state of personal crisis and the group fosters the views 
that martyrdom is the solution to their personal crisis.
168
  Suicide terrorist recruitment 
seems to follow the cliché of originating predominantly in areas of economic 
deprivations. But this requires prolonged violent conflict with no foreseeable political 
future coupled with a sympathetic societal culture that sees itself as oppressed and 
weak.
169
 Although, in the West, active recruitment of lonely rootless young men who 
seek group familiarity in areas of congregation
170
 points more to alienation rather than 
outright deprivation as a catalyst.  
  
While ideologies have been predominantly cited as the overarching reason for 
radicalisation, it is important to understand exactly what role they play. The dynamics 
behind the effect of ideologies are very intrinsic. They are sometimes as a result of a 
personal trauma or situation. But in many cases, they turn this initial low state around by 
creating an exaggerated sense of importance in which they might feel they are part of an 
enlightened elite. This results in an elitist espirit de corps. Reverse racism here provides 
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This percolates down to the role played by radical religious ideologies.
172
 The 
seekers here are looking for answers in order to make sense of the world.
173
 Religious 
ideologies give the recruit a place in a system that marginalizes. Larsson cites how all 
religions are theologically supremacist.
174
 The idea that God is on their side affirms 
one‘s place in the group and helps eliminate any doubt the recruit may have. Especially 
if it is a quick fix way to salvation and purifications of their sins for a lifetime of moral 
dilemmas and baggage. Research has shown how suicide terrorists can swing between 
two extremes of indulging in vice to fundamentalist religious behaviour. This has been 
said to give credence to the idea of terrorism being a phenomenon onto itself where 
recruits that gravitate to it have other issues besides just belief in the cause. The cause 




Religious traditions are said to be traditionally absolutist, with a crusade 
mentality and sense of purpose that usually centers on eschatological beliefs in the idea 
of a final battle between the good believers and evil unbelievers. Theological 
justifications of violence furthermore emphasize the insignificance of ordinary life as 
compared to the ultimate purpose. Responsibility is thus removed which make the 
individual more willing to undertake violence that one would not have contemplated 
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 Individually focused ideologies offer something missing from the lives of 
individuals. Be it higher calling or an alternative to secular material life.
177
 Socially 
focused ideologies behind religion offer explanations for individual victimization in 




An extension of how religious ideologies have played a considerable role in 
extremist motivations can be seen in millennial prophetic myths and in the realm of 
revolutionary eschatology. Norman Cohn who examined Christian and Judaic prophecies 




 century, described five elements characterising how 
millenarian sects and movements viewed salvation through a prophecy. The prophecy 
had to be collective such that the rewards are enjoyed by the chosen many. It would be 
terrestrial and thus realized in this world. It will be seen as an event that is imminent. 
The change that will come about will be total and will completely change life in this 
world. Finally, the change will be miraculous and will have therefore have supernatural 
or devine intervention.
179
 Cohn also described the societal conditions that would 
promote revolutionary Millenarianism. Oppression, hardship or some form of cataclysm 
sets the stage. This is compounded when there is an unorganised, atomised population, 
rural or urban who are not just poor but feel they have no recognised place in society. 
This group will also feel they lack material and emotional support from traditional social 
groups which have disintegrated or are not effectively organised. They are thus alienated 
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from traditional social groups or politically marginal. They will have no regular, 
institutionalised methods for voicing their grievances or pressing their claims. At times 
they could be in the in midst of a wider revolution, propelled by a charismatic authority 
figure that sets the idea behind waiting for the propheta. The group led by the authority 
figure will reinforce the importance of mission and they will come to feel that they are 





 Cohn then translates this to contemporary left-wing revolutions and movements 
and how those who subscribe to these ideas can also come from ―certain politically 
marginal elements in technologically advanced societies – chiefly young or unemployed 
workers and a small minority of intellectuals and students.‖181 This is fact correlates 
with what Merton describes when he states that those who spearhead this revolution will 
usually come from a rising class rather than the most depressed strata of the 
population.
182
 The findings chapter in this thesis will later demonstrate how 
revolutionary eschatological myths operate in the context of Muslim extremist 
narratives. Ultimately it will illustrate how the millennial ‗mythos‘ in extremist Muslim 
narratives is translated into a ‗logos‘ that makes sense to the individual and provides 
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Studies on radicalisation have placed considerable weight on religious ideologies 
as prime motivators. For instance Cozzens while recognizing the influence of other 
factors like social processes and other grievances cites that ―ideologies represent the 
fulcrum of their (Salafi Jihadis) campaigns.‖184 He also cites Wiktorowicz to say, ―If 
beliefs do indeed matter, then policy needs to focus on [jihadis‘] ideological and cultural 
structures…‖185 In sum advocating combating radicalisation squarely with combating its 
ideology.  
 
The problem with this approach is that ideologies are only as effective as to the 
extent of the resonance it creates within the individual‘s personal life and experiences. 
This goes beyond the ideologically framed sales pitch into how the ideology is 
interpreted in relation to one‘s life. This is what individual and socially focused 
ideologies do at the grassroots level especially when they are rationally constructed 
arguments that resonate with real issues and circumstances.    
 
Wiktorowicz cites the importance of looking beyond Islam and instead at the ex-
tremist group that operates according to the common dynamics in social movements. 
Citing Mancur Olsen, he describes how certain benefits (selective incentives) accrue to 
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only those who join. These go beyond material incentives to motivations such as a sense 
of belonging, trust, personal relationships and solidarity which become paramount mat-
ters.
186
 This again makes leaving very difficult as it is not just a matter of not believing 
in the ideology anymore but it also means breaking ‗family‘ ties. Atran in his study of 




At this point, the argument may allude to the idea of the activist or extremist as a 
rational actor who given the conditions, chooses a course of action which is rationalised 
to provide more gains.
188
 But this Münch says negates power relationships in which the 
actor has no choice. It also negates the effect of trust formation with the group built on 
feelings of familiarity and on an emotive non-rational basis. Finally it overlooks norms 
established through social ties and more importantly the construction of cultural mean-
ing-relationships.
189
 Furthermore Sciulli cites how subjective preferences have been ne-
gated to the point that any action can be deemed rational.
190
 Similarly, the idea of the 
Muslim activist or extremist acting according to a cost benefit equation and internalizing 
a rationality unique to oneself does not factor the subjectivity of this rationality. Being 
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subjective, it may relate more towards socially created feelings based on emotion, trust 
and the meanings derived through social relationships. But this approach does not factor 
the other possibility that there can be instances where a coherently presented rational ar-
gument or decision outwighes the effect of any subjective aspects brought upon by one‘s 
social conditions.  
For instance, Hafez in his study of suicide bombings cited how rationalising this 
violent act is done by justifying the victim as tyrants, apostates, heretics and infidels, by 
emphasising the justifiable intention behind the act in terms of sacrifice for a greater good 
and using historical Islamic religious rulings that excuse collateral damage when civilians 
are killed in a night raid and if Muslim civilians are used as human shields.
191
 Tosini in 
particular cited suicide bombers as being driven by an axiological rationality in which 
they are motivated by commitment to altruistic goals, end states and moral values similar 
to what Durkhiem espoused in describing altruistic suicide. In a sense, axiological ratio-
nality is alluding to a specific kind of rationality for an extremist that transcends instru-
mental logic.
192
 In the case of female suicide bombers Mia Bloom described how such 
women are dictated sometimes by a patriarchal morality and conception of motherhood 
which involves self-denial and self-effacement.
193
 
Christine Fair describes how militant groups have a selection bias to get the most 
qualified individuals. This is determined by the ‗recruiter‘ through personal interactions 
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with the potential member to size him up.
194
 Likewise Berman and Laitin in describing 
the ‗club goods‘ model relate how rational choice modelling helps explain in part the 
local popularity of groups like Hamas, Taliban and Hezbollah because they provide 
effective local public goods (e.g. welfare) which the government does not or is unable to 
provide or is providing ineffectively.
195
 But this undermines factors such as social ties, 
personal frame alignments and extremism in countries that offer effective public goods. 
This requires looking at motivations based on other specific incentives and persuasive 
effects.  
 
Societal presence has been described as another factor of attraction.
196
 This 
relates to movements that have the loudest, most visible, accessible and seemingly 
effective voice. Such movements create this impression by appealing to a sense of 
urgency and crisis in the Muslim world.
197
 What is key to all these theories of joining is 
summed in Wiktorowicz‘s explanation on how ―Incentives, networks and frames are all 
part of the more general process of persuasion.‖198  This can differ from movement to 
movement. Thus different movements might offer other localized ‗incentives‘ for 
joining. This supports the idea of ‗bottom up‘ ideological transmission in which the 
individual at the grassroots levels is best placed to bring in individuals who have similar 
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localized frames of reference. It also suggests that the process of indoctrination has 
spatial variations according to localities. Akin to how Ayoob cites the importance of 





Who presents the movement and its ideals and how it is presented is equally as 
important. Wiktorowicz explains that established and trusted social ties are trusted 
pathways of information which the newcomer is more likely to believe.
200
 It is not just 
about who the influential figure is but more about what this person does. Using the 
example of Omar Bakri, Wiktorowicz describes how this charismatic authority figure 
besides being ‗likeable‘, is also willing to interact and debate. 201  Critical discourse 
creates in the mind of the individual that if it can be talked about and debated over, then 
the figure that is more than willing to do this is credible. One might feel that this 
individual‘s view must therefore be true as it can stand up to criticism and scrutiny. 202 
 
Thus it might seem that cult dynamics involving a charismatic leader may 
equally apply to Islamist activists and militant groups. This includes controlling 
perceptions and behavior, denying and altering perceptions of reality to maintain social 
cohesion, using the transformative experience of group membership, close monitoring, 
boundary control to make leaving difficult and finally ensuring members remain 
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The MI5 briefing note on Understanding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 
in the UK which was based on numerous case studies done, explains how even in self 
radicalisation cases, it is the opening of opportunities for virtual social interaction over 
the internet and not just by passive browsing or simply reading ideological literature that 
contributes to recruitment. Any new media appeals more to the emotional content of 
such media rather than the actual content.
204
 This stresses the primacy of conveying 
emotive responses through social interaction while undermining the role of ideology or 
any rational aspects of the narrative.  
 
Percht in his report to the Danish Ministry of Justice agrees with the NYPD 
report that isolated ethnic enclaves create anti integration radicalism. Briefly citing how 
Islamaphophia in the West has caused some of this by steering individuals towards 
acceptance in these enclaves. The important factor that stands out in the report is the 
relative lack of Muslim public debate and discourse in Europe. They relate this to the 
relative silence of the moderate voice.
205
 But alternatively, if there are not enough 
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platforms for all Muslim voices in this discourse, actual grievances may be simply 
relegated to the ramblings of activists.  
 
An important perspective he touched on was the desire for activism. Which 
relates to the need to ‗do something‘ and the search for direct and simple solutions for 
the issues they face or is important to them. In quoting Sageman, he explains how such 
individuals sometimes are ―enthusiastic volunteers, trying to impress their friends with 
their heroism and sacrifice. Suicide bombers…have become the rock stars of young 
Muslim militants.‖  This alludes to the idea that Islamists activists and extremist groups 




The ICSR report by King‘s College London, cites the importance of activists as 
recruitment magnets for seekers and other self starter groups as they provide openings in 
an activity where open recruitment is not possible. The internet naturally plays a 
prominent role in this. Therefore such gateway organizations do not need to exist 
physically but the importance of the grassroot level activist is paramount for recruitment. 
In quoting Sageman, they cite how recruitment is more of a bottom up activity rather 
than top down where Muslims are able actively seek out opportunities for joining rather 
than being manipulated into recruitment. They explain how the process of recruitment 
extends beyond this. Radicalisation is an on going process upon recruitment which 
changes or entrenches the recourse to violence.
207
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In describing the recruitment process, they give importance to four factors in the 
persuasion process, namely identity, social forces (group dynamics), politics and 
religion. In citing Wiktorowicz they explain how the cognitive opening is not always 
political but can also be cultural, economic or purely personal. Such groups essentially 
manipulate such triggers.
208
 An important contributing factor as a result of this is 
‗reverse loathing‘ where the racism one experienced is reversed onto the offending 
group to the point that they become racist or supremacists themselves. This is coupled 
with the creation of empowering identities which allow the individual to reconstruct 
one‘s prior lowly identity and to rebuild their confidence.209 
 
Another factor mentioned in the report is the disconnect between traditional 
practices of immigrant Muslims to Europe and that of second or third generation 
Muslims. The traditional Islam of their parents is perceived by the newer generation to 
be too narrow, rituals based and apolitical. But the Islamic religious identity at the same 
time creates opportunities for opposition to Western culture and politics.
210
 The report 
also cites Farhad Khosrokhavar‘s idea of ‗humiliation by proxy‘ in which Muslims in the 
West identify with the humiliation and suffering of Muslims anywhere else in the world. 
This explains how the local Muslim issues anywhere else can get connected to other 
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local or global issues and used as a tool for recruitment.
211
 Even though this report 
relates to Muslim migrants to Europe, it may be equally applicable to any country where 
Muslims reside as this relates to generational rifts and how political activism is targeted 
at the young by extremists groups.
212
     
 
The study by Laila et al cites the recruitment technique used by Al-Muhajirun. 
This involves approaching religious seekers, starting discussions on Islam with them and 
focusing on the concerns of the recruit so as not to frighten him away. They also always 
encourage them to attend meetings and discussions. Extremist militant groups on the 
other hand have to be careful of who comes in due to concern for security. They usually 
tend to take in trusted members on basis of kinship and established and proven ties. 




In explaining the group dynamics of recruitment, the ICSR report refers to Henry 
Tajfel and John Turner‘s Social Identity theory in which the individual defines himself in 
terms of the group. Thus a threat to the group is a threat to the individual. They cite how 
such groups create openings for individuals seeking welfare or self –esteem. Such 
seekers enjoy having people that will listen and make them feel important. It becomes a 
place where they feel their thoughts have influence and feelings matter. Once this feeling 
of acceptance comes in, it is very hard for them to consider a world without it. The 
perception of danger against the external threat also holds the groups together and leads 
to what Irving Janis referred to as ‗group think‘ where there is fear of not conforming or 
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holding the view of the group.
214
 The social isolation created is a major contributing 




Gerwehr and Daly in their report to RAND regarding Al Qaeda recruitment shed 
light on what exactly is in the frame alignment. As a general guide to the psychographic 
pitch used, if the member is from a privileged class it is put in patriotic or religious 
terms. If the family is a struggling immigrant family, it is framed as a means of self 
advancement. If the family structure is disapproving or traditional, it is framed as a 




Finally, there is a need to look at how analysing an extremist narrative on the basis 
of the logical structure hypothesis relates to the other arguments and approaches 
presented earlier.  The logical structure hypothesis focuses on the sociology of 
communications. While the messaging can be individualistic if seen from the perpective 
of the reader, a comprehensive profile of the individual‘s cultural nuances, social 
networks, upbringing, moral persuasions and broader social-political milieu sets the 
context within which the logical structure hypothesis operates. How much the ethos, 
pathos and logos of an extremist argument is constrained by these social psychological 
parameters is contingent on the persuasive nature of counter narratives as well. These 
socially constructed counter narratives are similar to what Merton described as the 
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‗Conservative myth of society‘217 where an individual accepts disadvantage as normal 
societal fact or due to individual meritocracy. This can extend to social grievances on 
points of outrage or issues of injustice. When any societal coping mechanisms fails, it can 
lead to the ‗renegade‘ as described by Merton to relate and locate the source of one‘s 
frustrations to the dominant social structure. The renegade then renounces prevailing 
values and works towards a more suitable alternate structure that removes these 
discrepancies. The renegade thus puts the dominant values and ideals of mainstream 
society into question and signifies break of unity in the group.
218
 What the logical 
structure hypothesis is suggesting is that rationally constructed narratives leverage on 
these inherent and very real structural conditions by rebelling against mainstream 
explanations aimed at creating acceptance or an acceptable rationale to explain away any 
valid social discrepancies and points of outrage.   
 
Mamdani explains the context behind these points of outrage and how it is 
predicated on a lot of ‗culture talk‘ which overlooks how the cold war actually set the 
stage for these conditions. By ―Culture talk‖ he is referring to Edward Said‘s assertion 
that orientalist thinking sees rationality as residing in the West. The East is seen as 
emotive and religiously doctrinal. This has been reinforced by political projects that need 
to rely on an explanation of Islam as a culturally different, rigid and incompatible 
civilisation. Such ideas as developed by Bernard Lewis and later reinforced by Samuel 
Huntington have given rise to the idea of ‗good‘ Muslims as modern, secular and 
                                                 




Westernised and ‗bad‘ Muslims as doctrinal, anti-modern and virulent. 219 Stemming from 
proliferation of this theoretical premise, Muslim extremist narratives cannot be seen as 
being rationally / logically constructed or argued.  
 
Khaled M. Abou El Fadl challenges this notion by attributing the rise of Muslim 
radicals to the degredation of classical Islamic scholarship and authority. He felt that the 
Islamic Ulema have historically been progressive. Colonialism and post war authoritarian 
rulers brought about its steady decline in quality and influence. Islam he felt when 
hijacked by technocrats who were not really well schooled in Islamic jurisprudence. 
220
 
He states how most of Islamic law is in fact the product of juristic reasoning and 
interpretative activity.
221
 Thus when extremist narratives go into debates about their 
actions based on scripture, it is often on the basis of logical reasoning and interpretation 
of religious scriptures.  
 
Mamdani also cited the difference between reformists and radicals. As such there 
is a need to recognise the gradations in political movements that culminate towards 
changing the state as the final solution to all other issues. Both reformists and radicals 
speak the same language of Islam but advocate different means of getting to where they 
want. 
222
 Early Islamic reformers such as Al-Afgani felt that the key challenge facing 
contemporary Muslims was colonialism. He felt there was a contradiction in how 
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Western ideals that supposedly stood for modernity also entailed colonialism which 
stifled the free reign for human creativity and originality and hence modernisation. 
223
 
Mamdani locates the source of Muslim grievances today as being historically engendered 
by US and Western political projects. This is namely stemming from an imperial search 
for effective ways of undermining the political support of leftist nationalist governments 
or those deemed the ‗enemy‘. The US and the West by this strategy supported 
authoritarian dictatorships or regimes that were repressive. Nationalist movements that 
opposed such regimes via a leftist track were targeted by covert / proxy wars in which the 
West sided with the pro-West but repressive regimes.
224
 Mamdani states that the terror the 
West faces today ―could not have flourished except in a global environment where at 
least one ‗superpower‘ turned a blind eye to its ‗terror.‘ ‖ 225 The idea of each ‗terror‘ 
(state sanctioned or by an extremist group) feeding off each other is similar to what 
Muhammad Hee described to me when he talked about right wing hate groups in Europe 
and extremist Muslim group feeding off each other‘s perceptions, hate and agenda. 226 
Mamdani further asserts that ‗Bad‘ Muslims are not always the ones who dissent against 
state or US policies. There is thus a need to learn the difference between legit terror and 
justified nationalism.
227 But unfortunately extremists leverage on reasoning based on 
legitimate issues, develop rational arguments based on the origins of these issues and 
ultimately point it towards causalities that engender hate and destructive end state 
choices. 
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This can lead one to question why so few Muslims are actually involved in 
extremism if there is logic and rationality in extremist narratives. Logical / rational 
considerations are not always the prime driver for an individual to subscribe to an 
argument. Intuitive thinking and moral persuasions play an equally important or greater 
role and rightfully so. If there is one thing we can learn from humanity‘s experience with 
ethnic genocide, it is how ideologies and arguments can be pitched with such coldly 
convincing rationality that it can move individuals to making morally abhorrent choices. 
It is our morality that guides us towards negotiated, viable and acceptable end-states. This 
combined with credible counter rationality is sometimes the only bulwark against 
extremist arguements.  
 
 Furthermore, for an extremist sympathiser to move onto executing terrorist acts 
requires tactical considerations which are in terms of opportunity cost, time and alternate 
modes that involve less risk to the individual. All of these considerations are typical of 
the rational choice theory. Merton mentions how ‗rebellion‘ as a form of social adaptation 
is constrained by calculation of personal advantage and fear of punishment.
228
 
Furthermore an individual‘s journey to extremism as described by theories that explain 
the radicalisation process emphasise social tipping points. Moving past sympathising to 
violence entails considerable effort. Simply put, it is not easy for one to leave everything 
behind and join a militant group. Extremist narratives have often attested to this. It takes 
a very determined individual to move to this stage and it is something not every 
sympathiser is prepared to do.  
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 In summary, the dominant theories presented can be categorized into four main 
groups. One revolves around the role played by socialization. (E.g social networks, 
counter cultures, societal presence, differential association, social control, social learning, 
social movement theories and social identity). Psychological reasons form the other 
group. (E.g cognitive openings, moral disengagement, cognitive dissonance, humiliation 
by proxy, emotive resonance, and the influential part played by charismatic authority 
figures and activists.)  The other categories of theories allude to some form of rational 
calculations that are utilitarian or the overarching influence of ideologies. (religious 
ideologies, rational choice theory, resource mobilization, social incentives etc) The final 
categorization would be theories that focus on the centrality of the framing aspect of the 
arguement, how this is interepreted by the individual and how it finds resonance. While 
there have been attempts to amalgamate all aspects of this radicalization paradigm 
(Social, economic, political, cultural, psychological, rational etc), it is in the framing 
aspect that the ‗logical structure‘ gets constructed and interpreted in such a manner as to 
bring out the rational / logical characteristics of the narrative. It is this logical framing 











THE METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK EMPLOYED 
 
The main methodology being employed in this study would be content analysis of 
extremist Muslim websites. Content analysis is the most optimal methodology given the 
inaccessible nature of the phenomenon being studied, namely extremist Muslim groups, 
their ideologues and their sympathisers.  
  
We start with delineating the content in extremist ideology and discourses 
according to the themes and argumentation logics
229
 (Rational, poetic, dialectic, rhetoric, 
sophistic) they espouse. These themes and argumentation mechanisms illustrate how the 
narrative is framed situationally to achieve resonance within the targeted social milieu. In 
many ways this is akin to the social constructivist approach which in this case seeks to 
see the social reality that is constructed through the discourse and interactions230 over the 
extremist website forums. This relates to how emotions are conceptualised231 as a result of 
the posted content and facts are constructed232  based on interpretation or reinterpretation 
of the website materials. This can even extend to changing notions of self and identity 
that can come about by reading and internalising the website content in this case.233 All 
these constitute the various social constructivist approaches that the analysis will take 
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based on the nature of the content posted.  
For instance, a Youtube video featuring a lecture by Anwar Awlaki has a 
discussion forum below it where readers post their comments on the content of the video. 
The forum allows readers to interpret the lecture according to their particular socio –
psychological lens. The discourse this forum generates then has the potential to 
reconstruct the ideological message at the grassroots level. This reconstructed form of the 
message is more ‗raw‘ and elemental. This ‗raw‘ form causes a chain reaction of more 
discourse, interpretation and hence further reconstructions. 
 
Rhetorical analysis, ―focuses on how messages234 are delivered and with what 
(intended or actual) effects.‖235  This is precisely what the deconstructing of extremist 
Muslim narratives by themes and the corresponding argumentation logics seeks to do as 
well.  
 
In summary, the methodology is being used to ascertain: 
1) The delineated orientations reflected in extremist messages, i.e. the themes.  
2) Evidence of other dominant theories or perspectives on the approach used in 
extremist messages.  
3) The predominant argumentation logics being employed to create a convincing 
message. 
4) How dominant themes and argumentation logics are being employed and 
framed in an integrated manner to create appeal.  
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5) Evidence to indicate the presence (or lack of) of the ‗logical structure.‘ This is 
the key ‗unknown‘ in this research.  
 
Website sampling framework 
 
 The question being asked at this stage is what is the criterion by which the 
websites to be analysed are selected and what is the sampling frame? Which leads to the 
more fundamental question of what exactly is an extremist Muslim website? 
 
 Literature tells us there are over 50000 extremist Muslim websites236. At this point 
we need to recognise that some of these websites are essentially activist and for obvious 
reasons do not explicitly advocate militancy. Some are more in tune with nationalistic 
struggles and may lead to some questioning if it is a fair comment to label them as 
extremist. A thematic template thus becomes very necessary. This allows the delineation 
of the extremist themes found in messages from such activist sites that do not explicitly 
advocate violence but do so implicitly by their polarized and absolutist stance that 
promotes hatred of the ‗other‘.  Due to the nature of the content and social movements 
they represent, not all are readily accessible as they frequently change sites. But the good 
news is that once a central website that espouses extremist thought is found, the links 
leads to all the other websites. There is a lot of existing research that has used 
methodological tools such as Social Network Analysis to map the virtual universe of 
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Muslim extremist websites. One such web applications is the one done by the Artificial 
Intelligence Lab, Eller College of Management at the University of Arizona. It is web 
portal designed by them which incorporates content management software to analyse the 
universe of, ―All web content generated by international terrorist groups, including web 
sites, forums, chat rooms, blogs, social networking sites, videos, virtual world, etc.‖  As 
for the forums, the AI lab provides access to these forums through the ―Dark Web Forum 
Portal.‖ 237  The next step after identifying and accessing these websites involves 
constructing our sampling frame which utilises two key attributes of extremist content to 
identify them. This is namely the presence of extremist themes and the positive reference 
to extremist ideologues that espouse these themes.  
 




The problematic nature of defining terrorism also creates the same problems when 
it comes to designating which websites are extremist. An analysis of the literature on 
extremist Muslim ideologies presented in the earlier chapter helps us to narrow down the 
under mentioned preliminary thematic categories which can be said to be characteristic of 
extremist Muslim narratives. More themes will be discovered in the course of the 
research. These preliminary themes help to decide if the narrative being examined is 
extremist in nature or just critical. Essentially an extremist Muslim website would show 
any one of the following themes in their content: 
                                                 




1) Essentialist intolerance: This is referring to narratives that reflect a hateful 
intolerance to deviations in thought and practice from what the Muslim extremist 
considers as unadulterated authentic versions of thought, belief and practice. There needs 
to be some clarification here. It is the intolerance aspect stemming from a narrow 
interpretation of Islam that we are looking for to demarcate extremist content.  Very often 
this kind of esentialising also manifests itself in creating an attitude towards violence as 
an inevitable solution. This ties in with eschatological ‗end state‘ logic as well.  
Everything is essentialised towards an ‗end of days‘ or ‗final battle‘ between good and 
evil, where the downtrotten such as themselves are the ones that are saved. Every action 
has to contribute to this and everything else in day to day life pales compared to the 
preparation for the final hour when they will be triumphant against those who oppressed 
them for so long. 
 
2) An attitude towards violence as an inevitable solution. The presence of 
violence and ideologies that glorify militancy are seemingly straightforward demarcators. 
But one that targets an actual creed, religion or culture is all the more extremist as they do 
not just limit the confrontation to nationalistic struggles of any political / national entity, 
but rather xenophobically condemn or demonise the entire religious or cultural identity of 







3) A dualistic (Absolutist) attitude – this is one of the key components of extremist 
attitudes. The actor only sees things as right and wrong and there is no middle ground. 
Good and Bad. Us versus Them. This absolutist attitude demonises the enemy to the 
extent that anything associated with it is also a justifiable target.  
 
4) An attitude of demonizing or transference of blame to the enemy – A key 
point in demonizing the enemy and blame transference is that it empowers the actor. 
When someone‘s life is falling apart, what better way to mobilise oneself that by blaming 
an enemy that they can project their hate and reason for deterioration towards. 
Demonising the ―other‖ in society also creates the condition by which individuals with 
similar attitudes gravitate towards each other, mobilise and create further mutally 
reinforced feelings of empowerment.  
 
5) An injustice frame; - This is where keywords and phrases in the narrative focus 
predominantly on the victimisation resulting from hypocrisy, unjust actions, broken 
promises / treaties, lack of redress for harm or crimes inflicted, etc. In extremist 
narratives as will be shown, there are instances when emotive incitement in the injustice 
frame is also coupled with factual data.  
 
6) The „saviour syndrome‟ – A glorification of the task they are undertaking as a 
crusade of right against wrong, good against evil or in the name of divine vengeance or 
retribution. There is usually reference to some form of charismatic or religious authority 




Even activist social movements that do not explicitly pitch violent solutions can 
expound on any of the above six themes. Such themes if espoused in activist social 
movements may be presented in subtle, low key discourse that is implicitly referred to. 
But the very nature of such themes imbedded in their narratives creates the opportunity 




 Extremist ideologies  
 
Another identifier for extremist Muslim websites is the presence of populist 
radical / extremist Muslim ideologues/ ideologies in their narratives. This is also 
necessary as the six themes mentioned in the earlier section are not all encompassing of 
the kind of themes reflected in extremist Muslim narratives. Therefore, it is necessary to 
pick websites that already glorify and support well known extremist Muslim ideologies / 
idealogues. Such ideological literature has been the well-spring for much of the extremist 
Muslim narratives over the internet today.  
 
The undermention categories of ideological literature help set the parameters by 
which the websites for analysis are selected. Literature on extremist Muslim ideologies 
can effectively be summed into the following five categories: 
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 To illustrate this, here is an example of a HUT activist member who later became a suicide bomber. See, 
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1) The Qutubian genre of Islamist ideologies that have served as the basis of Jihadist 
networks and are now represented in the internet by the ideology of Al-Qaeda
239
. Al-
Qaeda now claims geographical subsets that its proponents cite as ‗branches‘ of this 
terrorist organization.  (e.g Al-Qaeda in the Maghrib, Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula 
etc) 
2) Populist, ‗new-age‘ and educated extremist Muslim ideologues who have a mass 
following over the Internet. Many of these idealogues having lived in the West can 
connect well with an English speaking audience. (Anwar Awlaki, Shiekh Feiz 
Muhammad, Adam Gadahn, Germany‘s Bekkay Harrach, Abu Musab Al-Suri, Abu Yahya 
al-Libi, Abu Bakr Naji 
240
) 
3)  Iranian Revolutionary Shiite ideologies that are espoused by militant 
organisations like Hezbollah.  
4)  Ideologies specific to liberations struggles in Palestine and those espoused by 
Hamas, including those now related to the Iraqi conflict.  
5) The European genres of extremist Muslim ideologies that are more activist in 
nature and usually do not explicitly advocate violence. But there are numerous instances 
where elements of extremist thought and ideologies pepper their discourse. Besides 
focusing on social issues concerning the Muslim minority in Europe, they also connect to 
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 ―Shortly before the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Azzam and bin Laden decided to form a new 
vanguard group—al-Qaeda al-Sulbah (The Solid Base). This concept is commonly attributed to the 
Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb. He envisaged a revolutionary Muslim vanguard that would overturn un-
Islamic regimes in the Middle East and establish Islamic rule.‖ One of the main ideas of the Qutubian 
framework that underlie al-Qaeda is the concept of the revolutionary vanguard to overthrow un-islamic 
regimes. See Rohan Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda's Ideology", Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/al-qaedas-ideology (accessed November 7, 2011).  
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 ‗Four Adaptations of Jihad‘, Control Risks 2010, p 1-7 
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broader Muslim struggles outside their national boundaries. Two in particular are 
representative of this. Those espoused by spinoffs from the now defunct Al-Muhajiroun 
(Omar Bakhri, his followers and counterparts in the UK) and its active manifestations 
after the movement dissolved and that of the Hizb ut Tahrir. In many ways these 
ideologies have been shaped by an activist environment that is somewhat tolerated in 
Europe. This has created the best opportunity to glimpse into the social and cultural 
dynamics behind relatively unrestricted Muslim extremist thought.  
 
 The study of such activist groups that espouse extremist thought but have not 
moved to outright militancy shows the formative indoctrinal dynamics that lead to the 
entrenchment of extremist belief systems and eventual militancy.  
 
6)  South East Asian (SEA) extremist ideologies such as those originating in 
Indonesia. Their origins are related to the Qutubian and Mawdudian genre of Islamist 
ideologies but over time have taken on a form and substance unique to them. SEA 
extremist ideologies while relating to local issues have been shaped very much by 
popular Middle Eastern extremist literature such as that of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
and Abu Musab Al-Suri whose latest works translated into Bahasa Indonesia shape the 
strategic focus of Jihad in Indonesia.
241
  Jihadi Militancy in SEA has also been shaped 
very much by the political, social and economic forces that have influenced the respective 
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  International Crisis Group. "INDONESIAN JIHADISM: SMALL GROUPS, BIG PLANS." Inter-
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7) Ideologies unique to the geographical context in other parts of the world. Such as 
in Chechnya (e.g the Chechen separatist movement) or in the African subcontinent (e.g 
Ash-Shabaab in Sudan). They may have different geographical contexts but common 
grievances that look to the Extremist Muslim repertoire which appeals to the idea of a 
unified Umma (Global Muslim identity).  The enemy may differ across boundaries but 
essentially represents a common  'villainous other' that is out to repress Muslims. 
 
 Finding the Websites 
 
 Chen et al, from the University of Arizona, Artificial Intelligence lab and leading 
researchers in the field of terrorism research such as Marc Sageman, have done extensive 
research on Muslim extremist websites and the empirical methodology used to identify 
and analyze them. By using computer based analytical tools, they have identified and 
categorised web clusters that exist in the universe of extremist Muslim websites on the 
internet242.  
The methodology used by the research project by Chen et. al. involved using 









 and downloading from internet 
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 Using a relevant seed URL and using a ‗crawler‘ to collate web pages linked to this seed URL. 
 
244
 Sourcing out of web pages that have selected extremist web pages as part of their links. 
 
245





 are all collection mechanisms employed by Chen et.al. The 
websites chosen by them represent the clusters grouped according to extremist 
organization and ideology as well. (See Annex B): 
 
Another source of categorisations can be seen in the work of the NEFA 
foundation
248
 that captures the most current narratives from the dominant extremist 
Muslims organizations and ideologues. These are mostly sorted according to 
geographical region and sometimes by organisation. (See Annex C) 
 
This research formed extremist website clusters similar to the ones above and 
using relevance / opportunity sampling has picked websites that are good representations 
of these clusters. Many of these websites are hard to locate as they are frequently shut 
down by the internet service providers and web hosts they tap on. (e.g. Wordsmith) Thus 
they move locations frequently. The only way to identify them is to use the links found in 
the more known, populist and stable extremist sites as a platform to explore the universe 
of extremist Muslim websites. Keyword search based on the most common words that 
appear in the discourse used in extremist Muslim literature is another identification tool 
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 Using relevant keywords. 
 
247
 e.g. www.archive.org offers historical snapshots of an old website that has closed. Given the temporal 
nature of such websites, this is a useful tool for environmental scanning for such sites. 
248
 The Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA Foundation) 
(http://www1.nefafoundation.org/documents.html)  is a nonprofit organization engaged in terrorism re-
search and analysis, see. "FARC international network sophisticated - UPI.com." Latest news, Latest News 
Headlines, news articles, news video, news photos - UPI.com. 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2008/09/23/FARC-international-network-sophisticated/UPI-
18411222207348/ (accessed November 27, 2011). 
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which helps to form a lexicon of Jihadist keywords. Some of the words from this lexicon 
that have proven to be useful in this study as they led to pertinent extremist material are 
as follows: 








The keyword, ‗Mujahid‘ has proven to be of particular importance as many 
extremist websites often refer to their members as this. Labels such as terrorist, extremist, 
Islamist and jihadist are labels Western literature has given them, which they sometimes 
throw back at the West using a positive spin on the label. Furthermore Mujahid (A 
Warrior for God) is a term of honour with religious legitimacy. Hence one of the best 
ways to identify extremist narratives is simply by how they address themselves.  
 
Once the website is identified, the webpage files or text from the website are 
saved and archived on disk. This is because of the temporal nature of most of these 
websites. Within a few days the website might get closed, altered or moved to another 
location. At times, the Internet Archives, ―Wayback Machine‖249 application available on 
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 "Internet Archive: Wayback Machine", Internet Archive: Digital Library of Free Books, Movies, Music 
& Wayback Machine, http://www.archive.org/web/web.php (accessed October 22, 2011).  
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the internet can help to locate these moribund sites.  But there are times when the website 
is also no longer even stored in these archives. In this study, whenever the texts from 
extremist websites and forums are quoted, the footnote will indicate the website address 
of the active site. If the site or text is no longer available, an alternative site will be 
quoted or the date when the text or video narrative was captured together with the name 




A final cross reference would also come from present literature and research that 
has identified the most populist extremist Muslim websites some of which are the official 
websites of popular extremist Muslim movements or ideologues.  These common and 
populist websites are in many the gateway towards more extremist content available on 
the internet. In summary, the sampling frame relies on the three determinants described 
earlier. Namely: 
 
1.  Websites belonging to prominent extremist Muslim organisations.  
2. Using popular keywords in the Jihadi lexicon and using the Dark Web tool for 
searching through extremist Muslim forums.   
3.  Populist extremist Muslim websites already identified by present research and 
sorted according to region or movements.  
 
Based on the above, the websites chosen for analysis are shown in Annex D. The 
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key contemporary ideological works from prominent extremist Muslim ideologues 
sourced out from the websites selected for analysis can be seen in Annex E. These have 
been sorted according to geographical and movement type clusters as shown in Annex F. 
 
„Inspire‟ – the magazine of al-Qaeda 
 
One of the main sources of extremist Muslim narratives for analysis came from 
the ‗Inspire‘ on-line magazine. This is touted to be the ‗official‘ magazine of al-Qaeda in 
the Arab Peninsula. The magazine is said to be the brainchild of American blogger, Samir 
Khan who also produced popular Jihadist blogs on the Internet.
250
 Inspire is chosen as 
one of the main source of narratives for analysis for the simple reason that it allows in 
many ways to capture a highly detailed ‗snapshot‘ / representation of dominant global 
extremist Muslim narratives.  Inspire also has thematic special editions that have articles 
by prominent contemporary extremist Muslim ideologues in response to major attacks 
such as the UPS parcel bomb plot or dedicated to the changes seen in the ‗Arab spring‘ 
which saw the removal of leaders such as Mubaraq in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia. 
 
Inspire is a sophisticated and evolved extension of similar magazines by al-Qaeda 
in the past which had a limited reach because they were mainly in Arabic. Bouchaib Silm 
(2006) a former researcher from ICPVTR (International Centre for Political Violence and 
Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological University) who did extensive research on 
extremist websites describes the general content of such magazines as  Al Qaeda‘s on line 
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magazine ‗Al Battar‘. Its content included: 
1) Articles on their ideology 
2) Book produced  
3) Comments and religious views 
4) Claims made 
5) News 
6) Instructional manuals for carrying out a terrorist operation 
7) Videos 
8) Biography of terrorists and their comments  
9) Forums to post comments and to communicate  
 
Inspire is in many ways the global Generation Y / Z
251
 evolution of previous al-
Qaeda magazines such as al-Battar.  This can be seen in the type of content they carry. 
The major features in this magazine are as follows: 
 
1. ‗Hear the World – a collection of quotes from friend and foe.‘& ‗Inspire 
Reactions‘: This special section is dedicated specifically to present the perspectives of 
mainstream views on terrorism. Quotes from prominent academics (e.g. Phil Rees), news 
personalities and agencies, (CNN, BBC etc) and major political leaders (US President 
Obama etc) are presented and used to support their arguments. 
2. ‗Feedback from readers‘& ‗Inspire Responses‘: This includes views from the 
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‗grassroots‘ of extremist sympathizers. This also includes prominent Western journalists, 
news agencies, think tanks and academics who comment on what Inspire presents. In this 
section, they also write back to letters received from readers.  
3. ‗Newsflash‘ and other creative advertorials promoting Jihad: This is akin to a war 
correspondents report on the latest in Jihadi battles and developments. In between the 
magazine are slick , graphical ‗advertisements‘ that provoke emotive reactions. Such as a 
graphically enhanced photo of a baby being buried after an attack on Muslims with the 
captions, ―Your Child, our Child…‖ or of marching Jihadists with the caption ―from here 
we start and in Aqsa we end…‖. There is also poetry on martyrs, about Jihad, their 
struggle etc.  
4. Account of Jihadi Experiences from prominent terrorists: This includes the 
terrorist giving their personal autobiography, the story of how they started out in Jihad 
and what they experienced while in it.  
5. Ideological essays and articles by prominent and contemporary Extremist Muslim 
ideologues: The works of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al- Zawahiri, Anwar Awlaki, Abu 
Musab al-Suri and many others are featured. The articles are very contemporary and 
directly relate to issues Muslims are experiencing globally.  
6. ‗The Jihad Times‘ & ‗What to expect in Jihad‘:  Experiential ‗war stories‘ from 
the battlegrounds of Jihad. Including practical tips on how to fight in a Jihad, mental 
conditioning for it, etc.  
7. ‗Open source Jihad‘: - This disturbing component gives actual instructions on 





Content Analysis of web forums 
Forum discussions are crucial to this research as they represent the views from the 
grassroots. As such, the aim is to analyse the content from a sociological framework of 
symbolic interactionism.  In this case the actions of the readers and the author of the web 
content are as a result of the meanings they ascribe to the content on the web. This mean-
ing cannot come from static content. It has to be a dynamic process that comes out of so-
cial interaction as well. The reader handles and modifies these meanings through an 
interpretative process when coming to terms with the web content. This research is thus 
investigating into how the web audience generates meaning, creates identity, impressions 
of the ‗other‘ being represented and interprets their social situations and conditions when 
reacting with others with similar mindsets over internet forums. Thus helping to 
understand how the reader of extremist websites actually define their situations and 
correspondingly behave according to these definitions.
252
  
This research will demonstrate how analyzing systems forms an integral part of 
extremist website analysis
253
 as discourse over internet forums sometimes create a 
feedback loop. Website postings can in fact be shaped by the virtual discourse about its 
content. The forum also creates the opportunity to test interpretations and inferences 
                                                 
252 In this case, the meaning of what the ‗enemy‘ is to the individual is constructed by interacting with the 
‗objects‘ (extremist narratives in our case) and with the narratives of other individuals on the internet. This 
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"Society as Symbolic Interaction" in Arnold M. Rose. Human Behavior and Social Process: An 
Interactionist Approach, (Houghton-Mifflin), 1962, 181 -183. 
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 Klaus Krippendorff, Content analysis:  an introduction to its methodology, ( 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage), 2004, xix) 
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made from the websites in this research.  
 
An example of a similar technique but on a simpler scale was used by Dr Peter 
Hopkins, School of Geography, Newcastle University in the research paper that he did on 
―The University Campus, Government Policy and Religious Identities: The Experiences 
of Muslim Students‖. This involved monitoring the comments posted by students on 
websites in order to elicit the unreserved opinions of Muslim students in campus.
254
   
 
When it comes to analyzing the discourse by extremist sympathizers, the Dark 
Web Portal developed by the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the University of 
Arizona was used. This database captured the discussion threads from the most popular 
Muslim web forums. Not all the conversation in these forums are out rightly extremist 
but many extremists many use of these forums to spread their message and express their 
viewpoints. The forums that were chosen in the Dark Web Portal are as follows: 
 
1) Ansar Al-Jihad 
2) Gawaher 
3) Islamic Awakening 
4) Islamic Network 
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5) Islamic Web Community (Myiwc) 
6) Turn to Islam 
7) Ummah.com 
 
These forums were chosen on the basis that they have a more global reach with 
many of the discussions being conducted in English from members from all parts of the 
world. Dark web also has a translation feature for any text that appears in other 
languages.  
 
The sampling frame for selecting texts from the websites and forums 
 
The sampling technique predominantly employed relevance sampling (purposive 
sampling) for the following reasons: 
 
a. It is defined according to the research problem, which is to get past taken for 
granted inferences about the persuasive nature of extremist Muslim ideologies. This 
requires zeroing in on the narratives that would illustrate a multitude of themes. Be it the 
personal account of a Jihadist in battle, the eulogy of a suicide bomber, the ideological 
works of a prominent Jihadist or a heated debate in the forums. The Inspire magazine is 
purposively chosen for this reason as are websites such as Kavkaz center for they are in 
many ways a repository of narratives for their targeted audience.   
 
b. It involves systematically lowering the websites that will be chosen for analysis to 
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form a ―population of relevant texts‖ which will then employ the use of random 
sampling within the clusters chosen after the population of relevant texts has been 




c. The one limitation is that many of these websites are chosen for their English 
content. Fortunately many extremist websites such as Kavkaz offer translations in 
multiple languages including English and prominent extremist narratives are often 
translated into English in order to reach a wider audience.  
 
d. Those narratives which clearly espouse a new theme or demonstration of 
argumentation logic are singled out.  
 
The analytical framework 
 
The delineating of extremist content first involves analyzing issues and narrations 
that summate into a categorical theme, then determining how and why they achieve 
resonance within the individual.  This is done by a deductive process that uses a coding 
agenda that interprets the themes to ascertain the intent of the message. While deducing 
the intent, these themes are also linked to the social context that the authors are relating 
to. The analytical framework for content analysis of the websites starts with defining 
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Earlier on we have categorized three distinct content categories: 
 
1. Ideological literature from prominent contemporary extremist Muslim ideologues.  
2. The discussion forums  
3. Extremist website content: Narratives, commentaries, web posts etc .  
 
Bruce L. Berg also explains that a researcher employing content analysis needs to 
decide if the analysis relates to manifest content (physically countable categories) or 
latent content (interpretative reading of the symbolism underlying the physical data). In 
this research it is the latter we are more interested in and in particular the ‗deep 
structure‘257 behind the message being conveyed in the website.258  
 
Two aspects about the author are revealed in content analysis of websites. One is 
the targeted audience profile. Secondly, the possible intended meaning behind the 
message. In Vivo codes which relate to the literal words used by the authors in the 
narrative, describe more the behavioural processes and how the actors resolve problems. 
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They are vivid and ‗raw‘ terms used in the narrative that reveal much of the local 
interpretative meaning. 
259
  This study intends to use these vivo codes from the narrative 
together with sociological constructs from literature.
260
 These sociological constructs are 
the themes which reflect an extremist mindset that the literature has alluded to. They are 
summarized once again as follows: 
 
a. An essentialist attitude that is intolerant of other deviations.  
b. An attitude that requires violence as the only viable and inevitable solution. 
c. A dualistic attitude that sees issues in absolutes. 
d. Demonising all aspects of the perceived 'enemy.' 
e. An injustice frame. 
f. The saviour syndrome. 
 
As the analysis progressed, new themes were discovered from narratives 
identified using the above sociological constructs and induced from in vivo codes that 
reflect the core of these newly discovered themes. A coding frame for these inductive 
categories (newly discovered themes) was thus formulated.  This open coding 
methodology uses tentative inferences based on what is written or appears. The question 
that will be asked at each point of examination is ―What theme does this text indicate?‖  
 
For e.g. if the text says ―the Zionist crusader alliance will now taste retribution 
from the hands of those who stand-up to injustice.‖ Two possible themes may be 
                                                 
259 Anselm L Strauss, Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Repr. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989, 33-34. 
260 Berg 2004, 271 
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identified in this sentence. One points to the retributive element and the other to the idea 
of a savior. This example is rather simple and furthermore the classical themes mentioned 
already have a coding frame. The trick is when a totally new theme is discovered. To 
ensure that it is indeed a new core theme, there needs to be evidence of it manifestly 
recurring in other websites as well. The findings chapter will later exemplify the nature of 
these newly discovered themes.   
 
Ascertaining the argumentation logics used in the conveyance of these themes 
involves the creation of demarcation codes and identifiers for each logic demonstrated in 
the narratives being examined.  
 




1. Sophistic:  This argumentation technique entails using oratorical skills to deceive. 
This can also include the combination of logical and empirical elements which may be 
individually valid but are used holistically to give an overall misleading argument.   
2. Poetic: The emotive aspect of the narrative is used to persuade. This can include 
the shock value of atrocities and injustices and getting the reader to emphasize with them 
or experience the ‗humiliation by proxy‘ that Farhad Khosrokhavar refers to. Other 
examples of poetic strategies in extremist Muslim narratives include ascribing to the 
sense of ‗altruism‘ for a greater cause as well as supremacist and ‗savior‘ arguments to 
appeal to the ego.  
3. Dialectic: Critiquing of the ‗enemy‘ is predominant in the text. Every criticism 
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directed at the subject is negated and the response is to cite the flaws of the opponent 
instead.  
4. Rhetoric: Almost equal combination of the sophistic, poetic and dialectic logics 
to create a convincing argument. It mainly refers to the art and skill of speech that 
leverages stategically on the credibility of speaker, the appeal of logic and reasons and 
the appeal of emotions. But in extremist Muslim narratives, it can also include arguments 
that latch onto popular arguments that already resonate mass appeal.  
5. Rational: The narrative is logically constructed towards a specific purpose and 
utilizes empirically provable evidence coupled with deductive and inductive reasoning to 
prove the elements of its construction and to build up the argument.  For instance the 
citing of empirically provable historical occurrences and events to corroborate a 
particular viewpoint and come to a logical conclusion.  Put simply, the narrative shows 
evidence of instrumental rationality, epistemic rationality and deductive or inductive 
reasoning. This is the essence of the ‗logical structure‘ theory.  
 
Essentially as these themes are revealed together with the argumentation logics 
used to make them convincing, plausible answers to them might emerge along with 
further questions.  Berg explains how ―these questions should lead you (the researcher) 
to other issues and further questions concerning various conditions, strategies, 
interactions and consequences of the data‖262 Likewise questions emerging from the 
content analysis of websites will form the basis for critiquing current perspectives on 
extremism by Muslims.  
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The research design in summary entails inductive category development followed 
by deductive category application. 
263
 The first step in inductive category development 
requires creating a definition criterion from the research question and theoretical 
literature on the subject for possible categories. The initial thematic categories described 
earlier 
264
 were formulated in this manner. After reviewing more text, the categories are 
supposed to be revised and reduced to main categories. This is how the newly discovered 
thematic categories which will be shown in the findings chapter were derived. Deductive 
category application requires formulating explicit parameters by which a text would fall 
into such a category. 
265
 The end product would be a summative coding table that lists the 
themes discovered. (See Annex G) 
 
To demonstrate the methodology being employed, an example of the content 
analysis result sheet is shown in Annex H. In this example cited, themes and 
argumentation logic are derived from examining a narrative in the Chechen separatist 
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 CRITIQUE OF LOCAL LITERATURE COUNTERING EXTREMIST MUSLIM 
IDEOLOGIES 
  
 This chapter examines the works of Muslims scholars who counter extremist 
Muslim ideologies. They predominatly use an approach that confronts extremist Muslims 
in their interpretation and understanding of Islamic scriptures from the Quran and Hadith. 
A caveat needs to be made at this point. Muslim scholars who counter extremism have a 
very hard task ahead of them, which they have selflessly dedicated their time and effort 
to. There have been reported successes as a result of their tireless efforts. But this 
approach might not work for all extremists. Furthermore, the reasons for abandoning an 
extremist mindset might have more to do with factors outside the realm of religion. It is 
too simplistic to assume that Muslims get radicalised just on the basis of religious 
ideology alone. While this is being recognised in studies on extremism
266
 and even to 
some extent in popular discourse
267
, we need to delve deeper into this aspect. It will also 
demonstrate how a debate on countering extremist interpretations of religious scriptures 
is at some point counterproductive and reaches a state of diminishing marginal returns. In 
this chapter we are not critiquing the validity of interpretations. That belongs to the realm 
of religious scholars. But more importantly, this chapter looks at how the sociology of 
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communications unfolds between counter radical ideology narratives and extremist 
narratives. It will show how quoting religion as the prime driver for getting into and out 
of extremism, entails falling into the trap of implicitly marginalizing the entire universe 
of factors that surround this phenomenon.  It is not what religious scriptures say that 
motivates an individual per se, but rather what those scriptures and the use of religious 
labels offer someone. Identifying this offers the missing lynchpin to enhance counter 
extremism efforts. This should be done in a manner that goes beyond superficial and 
dialectical arguments that result in attrition. A dialectical argument that resorts to 
attacking the views of extremist Muslims instead of addressing them, leaves the door 
open for unanswered critique to fester and become convincing. Let us now take a look at 
some works by Muslim scholars who have written counter radical ideology narratives, 
local literature on Muslim extremism and how Muslim extremists actually critique them.   
 
In 2007, Taman Bacaan Pemuda Pemudi Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay 
Youth Literary Association) published a very comprehensive book that detailed the 
perspectives of professionals ranging from those in the Religious Rehabilitation Group 
(RRG), political leaders and academics on the nature of Muslim extremism as evidenced 
by the Jemmah Islamiah (JI) Incident. That book was called Fighting Terrorism.
268
 With 
‗error‘ on the cover of the book in red bold letters to emphasize how religion has been 
misconstrued and manipulated by Muslim extremists and also how as a result of this, 
Islam as a religion has come to be misunderstood and associated with terrorism.  
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 The perspectives in this book provide an insight into the collective views that 
show how Muslim extremism is seen in mainstream society in Singapore and 
predominatly by academia anywhere in the world. This reveals areas of coverage which 
have not been given enough attention and the implications. More importantly, the 
findings chapter will later demonstrate how contemporary views that are overfocused on 
visible surface attributes take one away from understanding the intrinsic nature of this 
phenomenon. This usually has no singular root cause.  
 
In fact attributing a singular causal foundation can be the very source of 
misunderstandings in our conceptualisation of extremism and subsequently in 
formulating mechanisms to combat it. From the collective narratives in the book, 
Muslim extremists are summarily seen as having the following attributes. They are 
against modern civilisation. They have an idealized return to a ‗golden age‘ vision. The 
Islamic caliphate is the epitomic system, and solution to every problem Muslims are 




Therefore the root cause is seen as resting in extremist Muslim ideologies and the 
distorted idea of Islam that this generates. Grievances by Muslims and incidents of their 
suffering anywhere in the world are concurrently used to exploit the vulnerability of 
those searching for purpose and an understanding of Islam.  
 
For instance Dr Rohan, while giving a highly comprehensive account of the 





development of Jemmah Islamiah in South East Asia and its nexus with Al-Qaeda 
mentions how ―The strong religious overtones in JI‘s ideology therefore eclipses all 
other types of motivation, be it political or socio-economic.‖ 270  
 
Other comments further emphasise and categorise extremism and acts of terror 
by Muslims as result of an ideology that is based on the misconstrued and manipulated 
understanding of Islam. 
 
 …Political Causes might explain the nationalist or 
separatist who resorts to violence. Alienation and anomie 
might explain the anarchist.  A sense of injustice and 
wanting to right capitalist wrongs might explain the 
communist. But the Islamist, and the Islamic Terrorist? 
 
Security Experts are increasingly coming to accept that 
Islamic terrorism cannot be neatly diagnosed as stemming 
from this or that. There are no clear root causes. There are 
factors that give terrorists a pretext for action, such as the 
US-led Invasion of Iraq and the conflict between Israel and 
the Palestinians, but take these away and there will still be 
jihadi terrorists. One stark example: planning for the Sept 
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11 World Trade Centre blasts began in 1993, long before 




There are a number of issues with such perspectives. To begin with, the central 
role of Muslims grievances and the resulting ―injustice frame‖ should not be understated. 
This key ―pretext for action‖ is a near constant in extremist discourse. If there are 
terrorists even after these pretexts are removed only implies that there is insufficient 
understanding about the nature and evolution of their greviences. A prime reason given 
by extremists as to why they chose such a course of action is the lack of viable 
alternatives. But seldom do counter-narratives address their grievances directly or 
adequately other than stating that extremist solutions are bad. There is thus an overfocus 
on the evils of extremism and insufficient or perfunctory focus on the points of grevience 
or in giving rational, credible and viable alternatives acceptable to the individual.  A very 
dangerous vacuum is already being formed. 
 
Secondly as the discourse spirals onto the issue of religion, Islam as a religion is 
put on the defensive. It becomes a situation of moderate Muslims in attempting to 
explain extremism ending up in a dialectical debate of why Islam did not mean this and 
that, it is a religion of peace and its sayings and terms have been taken out of context / 
misinterpreted, and how Jihad is meant to be more than offensive Jihad and emphasis on 
peaceful / defensive Jihad etc. 
272
 This degenerates to the point that it becomes almost an 
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apologist argument that puts the focus on Islam and the fundamentals of the religion. 
This is why it becomes very necessary to understand Muslim extremist discourse away 
from the religious perspective. We apply sociological elements such as Religion etc only 
after this isolated discourse has been deconstructed to its elemental forms for analysis.   
 
The final problem from such perspectives is that Muslim extremism is seen as a 
unique phenomenon. This leads to equally unique approaches based primarily on 
religious monitoring while negating the possibility that Muslim extremism can for 
instance also be explained from a social identity perspective similar to race based 
extremism. When it is lumped as a unique phenomenon, a ‗white supremacist‘, a leftist 
terrorist from the 1960s and a Muslim terrorist are deemed vastly different specimens. 
The problem with this approach is that solutions based on combating absolutist and 
supremacist thinking and critical discourse to recognise grievances and working towards 
concrete solutions plaguing the social group in question lose emphasis. They apparently 
do not apply to Muslim extremists who are deemed to be primarily religiously motivated 
and misguided.   
 
Another example that illustrates the problems inherent in taking a religious counter 
narrative approach is Habib Ali Zain‘s article explaining Jihad 273. He describes how one 
should show love for the ‗Kuffar‘ (Disbelievers and non-Muslims) not for their disbelief 
but because they are a creation of God. Muslims should therefore desire salvation for 
them by their discovery of Islam. While this might be deemed by some to be another 
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pacifist narrative, this is not the case as it does talk about situations where military Jihad 
is necessary. Some Muslim readers might appreciate the less than overly pacifist stance as 
they might feel the author is not overly pandering to the views of the state and non-
Muslims and it therefore maintains a semblance of ‗dignity‘ and pride.  Zain quotes,  
 
―On the other hand, we have those who say, ―WE must love the kuffar, be kind with them 
and esteem them. They are nice people and they have a lot of good in them.‖ People who 
say this have mixed truth with falsehood, just as those who say they want to kill all the 
kuffar, without understanding or differentiation have also mixed truth with falsehood.‖274 
 
The narrative also how mentions that the Prophet Muhammad‘s undertaking of 
Jihad was not for revenge or out of spite but for defence and to fight against oppression 
for the sake of God only. Unfortunately, extremists can very easily slip their argument 




The point here is that the approach taken in this article does not directly address 
the commonly cited verses and corresponding justifications used by Muslim extremists 
even though it offers a balanced view of what is actually intended by such verses. But it 
is observed that the author offers an interpretation based on balancing this with other 
quotes from the Quran. It is not something that will be obvious to someone who reads the 
Quranic verse in isolation. Unfortunately, this methodology of Quranic interpretation is 
also employed by the extremists to explain their interpretations, for example in the case 









  This again shows how such an approach only results in an attrition 
of interpretations. i.e. ―you say...but I say....‖ 277 
 
For instance, in the extremist website called ‗Al-Muhajiroun‘, the extremist narra-
tive kills criticism by simply labelling anything not associated with their idea of Islam as 
Kuffur.
278
 The debate then becomes not about the issue itself but about its legitimacy in 
Islam. The extremist communicative mechanism here directs the argument into a reli-
gious frame suited to their convenience taking the light away from the issue itself. But 
having said this, counter narrratives also have to be careful to not fall into this same trap 
of discussions on religious scriptures based on varying frames of reference instead of on 
the issue itself.  
 
The religious rehabilitation group website also features an article meant to address 
misconceptions on Jihad.
279
 This well written and comprehensive counter narrative ad-
dresses some of the main misconceptions that will be of interest to a reader with little or 
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 ―…Clearly, beyond doubt, all the rulers of Muslim countries are Kafir Murtad. In  
order to purify our 'Aqeedah and Tawheed, we must declare them Kafir or we too  
may fall under the banner of kufr. Here are 6 reasons why the rulers of Muslim  
counties are Kafir Murtad: 
 
1. They do not fulfil the pillars of Tawheed 
2. They ridicule the deen of Allah (subhana wa Ta'ala) 
3. They ally with the disbelievers against Muslims 
4. They adopt the deen of Democracy 
5. They direct some of Allah's names and attributes to themselves 
6. They legislate kufr constitutions (kufr law)‖, quoted in “6 Reasons why all the rulers are Murtad‖, article 
downloaded from www.muhajiroun.com, (Accessed Dec 24, 2010). 
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no knowledge on the conventional Islamic perspectives on Jihad. The narrative focuses 
on purely dialectical arguments by citing the tolerant and positive virtues of Islam but not 
directly addressing the controversial verses cited by extremists and their interpretations of 
it. The problem arises when an individual is ‗searching‘ for what Jihad actually entails. 
Unless one finds exact answers to difficult and controversial questions that arise as a re-
sult of verses that on the surface directly support the views of extremists, they are more 
likely to find the answer given lacking.  
 
 For example, the article mentions that Jihad is only in self defence, ―…against 
oppression of one‘s religion or on the part of those whose homeland has been occupied by 
a foreign and oppressive regime and they have been expelled forcibly from their homes.‖ 
Then later mentioning Quranic verses such as verse 16:128 which says ―For Allah is with 
those who restrain themselves and those who do good.‖ But unfortunately this creates the 
opportunity for extremist Muslims to scoff at such a narrative as they can easily associate 
the occupation by a foreign and oppressive regime to be exactly the situation in Palestine, 
Iraq or Afganistan. They can then bring in a quote from any of the so called ―Sword 
Verses‖ in the Quran that on the surface directly summarises the need to ―Kill the 
unbeliever.‖ 280 
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A commonly quoted idea amoung Muslim extremists is apparently the idea of  Al 
Wala and Wal Bara. Uztaz Hj. Ali Hj. Mohamad wrote an article meant to address what 
this idea actually entails.
281
 This article critiques Al Qahthani‘s ―Al Wara wal Bara fil Is-
lam‖ on the basis that his perspectives are not impartial and is infused along with his per-
sonal views. It is meant to illustrate how perpectives from ‗other‘ Muslim scholars can 
misguide Muslim readers if they have no access to the ‗right‘ Muslim scholars to guide 
them.  
In trying to prove the flaws in Al –Qahtani‘s understanding of al-Wala and Wal-
Bara, the article by Uztaz Hj. Ali says, ―On a number of occasions, Al-Qahtani takes a 
swipe at Muslim scholars such as Syaikh Mustafa al-Maraghi, Syekh Muhammad Abu 
Zahraand Dr Wahbah Az-Zuhaili who advocate peaceful co-existance.‖ 282  Then it 
mentions how the al-Qahtani is not impartial in his views and has ―infused his personal 
views.‖  It then goes onto giving examples of Quranic verses 283 which reflect Islam‘s 
tolerance and mercy towards others and their interpretation of what the concept of al-
wara and wal Bara actually entails. But no example is given of the verses that the 
extremists like to quote. Furthermore the article ends by citing how important it is for 
―The reader of al-Qahtani invariably must have access to knowledgable Islamic scholars 
and experts for reference.‖284  
 
The avenue now exists for extremist Muslims to give a dialectical counter 
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 Quran Surah al-Anbiya, verse 107, al-Baqarah, verse 256, al-Mumtahanah ayat 8-9 and al-Isra‘ verse 70.   
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argument that simply says that counter radical ideology scholars themselves are giving 
their own interpretations and are not impartial in their views either. Futhermore, the 
highly subjective and judgemental statement on choosing the ‗right‘ Muslim scholars can 
be  countered by extremist Muslims questioning what makes counter radical ideology 
scholars decide who is to be deemed a ―knowledgable Islamic scholar and expert‖ and 
what makes them think they know any better. Extremist Muslims then only need to cite 
their own references and scholars.  
 
  For instance, Anwar Awlaki‘s footnote quote in his article called, ―Allah is 
Preparing us for Victory‖, says this with regards to counter radical ideology scholars and 
their pacifist views,  
Al-Walaa means loyalty and love for the sake of Allah. Al-
Baraa means disloyalty and hatred for the sake of Allah. 
The majority of Muslims are extremely ignorant regarding 
this as we hear many of them say that we must be tolerant 
of everyone and loving of everyone; this is absolutely kufr 
to say this since our allegiance is to Allah and we are 
ordered to hate what He hates. Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi (fakkAllahu Asra) wrote an excellent book on this 
entitled, ―Millat Ibraheem‖ 285  and it has been translated 
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 The extremist ideologue here simply resorts to citing other ‗religious scholars‘ who 
use Quranic corroboration as well and dialectically opposes the stance of counter radical 
ideology scholars. The end result is that the approach by the counter radical ideology 
narrative is no more convincing than its extremist counterpart.    
 
Another problem with the argumentation approach used by Uztaz Hj. Ali is that it 
rests mainly on giving alternate interpretations on what the concept of al wala‘ wal Bara‘ 
entials. But the article does not directly address in detail which Quranic verses used by 
extremist Muslims were misquoted and more importantly how. The simplistic explanation 
given is, ―surah al-Maidah verse 55 is by no means intended to lay the seeds of hatred to 
those other than Allah swt, Rasulullah s.a.w and Muslims.‖ Extremist Muslims to earn 
credibility and persuasiveness to their narrative and to dismiss such counter claims then 
only need to give a resonating context based on issues Muslims can identify with.   
 
For instance in the Kilafah.com discussion forum, a reader says,  
 
We should be supporting our "boys", not the soldiers who 
are british, american, danish, german, dutch "boys". Our 
brothers and sisters are the muslims, who are being 
wronged in pakistan, afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Kosova, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Egypt, algeria, morocco etc. Our 
Walaa (loyalty) should be to Islam, not indirectly by trying 
to appease both parties (the muslims and the Kuffar) on an 
129 
 
equal footing, but by showing your support - in words and 





Now the argument is no longer a technical one based on religious interpretations 
but a concept that gains credence based on the potrayed idea it espouses, namely loyalty 
and closing ranks against any oppressor.  
 
There is a need to understand how viral an impression is when it is not countered 
immediately at that moment or is given too superficial / simplistic an answer. At the 
sociological level, mutual reinforcement of such impressions further entrench and 
extrapolate answers which are lacking or do not directly answer arising questions.   When 
attempts are made to do this later in disparate instances and narratives, it is already too 
late as the unanswered and at times more resonating extremist perspective has already 
taken root.  
 
What exactly are the ‗Sword verses‘288 and other verses that have been used by 
the extremists. Some of the often quoted verses in extremist Muslim narratives on the 
internet can be seen in Annex A:  
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One of the most often cited and abused verse by extremists is Surah Al maidah 
5:51-52, from the Quran which says, ―you who believe! Take not the Jews and the 
Christians as Awliya'(friends, protectors, helpers, etc.), they are but Awliya' to one 
another. And if any amongst you takes them as Awliya', then surely he is one of them.‖ 
How is this verse that suggests isolation rationalised by moderate Muslims?  
 
The book by Dr Ismaeel offers an attempt to counter the surface impression of this 
verse. The counter narrative by Dr Ismaeel is a dialectical argument that simply relegates 
extremist misinterpretations to a problem of context and not looking at verses holistically.  
He takes the trouble to explain some of the highly debated verses (e.g: Surah Maidah, 
Quran Verse 5:51-52) 289, but context as we know can be highly interpretative. He himself 
says, ―Therefore, to understand any verse properly we cannot ignore its direct or indirect 
contexts‖.290 Very often, the author quotes from historical precedence which is exactly 
what the extremists do as well. The problem arises when extremists can also use a seem-
ingly equally plausible context to the verses they quote. Muslim extremists do this on the 
websites vigorously by corroboration with other verses, hadith, historical precedence and 
the words of scholars. At the end of the day, for the layman reader, it can become a case 
of attrition, with equally plausible alternatives. One interpretation or another is chosen 
influenced instead on the social psychological makeup of the individual. Take for exam-
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ple how in the HUT (Hizb Ut Tahrir) internet forum extremists interpret this same verse 
based on the references they read. 
One of the posts quotes an article that says the following regarding Surah 
Ma‘idah,  
What is special about Surah Ma'idah is that it is the last re-
vealed surah of the Qur'an . Imam Qurtubee in his tafseer 
reported that Hazrat Umm- Almu'mineen A'eshah said: 
"Surah Ma'idah is the last surah of Quran. For that reason, 
what is described as Halaal in it  is Halaal, and what is de-
scribed as Haraam is Haraam". Which means that the ver-
dicts in it are not superseded by any other Ayah or Hadeeth. 
Hence, if an event in the Seerah seems to contradict the im-
plications of these verses we go by these verses and we as-
sume that this seerah event has been superseded by Surah 
Ma'idah. This is a fundamental rule that should be kept in 
mind while reading the Seerah.
291
 
Here we see how extremists tackle the justification about this verse in relation to 
context and other superseding verses. If laymen to Islam were to read Dr Islamael‘s in-
terpretation, it may not still convince them. This is not because his writings are incorrect, 
but rather they give alternate interpretations and narratives instead of countering the ini-
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tial argument of the extremists directly. By the time this is done, it is too late. His alterna-
tive interpretation of the concept of Wallaa and Barraa likewise has similar qualifications 
behind the verses. 
The same HUT post then quotes this Quranic verse.  
-―When ye proclaim, your call to prayer, they take it but as Mockery and Sport; that is 
because they are a people without   understanding.‖  
  A comment from the forum member that posted the above article excerpt then 
wrote his views in between the lines of the article,  
            (Comment): How much have the americans and eu-
ropeans made fun of our  religious affairs such as: Hijab, 
polygyny, slavery, Jihad,. In the application for US citizen-
ship polygamy is put on the same lines with adultery and 
other "non-ethical" behaviors. When Salman Rush-die 
wrote his obsene satanic verses, he was rewarded with a 
prize, because his book was meant to attack the Prophet 
and his wives. Moreover, he is being protected by the Kuf-
far wherever he goes. 
Here we see not a problem of interpretation or misinterpretation of verses but 
more of how verses are applied to social contexts. In this case the social context of Mus-
lim minorities in the US and how such Quranic verses seem to directly relate to instances 
when they are ridiculed and suffer under perceived double standards. This is something 
133 
 
that will resonate even more with a Muslim who might already be feeling marginalized 
on this basis. 
Dr Ismaeel also rationalised his argument in terms of how the need for objectivity 
is an Islamic principal as well. This entails the use of universal values of justice and 
objectivity with an emphasis on the latter and the importance of dialogue. But again 
extremists tap on the same argumentation parameters as counter radical ideology Muslim 
scholars. In this case, they too resort to the appeal of universal values to support their 
argument.
292
 Let us take a look at another example of this ―Mis-application.‖ This 
Quranic verse was quoted in the website Kalifah.com regarding US atrocities in 
Afghanistan and their hypocritical political claims,―Indeed, the disbelievers are ever to 
you a clear enemy.
293
Then, in the website Islamicweb.com and in 
sayfullaah.blogspot.com, this surah was also quoted to emphasize the hypocrisy of the 
West,  
 
 " And when it is said to them: "Do not make mischief in the earth," they say: "We 
are only peace-makers." Of a surety, they are the mischief-makers, but their [hearts] 
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Muslim extremists in such sites make it very clear that claims by the West to champion 
peace are hypocritical and the West are actually the ‗mischief makers‘ the quran is refer-
ring to.  In anti extremist ideology propaganda, this very part of the Quranic verse which 
talks about ‗those who make mischief on earth‘ is used to refer to the extremists instead. 
296
 This is the end result of varied application of religious scriptures and debates over the 
interpretation and context. Ultimately it all comes down to label throwing over who has 
misunderstood God‘s verses. 
Muhd Haniff Hassan also tackles the issue of misinterpretations in his article.
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He critiques extremist Muslim narratives that claim verse 5, Chapter 9 of the Quran that 
calls for Jihad and the slaying of pagans, actually overrides verses that call for peace. 
298
 
                                                                                                                                                 
their attempts to divide the Muslims, they reply that they want only to achieve peace between the Muslims 
and the People of the Book by their actions. But Allah makes plain to us in the second verse, that they, 
themselves are the cause of the corruption and mischief and that the reason for their willful deception and 
misguidance is their ignorance of the fact that Allah will send down revelation to His Prophet (may Peace 
Be Upon Him), exposing them and revealing their hypocrisy.‖quoted after this verse Surah Al-Baqarah 
2:11-12, cited in ―Kitaab At-Tawheed, Chapter: 37‖,  Islamicweb, 
http://www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/creed/abdulwahab/KT1-chap-37.htm, Accessed Oct 13, 2011.  
 
295 ―the tyrant rulers and the  scholars that recieve salary from them accuse the mujahidin of sowing 
corruption and causing mischief on earth…. This Ayah means that the hypocrites' behavior, and their claim 
that it is for peace, is itself mischief, although in their ignorance, they do not see it to be mischief. refer to 
ibn kathir's tafsir of surah baqara 11-12‖, quoted in ―Mujahidin Cause Mischief on Earth? July 14, 2011 
Thursday‖, http://sayfullaah.blogspot.com/2011/07/mujahidin-cause-mischief-on-earth.html, Accessed Oct 
13, 2011.  
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 He then explains how this is an incorrect view as verses in the Quran need to be read 
in relation to other verses, the context behind the verses and the actual practice of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
300
 His article is structured such that the views of the extremist are 
juxtaposed against an opposing viewpoint that cites verses that call for peace. The 
counter argument offered by Haniff later for the extremist view on the abrogating verse is 
simply that most Muslim scholars do not agree with it and there is no strong evidence to 
prove the abrogation argument. Haniff also suggests by quoting other scholars, how 
conversely other verses in the Quran that are relating to peace may actually abrogate the 
verse 5, Quran chapter 9 instead.
 301
 Verses that promote peace, tolerance and inclusivity 
are highlighted as the response to the extremist argument. But this type of dialectical 
argument still does not directly address how this Quranic verse (Verse 5, Chapter 9) that 
talks about slaying pagans should actually be interpretated. The problem of 
misinterpretation is put down to context and the need to understand the Quran in relation 
to other verses.   
 
This form of response leaves the door open for converse arguments to be used by 
extremists. Namely that looking solely at Quranic verses that focus on peace and 
tolerance is likewise not meant to abrogate all verses on militant forms of Jihad. This also 
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forms the basis of the common charge used by extremists against counter radical ideology 
Muslim scholars as well. Namely, that counter radical ideology Muslim scholars working 
as lackeys for the state, the West and her allies want to change Islam into a pacifist form 
that will be more to the liking of their rulers.  
 
Verse 5:51(Surah Al-Maidah) is also not addressed directly in this article. Muslim 
extremists easily cite incidents of Islamaphopbia to prove that this is what the verse 
means when it says that Muslims can never be accepted by Christians and Jews. This may 
carry more appeal with disgruntled Muslims than any effort or approach to explain this 
verse in context. 
 
Haniff‘s paper says that Quran verse 5:51 according to Muslim extremists tells 
them to, ―restrict from imitating non-Muslim behaviour, dress, hairstyle, beard etc‖302 so 
that Muslim identity is preserved and they are able to distinguish themselves.  This is not 
always the preoccupation of extremists in their narratives. Extremist verses more often 
than not use this verse instead to exemplify the grievances of Muslims and political issues 
which portray the West and their allies as being untrustworthy and actually against 




The argument of ‗context‘ mentioned by Haniff is also used by extremists.  
Context is a highly debatable topic. Haniff mentions how the ambiguous nature of the 
verses allows Muslim scholars to, ―adapt the teaching of the religion in accordance to 
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the changing context‖. 304  This same argument can also be used by extremists to justify 
their context relating to contemporary Muslim grievances instead.  
 
Finally, Haniff knows the argument used by extremists is that since the verse in 
Surah Ma‘idah is revealed later in the order of revelations in the Quran, it should not be 
interpreted using previous verses.
305
 But the retort to this in his paper is that most Muslim 
scholars do not agree with it.
 306
 This again does not answer the extremist Muslim 
criticism directly by merely citing what is deemed as mainstream views. Although Haniff 
correctly talks about how grievances slant scriptural interpretations towards the extremist 
context, he is discounting the fact that grievances can be standalone reasons for Muslim 
extremists as well.     
           
Uztaz Haji Ali in his article mentions how Jihad on the battlefield (Qital) is the 
lesser Jihad. 
307
 But no scriptural corroboration is provided to substantiate this. This is 
something extremists attack at length. But he instead gives historical evidence to cite how 
Qital is a last resort in the tradition of the prophet.
308
 He then talks about conditions 
under which Jihad can be carried out, such as ―to be free from oppression and cruelty.‖309. 
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Naturally once again, this very same reason can again easily be used by extremists.  
 
One of the fundamental points extremists need to establish to get scriptural 
validation of their actions is that there is a ―war on Islam.‖ The ambiguity of what ‗war‘ 
entails works in their favour. Western foreign and domestic policy on Muslims when seen 
as being heavily biased and unjust, naturally adds credence to this argument. To someone 
who is directly experiencing or is aware of such injustices, the idea that there is a ‗war‘ 
against Islam is all too real. For instance, it can be someone who is witness to ‗ethnic 
cleansing‘ in Bosnia or reads about the horrific attitudes about some IDF310 snipers who 
printed T-shirts showing a Palestinian woman with sniper cross hairs over her, crying 
over her dead child with the slogan, ―Should have used Durex...‖ 311 
 
Counter-radical Muslim scholars should therefore also use in their counter 
narratives, religious based guidance directly addressing how Muslims should react to 
such ―points of outrage‖ in a manner that is balanced, rational and not harmful to society. 
While the booklet "Questions and answers on jihad" correctly does this at a general level 
by citing that Muslims should ―offer prayers‖, ―participate in humanitarian relief 
missions organised by trusted and recognised sources‖ and limit themselves to peaceful 
activism, 
312
 it does not address the specifics about their ―point of outrage.‖  
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A second similar booklet entitled, ―Don‘t be extreme in your religion‖ is meant to 
explain the signs that one can ―observe to identify the ideology of extremists and 
terrorists.‖313 Twenty three of these ‗signs‘ are then listed in this booklet. While these 
‗signs‘ may be accurate to an quite an extent, some of these ‗signs‘ of extremist ideology 
also include highlighting the suffering of Muslims and atrocities done on them as well as 
the critiquing of legitimate Muslim scholars. 
314
The problem naturally arises when valid 
critique or emphasis of actual grievances get lumped into this same vilifying category.  
 
The development of an effective counter-narrative needs to encompass 
recognition of ‗points of outrage‘ which are actually valid.  While the natural concern 
might be that we are validating extremists narratives, it allows the opportunity to 
demonstrate that we are capable of taking on ‗hard truths‘ and not afraid of dealing with 
controversial issues. The major point of resonance for extremists is when such ‗points of 
outrage‘ are dealt with superficially or given general answers that extremists easily 
critique as being ‗defeatist‘ or pacifist answers given to please the state. It is this 
arguement that needs to be defeated in order to have a highly effective counter narrative.  
 
This is actually in line with a common argumentative technique that extremists 
use in which they preempt or cite upfront the criticism used against them and then 
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proceed to counter it head on. This form of rational argumentation has the potential to 
significantly weaken the extremist aura of being the ones who represent ‗hard truths‘. For 
instance Awlaki in his lecture on ―Ruling on living in a non-Muslim country‖ says how 
Muslims shy away from controversial topics that they will have to deal with eventually. 
He declares that he will discuss topics that mainstream Muslims would find 
uncomfortable talking about and that for such issues Muslims, "Cannot push them under 




Thus the factor that works against counter radical ideology Muslim scholars is 
that they are portrayed by extremists and their sympathizers as shying away from 
answering ‗hard truths‘ and only advocating interpretations that please the rulers. Take for 
example this quote that appeared in both the Sallafiah Jadeedah and in the 
unjustmedia.com site that stresses on the idea that,  
One of the strangest things to note is that we are living in a 
time when some of the Muslims are embarrassed to quote 
the verses and ahaadeeth on jihad in front of their kaafir 
friends. Their faces turn red because they are too shy to 
mention the rulings on the jizyah, slavery and killing 
prisoners of war. They wish that they could erase these 
verses and ahaadeeth from the Qur‘aan and Sunnah so that 
they would not be criticized by this world with its 
backward principles despite its claims to be civilized. If 
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they cannot erase them then they try to misinterpret them 
and distort their meanings so that they suit the whims and 
desires of their masters. I will not say so that they suit their 
whims and desires, for they are too weak to have their own 
whims and desires, and too ignorant. Rather it is the whims 
and desires of their masters and teachers among the 
missionaries and colonialists, the enemies of Islam.‖  
The result of that is that we hardly hear anything nowadays 
apart from the following phrases: world peace … peaceful 
coexistence … safe borders … a new world order … the 
calamities of war…  
Those who proclaim the verses and ahaadeeth of jihad 
nowadays are subject to a number of accusations. They are 
called terrorists, extremists, enemies of peace and 
bloodthirsty, and are accused of wanting to destroy 




  There is a very important theme highlighted here.  Extremists know exactly about 
                                                 
316
 ―The Ruling on physical Jihad‖, 
http://www.theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/Dec08/The%20Ruling%20on%20Jihad.htm, 
Accessed Oct 13, 2011. 
 
317
 ―The Ruling on physical Jihad‖, http://salafiyyah-jadeedah.tripod.com/Qital/Part_3.htm#physical, 




the ‗discomfort‘ that Muslims will feel when talking about Jihad and how it might make 
them look ‗barbaric‘ to their non-Muslim counterparts. They are also fully aware about 
what can easily be construed as common apologist arguments. Extremists therefore give 
the apologist label to any counter extremist ideology narrative that gives a benign view of 
Islam. A major point of resonance here is the presence of ―uncomfortable issues‖ being 
narrated. Thus the impression the extremists are painting is that they belong to a chosen 
group of people who are not afraid to speak the truth behind issues no matter how 
uncomfortable it might be. They cite that since they do this, they are labeled as terrorists, 
extremists etc. Being well acquainted with the criticisms leveled against them, Muslim 
extremists cite back the label ascribed onto them while addressing criticisms directly. 
When there is no visible / audible counter retort by counter radical Muslim scholars to 
these supposedly ‗hard truths‘ , it has the potential to be taken as a given by the reader. 
 
Extremists also do not shy away from engaging their audience. Uztaz Ali in his 
article ―Understanding Jihad‖ goes into technicalities of interpretation318 and says, ―In 
short, they (extremists) choose to disassociate themselves from any social discourses in 
the community.‖ 319  This is hardly the case when you look at what HUT and other 
extremist Muslim activist groups are doing. They thrive in social discourses and this is 




Counternarratives sometimes attempt to explain complex issues in a simple man-
ner for the masses. This is seen in the MUIS and PERDAUS booklet meant to address 
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what Jihad actually entails. 
321
 This booklet explains the mainstream interpretation that 
Jihad can only be called ―under leadership of an appropriate authority‖, i.e. the leader of 
a country, as armed jihad has ―huge repercussions on the general public.‖ Their starting 
premise is correct and substantiated. Futhermore, it is cited that ―hence, only those in 
power and have received the mandate of the people are in a position to decide‖. 322 But 
extremists can easily counter this by citing instances when the problem is the ‗rulers‘ 
themselves who are lackeys of their enemies.  Hence, if they are being persecuted by 
these very rulers, it is obviously very difficult to get a people‘s ‗mandate‘ under such 
conditions. 
 
Also the article cites, ―Only in a situation where a particular government has 
been removed by the enemy can Muslims be allowed to collectively carry out armed jihad 
to overcome enemies who are occupying their country.‖ 323  Extremist narratives have 
instead cited Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine as classic examples of this when they 
invalidate the invasion army facilitated local government. This demonstrates how our 
counter narratives have failed to address the extensions to such arguments.   
 
Q 18 and 19 in this booklet are balanced and cogent answers to issues of how to 
respond to points of outrage and how violence as a first recourse is ultimately harmful 
and against the tradition of Islam.  The common retort by extremists to this is that 
peaceful means are not viable solutions and the evidence is in the results.  The booklet 
counters such an assertion by saying that ―History has witnessed many examples of 
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authoritarian governments who were successfully replaced without the process of armed 
rebellion.‖ 324  But this needs to be expounded on and exemplified further. Even though 
their answer is very much on the right track in its intent, its very generality leaves a 
gaping hole for critique. For instance the reader is left to somehow associate this quote to 
perhaps refer to Ghandi‘s use of non-violence (Ahimsa)325 against the British. But one can 
easily counter such arguments by citing other instances during this period of Indian 
history in which non-violence resulted only in massacres and that the reason for the 
British to quit India had reasons other that peaceful protests by Indians. 
326
 This shows 
how giving general and placatory answers to complex issues can only result in hard 
questions arising from ‗points of outrage‘ to remain without credible answers. Worse 
still, the very nature of such general answers leaves them open to get totally debunked.  
 
In summary, counter narratives while giving a very precise and in depth 
exposition of the merits of Islam and what Jihad really entails do not address the critical 
and controversial issues extremists often cite. The responses given to extremists are 
classic dialectical arguments which expound on what Jihad is and the benign aspects of 
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Islam. Sometimes counter narratives give simplistic answers to complex and 
controversial issues. While there is critique of common extremist Muslim claims, there is 
little done when extremists retort with counter claims. This creates a situation where their 
counter claims remain largely unaddressed. What would be very effective would be a 
point by point and sustained rebuttal of everything populist extremist ideologues like 
Awlaki cite that goes beyond addressing issues of religious scriptures and their 
interpretation.  
 
A fundamental question needs to be asked at this stage. Religious motivation 
definitely plays a big part in creating an extremist mindset. But is it the main factor for 
persuasion? The Institute of Peace did a special report on, ―Countering Radicalisation in 
America: Lessons from Europe.‖ The report categorically said, ―The role of religion in 
the radicalisation process is debated, but theories that set aside ideology and religion as 
factors in the radicalisation of Western jihadists are not convincing.‖ 327 The report also 
adds that when support is given to organisations and individuals that challenge the 
Jihadist religious ideology, they unwittingly play into the hands of extremists by proving 
that there is a ‗war on Islam‘ as the state itself wants a form of Islam that does not resist 
it. They also quote the RRG of Singapore to say that Singapore‘s experience with the 
Jemmah Islamiah (JI) group is that JI‘s ―simplistic, literal, interpretation extinguishes 
centuries of Mainstream Islamic intellectual tradition‖ and ―can only be de-legitimized 
by ideological and theological refutation.‖ 328 This is in many ways reflective of the 
                                                 
327
 Lorenzo Vidino, "Countering Radicalisation in America | United States Institute of Peace", United States 
Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/publications/countering-radicalisation-in-america (accessed August 
26, 2011). 
328
 Ibid., 3-4 
146 
 
Singapore experience in handling extremism.  
While there is merit to both sides of the argument, the findings in this study will 
show how extremist narratives are at times anything but simplistic and if they are, it is 
with a purpose. They also employ rational argumentation that show a high degree of 
intellectual analysis, albeit highly abhorrent and wrong in their ultimate conclusions and 
suggested actions.  To get an idea of how other factors besides religion might play a more 
dominant role in radicalization, we look at an interview done in Malay with a former JI 




Interviewer: ―From your perspective, in the process of 
your quest for the truth, what was the biggest revelation 
that succeeded in changing your mindset?‖ 
 
Former JI member: ―While undergoing counselling, one 
day, while I was in detention, I thought about what I had 
gone through and reflected on my experiences. 
I realised that I had lost a lot of time.  
I wasted my youth, when I could have continued with my 
studies and lived life as a normal person.  
Because I was detained indefinitely, I did not know when I 
would be released. 
It was then that I feared for my future, whether I would get 
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my life back. 
That became a strong motivation for me. 
I told myself that if I was given a second chance, I would 
change and become a better person. 
I really repented and realized my mistakes. 
 
Interviewer: Who do you blame the most for your bitter 
experience? 
Former JI member: At first, I blamed my parents but they 
did not know of my involvement. 
In the end, I was angry at the JI. 




At the risk of generalising, we can infer a few possibilities from this narrative. 
One, the reason for his leaving was not primarily because he discovered and internalized 
the ‗correct‘ interpretation of Islam on Jihad. The motivation to leave a prior mindset 
rested on more basic needs such as wanting his freedom back and regret over the life he 
wasted by engaging in such activities and getting incarcerated. While this narrative 
reveals to some extent this core motivation to leave an extremist lifestyle, it also alludes 
to the possibility of similar social psychological motivations that play an equal or greater 
part in indoctrination.  When extremists directly quote religion as the sole reason for their 
motivation, sometimes there is a need to look further than that and not just accept what is 
visible only at the surface.  
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Counter radical ideology Muslim scholars have a monumental task. There is a 
special category of hate just reserved for them in extremist narratives. Take for instance 
this narrative that appeared in the ―clearguidance forum.‖ 
 
It seems to me as if the scholars that are residing in Saudi 
Arabia & are giving fatwas are under pressure from the 
Saudi government to give fatwas that can help them in their 
political agenda or do not go against their hypocritical 
ways. That is why the genuine scholars either leave Saudi 
Arabia or end up in jail. This is also why many people call 
the scholars of the kingdom the weapons of the Saudi 
government. In my opinion it is best to verify fatwas given 
by the scholars in the kingdom with respected scholars in 
Pakistan and other countries. Best of all, get the opinion of 




As can be seen, this is just a small reflection of the total loss of credibility in state 
sanctioned religious scholars among extremists. Extremist narratives also insinuate that 
all these scholars only mouth state approved rhetoric. The main factor for losing 
credibility can possibly be relegated to the general impression that state sanctioned 
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religious scholars never say anything genuinely critical about state approaches. This is 
reflective of the power behind alternate and critical discourse. This is especially the case 
when critique becomes so inaccessible and suppressed that it creates the conspiratorial 
impression that suppressed knowledge is likely to be true.  
 
Take for instance this quote which appeared in the Hizb Ut Tahrir (HUT) internet 
forum, 
  ―ANY EXCUSE NOT TO ADDRESS THE POINTS BEING MADE OR 
ADDRESSING THE QUESTIONS....YOU CAN TALK!!!!...YOU CARRY ON DOING 
JIHAD WITH THE KEYBOARD....LIKE VIRTUAL JIHADDI'S LIKE YOURSELF DO!!!!  
‖ [sic] 332 
 
 As can be seen in this strongly emphasized quote, in the internet and probably 
outside of it, not addressing difficult questions is tantamount to evidence supporting the 
opponent‘s views. In some ways, questions which are not answered effectively can 
become one of the key points of persuasion. Action, even on the internet, appeals louder 
than words. This is why the need to engage Muslims in a critical discourse is now all the 
more pertinent to Muslim scholars doing counter radicalization efforts. They have already 
made inroads in this direction but there is still more ground to be covered.  
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THE FRAMING PROCESS: THE HABERMASIAN IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION 
AND ARGUEMENTATION LOGICS. 
 
Tuman cites how ―…terrorism truly is best understood as a communication 
process between terrorist and audience(s), the meaning of which is socially constructed 
in the public discourse and dialogue we have about the subject.‖333 In line with this 
approach, there are two elements that constitute the research approach for this study. 
They are the themes reflected in the narrative and communication process itself. The 
earlier chapter on the methodology of this study has described themes which are used as 
identifiers for extremist websites. This research will also discover more themes that have 
not been identified or explored sufficiently in studies on this subject, especially themes 
which support the existence of the ‗logical structure.‘  The other aspect of the research 
looks at the social construction of the meaning of the extremist message in and through 
discourse. This entails a discussion on the framing process itself. As such this chapter 
focuses on the instruments for the social construction of the message. These instruments 
are what we refer to as argumentation logics. Of particular interest are rational arguments 
which are elements of the ‗logical structure‘. This chapter will also demonstrate how 
quasi logical arguments are also imbedded in other forms of argumentation that are not 
purely rational. This study makes reference to the theory of communication by Jurgen 
Habermas and his ideal speech situation and how this applies to these mechanisms for 
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persuasion. We will set the context for a discussion of arguementation logics by first 
examining the Habermasian theory of communication and what he means by the ‗Ideal 
Speech Situation‘.  
 
The Habermasian Ideal Speech Situation 
 
 According to Habermas, social action is either communicative or strategic.
334
 In 
strategic action participants have a goal in mind when communicating and are not 
looking towards reaching concensus and understanding.
335
 On the other hand 
communicative action is a consensual process by which actors cooperate to ‗mobilize the 
potential for rationality‘ 336  and thereby find a rationally motivated agreement. An 
argument is true communicative action if there is no suppression of arguements, 
manipulation, self deception etc. If there is a disagreement, then the ‗discourse‘ process 
of argumentation and dialogue will take over. This process will then yield a rationally 
justifiable result achieved through dialogue. Different ‗logics of argumentation‘ will be 
employed in Habermas‘s discourse theory according to different types of justificatory 
discourse or validity claims. To Habermas there is a set of universal values and norms 
that will get a reasonable audience to accept the best argument. For logical arguments, the 
presence of empirical proof is one form of justification that is universally accepted.  But 
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informal logics that use induction, analogies and narratives also get employed in a 
―ritualized competition for the better arguments.‘ 337 
 
One sub component of the Habermasian typology of social action is concealed 
strategic action where the actor actually has other motives behind his message that his 
audience and others he is communicating with may not agree with if they knew. Or at 





In addition, Habermas, postulates an ―Ideal Speech Situation‖ as one where 
power is not able to influence and distort the message and the argument that wins is the 
one with the strongest impartial evidence and which is most convincing.  Thus the idea of 
what is truth is derived from consensus arising from this contest of messages put 
across.
339
 This ideal speech situation according to Habermas would fall under the realm 
of true communicative action. 
   
Therefore, in the Habermasian ideal speech situation: 
1. ―Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. 
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2.  Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
3.  Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
4.  Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. 
5.  No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his 
rights as laid down in (1) and (2)‖340 
 
Habermas advocates communicative action not just for its ―rational potential‖ but 
also because the ‗dark side‘ alternative of this would be what he calls concealed strategic 
action. That is the kind of action that is influenced by power politics and other social 
barriers resulting in the absence of open, free and undistorted communication.  
Introducing the Five Argumentation Logics 
  With the idea of Habermasian communicative action in the background, we now 
need to look at the five types of argumentation logics from Philosophy as a framework to 
examine extremist narratives. These argumentation logics are what Ibn Khaldūn, the 
renowned Muslim philosopher from the 14
th
 century described when he reviewed the 
works of Aristotle on logic. These Kitab‘s (books) of logic include five which pertain to 
how analogical reasoning (the syllogism) is produced and applied. 
341
 In essence, they 
also relate to essentially five ways that people can argue and convince. This is namely 
through the use of, Rational, Dialectical, Sophist, Rhetorical or Poetic arguments.  
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 Aristotle‘s Apodeictica or Kitâb al- Burhan as Ibn Khaldūn called it, delved into 
the analogical reasoning (syllogism) that produces the knowledge in question and in 
particular how things come to be defined. 
342
  In rational arguments, in particular 
epistemic rationality, 
343
 there is evidence that can be proven empirically and 
corroborated. There is also an element of instrumental rationality, which is the 
―rationality which one displays in taking the means to one's ends.‖ 344  Both analogical 
reasoning (which looks at finding associations) and syllogisms (which base themselves 
on deductive reasoning) are logical arguments which become more convincing when 
there is are elements of epistemic and instrumental rationality imbedded in them. In this 
research, we refer to narratives that employ analogical reasoning, syllogisms, epistemic 
and instrumental rationality as rational arguments.  
 
 Aristotle‘s Topics or Kitâb al- Jadl (―disputation‖) as Ibn Khaldūn called it, 
teaches the analogical reasoning used to ―cut off a troublesome adversary and silence 
one‘s opponents.‖345  Dialectical arguments as defined in this study, are adopted from this 
category and involve an approach in which instead of addressing the criticism, one 
counters it with the flaws about the opponent‘s position.  
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Aristotle‘s Sophistici Elenchi or Kitâb as- Safsastah as Ibn Khaldūn called it, ―is 
the kind of analogical reasoning that teaches the opposite of truth and enables a 
disputant to confuse his opponent.‖ 346  For the purposes of this research study, the 
sophistic arguments we are referring to are defined as cleverly crafted but deceptive 
statements that come across as being very convincing. For instance sophist arguments can 
seem to employ rational logic and they may give the impression of being empirically 
credible. This is especially so if the narrative bases itself on little known and empirically 
provable facts which are connected creatively to mislead. 
 
Aristotle‘s Rhetoric or Kitâb as-Khitâbah as Ibn Khaldūn called it, refers to the 
analogical reasoning that shows how to influence the masses and to convince them to do 
one‘s intentions. 347 The Rhetorical arguments we are referring to in this study are defined 
as populist sentiments or those advocated by the ruling powers. If these rhetorical 
arguments become socially entrenched, they may be taken as the truth.   
  
 The last book, Aristotle‘s Poetics or Kitâb ash-Shi´r as Ibn Khaldūn called it, 
refers to the analogical reasoning that shows the use of parables and similes that can 
especially be used to encourage either themselves or others. 
348
 In the context of this 
research, the Poetic arguments used in the narratives examined, make use of emotive 
language and emotionally resonant references to win the argument.  
 
  All the above forms of argumentation may not (as this study will demonstrate) 
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exist in a pure state. Thus the analysis in this research involves not only identifying the 
purely rational components used in extremist narratives but also the presence of rational 
or logical components imbued in rhetorical, poetic, dialectical, sophist  arguments and 
their effect on the overall pitch. In the next few sections of this chapter, we will begin by 
detailing the nature of each of these argumentation logics (Rhetoric, Poetic, Dialectical, 
Sophist and Rational). 
 
The use of rhetoric in communicating extremism 
 
Tuman explains how the process of communicating the ‗terrorist‘ message 
involves a process of the sender encoding and the audience decoding this message. A 
situation of multiple audiences requires these audiences to decode using available tools. 
By this, he is referring to available mediums (e.g. mainstream news and information) that 
have created the ‗standard‘, accepted and foundational knowledge on the topic of the 
message or discussion. Tuman ultimately sees terrorist messages as a process of 
persuasion and hence ultimately rhetoric. He recognizes the use of rational logic and 
arguments in the process of persuasion. The audience in turn reacts based on rational 
calculations and by varying their responses accordingly.  This is illustrated in 
Giambattista Vico‘s premise that human reality is ―constructed and this construction 
could be rhetorical.‖349 But ultimately this line of thinking fails to acknowledge the 
enormous influence of rational arguments in and of themselves, and not just as an 
instrument to create the overall rhetoric. This is based on the assumption in this study that 
rational (empirical/ can be proven) facts by themselves are what the decoding process by 
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the audience seeks to achieve. In other words, there is an element of discernment in any 
audience that seeks to filter the rhetoric to analyse the validity of the claims from a 
rational perspective.  This is what we have referred to in this study as the ‗logical 
structure.‘  If there are enough of these ‗logical structures‘ then the role of rhetoric is 
minimal as the ‗facts‘ can seemingly speak for themselves.   
 
For this research we use the pejorative view of sophists by Plato designates, 
―sophistry ….as empty rhetoric- making arguments that sounded clever and logical but 
were really specious and with little merit‖350.  Aristotle on the other hand took rhetoric as 
a skill. He saw an effective argument as one that ―contained    one or more of three 
―species‖ of proofs‖351 which are as follows:  
 
1. Ethos: credibility of speaker 
2. logos  - the appeal of logic and reasons  
3. Pathos – the appeal of emotions.  
 
Labels and definitions according to Tuman also play a significant role.  Primarily 
―labels and definitions become frames entrenched by institutionalization and tradition 
which makes changing their meaning very difficult,‖; 352 they have the power to empower 
or marginalise, include and exclude (i.e. creates the ‗other‘ or contrast by which we 
understand ourselves), demarcate acceptable norms, values and views, intentionally or 
unintentionally distribute or redistribute power.  They also have the capacity to create or 
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break alliances between disparate groups and help to legitimise and create respectability 
for certain actions based on how they are used.
353
  Thus, for example if an individual‘s 
action was described as simply a reaction to emotive motivations and rhetoric, this 
creates a label that infantilizes his rationale and subsequent actions. By contrast, if the 
action were to be described as politically motivated, this labeling would lend credence, as 
the act would be now alluded to as a form of strategic action. This can also be the case if 
the act was based on the rationale for self-defense. The key point here is that the 
rhetorical power embedded in labels and definitions should be recognized in any 
rhetorical criticism of extremist narratives. Likewise when a narrative implies or refers to 
classical ideology, then ideological criticism is needed to evaluate the extent to which the 
speaker‘s credibility is based on ideology354 as opposed to other aspects of the narrative 
that might actually play a bigger role. The deficiency of Tuman‘s work is that it implies 
that web discourse is predominantly rhetoric.  This negates the possibility that it might 
instead be logical arguments (the logical structure) imbedded in the narrative having a 
greater influence.  
 
Tuman‘s methodology for deconstructing an extremist narrative for rhetorical 
criticism and analysis involved the following processes: 
 
1. Audience analysis. 
2. Identification of rhetorical appeals. (Ethos, Pathos and Logos) 
3. Identification of rhetorical figures of speech. 
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4. Identification of the use of rhetorical fallacies. 
 
Audience analysis requires knowing the social context and demographics of the 
targeted audience.  This according to Tuman is important as factors such as emphasizing 
a common ground between audience and the rhetor is potent. Other factors include prior 
favorable exposure to the similar rhetoric and disposition of the audience to the rhetor.  
 
Indentifying the rhetorical appeal in any narrative involves a process of deductive 
reasoning in which ―This form of reasoning operates from the assumption that if certain 
statements - called argumentative premises- are true, then a certain conclusion must 
follow.‖ 355 The use of syllogisms comprising true major and minor premises to derive 
conclusions stems from the deductive approach to reasoning. Tuman further explains how 
―More often, we find these premises embedded in the text of the speaker‘s arguments as 
we deconstruct them.‖ 356   Thus deconstructing the extremist narrative for rhetorical 
criticism also involves identifying if the speech message is ethos, pathos or logos and 
how it is oriented to a specific audience.  
 
 There are six steps according to Tuman in how rhetorical figures of speech and 




1. Accumulation – Where two or more clauses are used in succession to emphasise 
the same thing. 
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2. Anaphora – Repetition of the exact same words. 
3. Anti-study – Shows the appeal or flaws of the opposite state of events.  
4. Catalog – Logos appeal, as if the speaker is aware of and considered all 
possibilities.  
5. Personification – Referring to a country or religion as a person. 
6. Prolepsis – anticipating the kind of criticism or refutation that the narrative is 
likely to generate, thus diminishing the effect of any criticism.  
 
Tuman also cites rhetorical fallacies which give the appearance of being logical but 
are in essence really rhetoric. This is comparable somewhat to a sophist argument that is 
logically convincing but deceptive. 
 




1. Example reasoning- but the example cited can be proved wrong. 
2. Scare tactics to frighten the audience in issues that the rhetor knows is of concern. 
3. Post hoc ergo prompter hoc arguments - appearance of logical causation- a 
conclusion after the fact that is in essence a causal argument.  
4. Reductio ad absurdum – claim is reduced to reach an absurd position. E.g. in 
extremist narratives, any personal slights are reduced to the conclusion there is a 
‗war on Islam.‘ 
5. Ad Hominem – name calling and critiquing the characteristics of the opponent to 
advance a claim. 






Rhetoric and Quasi Logical arguments 
 
Perelman & Tyteca in their work on the contemporary application of methods by 
which rhetoric is used in argumentation, explain how quasi logical arguments lay claim to 
some empirical demonstration or formal reasoning of logic to appear convincing. But 
upon scrutiny it is realised that they appear so only when the arguments are reduced or 
simplified to an informal level that makes them seem demonstrative of reality. This 
reduction or simplification of the argument gives them credibility.   
 
Furthermore, "Quasi logical arguments are presented in a more or less explicit 
manner. Sometimes the speaker will mention the formal reasoning to which he makes 
reference, availing himself to the prestige of logical thought..."
359
 Thus we can see how 
the impression of logical thought provides a high degree of respectability to any 
argument.  
 
 To defeat this argument the critique would either need to debase it on the basis of 
being an "impassioned speech" or offer a logical counter argument. The latter accusation 
can also be a quasi-logical argument. But it needs to be noted that, " ...almost every quasi 
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 The following will thus describe the various permutations of rhetorical methods 
employing quasi-logical argumentation. These demonstrate how the syntheses of 
rationally constructed arguments with rhetorical elements create a highly potent mix. The 
presence of these quasi-logical components supports the idea of a ‗logical structure‘ 
existent in extremist Muslim narratives, albeit in varying magnitudes. In this section of 
this study, illustrations are given as to how extremist Muslims might possibly use the 
various quasi logical arguments.  
 




1. Contradiction and incompatibility - The critique based on calling the opponent's 
argument as incompatible, "can result from the application of several moral or legal 
rules or sacred texts to define situations. While contradiction between two 
propositions implies a formal system..." 
362
 This is exemplified in extremist 
narratives that make use of religious texts as the final and definitive authority by 
which their arguments are true. Thus anything that falls outside is deemed 
‗incompatible‘ with the context of their argument.   
 
2.  The ridiculous and its role in argumentation - This is referring predominantly to the 
ridicule and sometimes humor that is generated when an argument is critiqued on the 
basis of contradicting accepted opinion or error of fact.
363
 Thus this powerful, "quasi 
logical argumentation by the ridiculous consists in temporarily accepting a 
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statement contradictory to that one wishes to defend, deducing its consequences, 
showing their incompatibility with what is accepted on other grounds, and thereby 
inferring the truth of the proposition being defended." 
364
 This is in a similar vein to 
the idea of reductio ad absurtum
365
. The power of ridicule should never be 
underestimated. In extremist narratives this can take the form of ridiculing a political 
leader on the self evident and ineffective results of his policies and very often by 
highlighting the hypocrisies involved using insulting humour and ridicule.  
 
  But conversely to defy the ridicule that goes against accepted norms according to 
Perelman and Tyteca (1969) requires courage and defiance. Aristotle explains how "in 
order that a statement which is contrary to accepted opinion become a principle worth 
discussing, it has to gain the support of some eminent philosopher." 
366
 In extremist 
narratives this is done by citing the saying of the Prophet but according to their 
interpretation and context to justify their arguments. Very often this is seen in how they 
propagate the idea of an ‗offensive‘ Jihad that goes against mainstream Islamic views.   
 
3.   Identity and use of definitions in argumentation: - Arne Naess describes the various 
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    " a. Normative definitions, which indicate the manner in which a word is to be used. 
This norm can result from an individual decision, from a command given to others, from 
a rule of which one believes that it should be followed by everyone.‖ (The meaning of the 
term Jihad for instance can be dictated by a person or institutional body in a position of 
authority or influence. The issue then becomes not about the appropriateness of the 
meaning but more about the credentials of the person or body defining it. Extremist 
narratives and counter narratives may then go into debates resulting in attrition over 
credientials.)  
  
     b. Descriptive definitions, which indicate what meaning is given to a word in a certain 
environment at a particular time. (The meaning of Jihad can again be dictated according 
to context of the time period it is relating to. Extremist narratives might try to equate the 
state of Muslims today with events in Islam‘s past where Jihad became necessary. 
Counter narratives might conversely cite the inappropriateness of today‘s context and that 
the right to be a Muslim in not under physical threat as in the past and hence the meaning 
does not apply to situations the extremist narratives relate to. )    
  
     c. Condensed definitions, which point out the essential elements of a descriptive 
definition. (There is a more rational element here that might define Jihad according to 
objective parameters that constitute the essential elements of Jihad. The problem arises 
when even these essential elements are debated over, especially if these are based on 




    d. Complex definitions, which combine, in various ways, elements of the other three 
types.‖ (With more elements involved, the greater the potential to reconstruct and alter 
the meaning of Jihad.)  
 
 4.    Analyticity - This explains how ―all analysis is directional.‖ Meaning that all 
analysis has a definite purpose and is steered and constructed according to what point the 
interlocutor is trying to make. Likewise one will construct the argument based on the 
tenets of the disciplinary approach they subscribe to. Thus all analysis is quasi logical in 
some ways.  Using definitions or quantitative procedures also facilitate validation of their 
concepts. 
368
  A particular reference needs to be made to the concept of philosophical 
analysis as it tends toward fundamental facts or towards sensory data.
369
  Again applying 
this to extremist narratives, the impression of analyzing facts that extremist narratives 
sometimes give is based on the use of ‗emotive facts‘ that have the potential for a lot of 
emotive resonance which may also be empirically true. Extremists also steer their 
argument negating or putting down contradictory or alternate views points to establish 
their perspective. This gives the impression of having done a comprehensive analysis of 
facts. But we must also keep in mind that this can apply to even any type of mainstream 
academic discourse that inadvertently or otherwise does the same.  
 
5.    Rule of justice – This refers to the rational logic about fair and equal treatment, i.e. 
what applies to one should apply to the ‗other.‘ 370  Many a time in extremist narratives, 
this may seem like blatant ‗eye for an eye‘ rhetoric but one that is often rationalized on 
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the ideal of this ‗Rule of Justice‘. Perelman and Tyteca also explain how this 
―presupposes the partial identification of beings by putting them into a category and 
applying the treatment foreseen for members of that category.‖371 For instance this may 
involve citing how those labelled as ‗radicals‘ or ‗extremists‘ expect to recieve oppressive 
treatment and vilification even though it is contrary to any agreed upon and socially 
constructed ‗rule of justice.‘ Extremist narratives similarly cite how a Westcentric ‗Rule 
of Justice‘ is applied differentially or even negated when it comes to Muslims. Thus even 
though such statements might come across as rhetoric, they have a quasi-logical 
dimension based on this ‗Rule of Justice‘ rhetorical method.  
 
6.    Reciprocity – This refers to the ―Same treatment for 2 situations which are 
counterparts for each other‖.372 This again requires a reductionist stance to simplify 
matters to enable such comparisons to have credence. Extremists might use this type of 
argument to say bombings that result in collateral damage to Muslim civilians by the 
principal of reciprocity require the same to be done to the civilians of the nation which 
perpetuated the attacks. In this case, the simplification of the argument negates any 
possibility that the attack was not intended or was an accident.  
 
7.   Transitivity – essentially the argumentation logic goes, if a = b and b = c, then a = 
c.
373
 To exemplify this, if a rule banning headscarves represents repression against 
Muslims, this might be equated to a unified worldwide war against Islam by the West. If 
elsewhere in the world derogatory cartoons are made about the Prophet Muhammad and 









again equated to a worldwide war against Islam, then both situations might be deemed to 
be exactly similar in nature and extrapolated to mean that there is a global war on Islam 
waged by the West.  
 
8.    Inclusivity of the part in the whole – This quasi logical argument compares the whole 
with one of its parts. This is extended to the point that the parts are seen as 
representatives of the whole. 
374
 Thus if repression of Muslims occurs in one Western 
state, then it may be seen by extremists as a representation of the attitude of the entire 
country or of Western nations in general. This is also similar to how extremists group 
might claim they represent all true Muslims.  
 
9.   Reducing whole to its parts - To understand the whole requires reducing the situation 
to the point of a dilemma. 
375
 This shows the two alternatives as incompatible. Urgency of 
the situation is also stressed to ‗exclude the possibility of pausing for thought: the debate 
is limited to the study that has been offered and to what might possibly be opposed to it 
immediately.‖376 For instance, the opposition to the building of a Mosque at ‗ground zero‘ 
in New York is popularly portrayed by Islamaphobes to mean that it is a highly 
insensitive celebration of the terrorist‘s success. The terrorists are equated with Islam 
itself and an indication of the alarming, rampant and unchecked proliferation of Muslim 
presence in America. When drummed up by populist sentiment, it limits the debate to this 
narrow context without looking at the bigger picture. The entire issue here is reduced to 
this alarmist dilemma. Thus totally negating the possibility that the building of the 









mosque can also be meant to demonstrate religious tolerance, that there is no ‗war on 
Islam‘ and it is meant to show that people in the US are not giving in to the polarized 
vision of extremists. This alternate possibility and argument has no chance to mature in 
light of the alarmist dilemma and the narrow part that it has reduced the debate to.  
 
10.  Argumentation by comparison – again reduce issues to a level of comparison.377 The 
problem arises when the argument is made so simplistic that it negates all other 
mitigating factors that add balance to the argument. 
 
11. Argumentation by sacrifice – This is where, ―the sacrifice is a measure of the value 
for which the sacrifice was made.‖ 378 For instance the argument for suicide bombing 
might focuse on the reward that await martyrs in heaven or justice for the ummah (Global 
Community of Muslims) that will be achieved by their sacrifice which far outweighs the 
value of their lives. This applies to the relationship between ends and means.
379
 Thus in 
this case the argument is persuasive by the sheer weight of the sacrifice that is involved 
and the sympathy that this creates. By this argument, if someone is willing to make such 
a sacrifice, then the grievance behind this sacrifice must have some valid reasons.  
 
12.  Argumentation by probability – The ability to predict the shape of things to come 
based on precedence make for a strong argument. It is a kind of argument which acquires 
a ―special character when the evaluations are based both on the importance of the event 
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and the probability of their occurrence.‖ 380 Precedence which applies a series of prior 
arguments
381
  has greater credibility.  We see elements of reductionism again as Perelman 
and Tyteca cite how this ―entails reduction of the data – even if it is not a matter of 
quantifying them – to elements which seem more easily comparable.‖ 382  Furthermore, 
having an empirical character to the problem makes the argument seem more valid.
383
 
Frequently in extremist narratives, there is reference to historical precedence to explain 
the present state of things and where it is heading. For instance, extremist narratives may 
cite that the British colonial tactic of divde et impera (divide and conquer) used against 
Muslims in the past is replicated today in Iraq by the US strategy to divide and create 
mistrust among insurgent groups, thereby making it easier to subdue them. Then the 
narrative might extend this line of argument to predict that this is indicative of how the 
West intends to rule Muslims around the world and subdue them.  
  
13.  Arguments based on the structure of reality (causal link) - This refers to ―structures 
of reality to which they apply and which one can find in common usage.‖384 This can take 
the form of a causal link or a pragmatic argument. A causal link is one which attaches two 
given successive events to each other, shows the existence of a cause which could have 
determined a given event, or shows the resultant effect due to an event. 
385
 An extension 
of this might involve extremist narratives using causal links that mainstream readers 
might not have considered previously.  
















14.  Arguments based on the structure of reality (Pragmatic argument) – This is ―an 
evaluation of an act or an event, in terms of its favourable or unfavourable 
consequences.‖ 386  More often than not it relies on mere estimates 387  and has a   
―utilitarian common denominator.‖ 388 In extremist discourse, this argument can come in 
the form of portraying the negative consequences of not resisting the ‗oppressor.‘ These 
consequences can then be pitched in a utilitarian form that resonates with the private 
needs and concerns of the individual.   
 
15. Argumentation on the basis of ends and means - Perelman and Tyteca explain how 
―…only ends stated in a general and vague manner remain invariant and universal and 
that the end is often made clear by examination of the means.‖ Furthermore ―Some ends 
appear desirable because the means to realize them are created or become easily 
accessible‖ and at times, ―means can become an end to be pursued for itself.‖389   
 
Similarly, one might prefer to choose among values that justify such means. The 
means which are chosen can be ones that require the smallest sacrifice or which are 
seemingly more effective. This requires devaluing other means to present the means one 
favours as the only viable solution.
390
 At times, ―ineffectiveness of means often influences 
much more of the discussion of the ends than the technical problem of the best means.‖ 
















Applying this to extremist claims, actions that tend to produce immediate visible 
results and in feelings of vindication resonate well with sympathizers. The alternative 
through political action and debate with their perceived ‗oppressors‘ may not produce 
immediate gains and the results may also seem negligible to sympathizers. Whereas 
violent opposition escalating to terrorist acts create more visible impact and seem at least 
for the short term to gain the attention of their ‗oppressors‘ and even get the results they 
want. The very fact that these attacks generate fear may suffice for extremists as a short 
term gain aimed at retribution.  
 
There exists an agreement on ends which can help explain the nexus between 
activism that espouses extremist thought and terrorism. Both desire the same ends. 
(Liberation of Muslim lands, eliminating oppression, marginalization etc) But the 
mechanisms / means (demonstrations and other forms of activism vs. terrorist acts) to 
achieve these similar ends are different. As Marc Sageman rightfully put it,
392
 the 
problem then becomes one where those in activist circles who find pacifist means 
ineffective, too slow or simply ‗empty talk‘,  turn to other means such as terrorism that 
seem to produce immediate results.  Extremist narratives often make it a point to discuss 
how ineffective pacifist means of resistance are. 
 
16.   Argumentation of waste – emphasizes the wasted effort or sacrifice if a course of 
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action is not pursued. Therefore the means must be continued until the end is achieved. 
393
 It is interesting to note that the findings by the psychologists in the White Paper on the 
Jemmah Islamiah (JI) arrests cite how many of the members of JI felt they could not 
leave because they were, ―…in too deep,‖ and they were too forgone to leave the 
organization. 
394
  Similarly, extremists may feel they have invested too much on an ideal 
and turning back is not a viable option. It then becomes a case of making their sacrifice or 
effort worthwhile by meeting their objective or to die trying.  
 
17.  Argumentation of direction – This quasi logical rhetorical method aims to show 
where actions they are describing will eventually lead up to. Quite often for these kinds 
of arguments, the narrative will refer to precedent as evidence of the direction foreseen. If 
the precedent can be empirically provable, this will be used to support the argument. 
395
 
The rhetoric will also stress that when something is done it will stem this tide leading to 
this outcome. To exemplify this, for Islamaphobes, the presence of a Mosque at ground 
zero is indicative of the dangerously liberal direction towards Muslims by the present US 
government. This requires something to be done. This type of argument is also linked 
with the idea of unlimited development which is about the increase in value in continuing 
to pursue a certain direction of action. 
396
 In the example cited, continuing to resist the 
building of the mosque may seem to Islamaphobes to increase the value of efforts done to 
stem the liberal accommodation of Muslims in the US.  
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18.   Individual or group authority charisma and prestige can greatly facilitate the 
argument. 
397
 The persuasive power of the argument is strengthened by the use of 
hyperboles and symbolic representation.
398
 Arguments based on authority often use the 
acts or opinions of a person or group of persons as proof to support their argument.
399
 For 
example, extremist narratives cite the prophet Muhammad and the Hadith as the prime 
source of validation. But if the prestige of the person or group of reference is gone, then 
the argument is diminished. 
400
 Thus there is a tendency to focus the attack on the person 
and not argument in these cases. For instance focusing an attack on the character of a 
presidential candidate negates polices and viewpoints which may be unrelated to the 
person‘s character. 
 
 Furthermore the ―value of arguments will be gauged in terms of the value of the 
audience giving the credence.‖401 Thus the opinion of critiques and professionals in the 
audience carry a lot of weight.  This is also related to the idea of ‗essence‘ where the 
relation or label attached to the rhetor is used as the starting point to frame an 
argument.
402
  For example, the rhetor starts the argument from one‘s ascribed label as a 
freedom fighter, scientist or as the survivor of a holocaust. The surrounding experience or 
disciplinary background of the individual then greatly magnifies any points made by 
them.   
 















19.   Argumentation by example and illustrations - This simplification of arguments by 
use of examples and illustrations to enhance their potency requires that the 
exemplification be convincing enough. The use of models, analogies and metaphors are 




Based on all the above Quasi –Logical argumentation methods described, a 
common theme seen in the use of rhetorics and their quasi logical permutations is 
simplification or reductionism. But this does not mean that it is a form of argumentation 
that is most effective with those who do not think critically. On the contrary, the 
simplicity of the argument is at times its greatest strength. It is an argument that will be 
hard to refute unless an equally fundamental counter argument is given. It therefore 
stands to reason that quasi- logical arguments (quasi-logics) derive their strength from 
complex situations being reduced to elemental forms where rational and logical 
arguments become more visible and evident.  
 
This is an important line of reasoning towards the study of the ‗logical structure.‘ 
While it may seem that extremists follow a rationality that is unique to their social 
context and individual psychology, this is not what the logical structure represents. 
Instead it is argued that the kind of rationality that is subscribed to 
404
  is applicable to any 
‗reasonable‘ / rational individual.405 Again there is a need to make the vital caveat that 





 Either through reductionist quasi logical arguments or in complex arguments that are rationally 
constructed with little use of the other forms of argumentation. 
 
405
 ―The Reasonable man‖ test a Legal Maxim. ―This serves as a comparative standard for determining 
liability. For example, the decision whether an accused is guilty of a given offense might involve the 
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this does not mean that their arguments are right. Far from it, it is yet another indication 
of how the worst of crimes such as genocide can be framed in very rational arguments 
that can appeal to anyone. Many prominent cases have shown how extremist narratives 
appeal to even professionals and educated individuals with seemingly rational mindsets 
and relatively stable lives. There are many examples in this century of educated 
individuals who are commonly assumed to be more discerning, turning to extremist 
thinking. Many such educated individuals more often than not reside in the upper 
echelons of the terrorist / extremist organization. 
406
  Only when we begin to understand 
the nature of how the ‗logical structure‘ is an inherent component of extremist thinking, 
can we produce effective counter-narratives to extremist discourse – especially to those at 
the leadership levels in such an organisation. Once the leadership moves away from such 
thinking, the effect is very likely to be felt with the followers and sympathizers.
407




Aristotle‘s idea of poetics saw argumentation as a species of imitation that 
                                                                                                                                                 
application of an objective test in which the conduct of the accused is compared to that of a reasonable 
person under similar circumstances‖, cited in ―Reasonable Man Theory Law & Legal Definition," Legal 
Definitions Legal Terms Dictionary,  http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/reasonable-man-theory/ (accessed 
August 26, 2011). 
406
   Hoffman, Bruce,  ―Today's Highly Educated Terrorists‖, 15 Sept 2010, p2 ―Indeed, an inevitable 
bifurcation generally occurs across all terrorist movements whereby the top leadership and mid-level 
command strata are populated by the educated (or relatively well-educated) and financially well-off, while 
the majority of foot soldiers will be less educated and often from far more modest socio-economic 
backgrounds. A rule of thumb is thus that the larger the movement, the more diverse its members‘ socio-
economic and educational backgrounds‖, cited in Bruce Hoffman, "Today's Highly Educated Terrorists | 
The National Interest Blog." The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/bruce-hoffman/todays-
highly-educated-terrorists-4080?page=2 (accessed August 26, 2011).  
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 See Ashour 2009, 138 described in Chapter 9, pg. 364-365 of this study. 
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employed various modes, mediums and referred to varying objects. One key component 
of this would be the ‗tragedy.‘  Aristotle described tragedy as an imitation of action and 




Aristotle also described another facet of poetic discourse. This is the idea of an 
‗epic‘. He explained how, ―Again, epic poetry must have as many kinds as tragedy: it 
must be simple, or complex, or 'ethical,'or 'pathetic'. The parts also, with the exception of 
song and spectacle, are the same; for it requires reversals, recognitions, and scenes of 
suffering.‖ 409 
 
 From Aristotle‘s description, we can surmise a number of key components of 
tragedy and epic as it is employed in extremist Muslim narratives. One, when emotive 
content or words are used in extremist narratives, they often refer to the tragedy of 
Muslims and their plight as a result of oppression and injustice. Extremist literature also 
exploits Quranic prose. The sheer poetic strength of Quranic narratives is used to 
culminate accounts of Muslim ‗tragedies.‘ Many a time Jihadi Nasheeds or religious 
songs with the corresponding video content are highly emotive. The way the extremist 
websites portray their struggle has epic proportions.  
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For instance the narrative could be about the long suffering saga of a band of 
resistance fighters, whose ethical strength which stems from their devotion to Islam, 
fighting against a militarily far superior enemy. This notion may be portrayed in the 
scenes of attacks against American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, with accompanying 
Nasheeds. This narrative may also highlight how the struggle goes on, thus taking on the 
qualities of an epic as described by Aristotle.  
 
The scenes of smiling suicide bombers as they record their last moments and 
narratives of their last will prior to an attack is again intended to demonstrate the courage 
and strength of the character of the Mujahedeen (Holy warrior) and the promise of final 
victory behind the poignant tragedy. The recording of the dramatic explosive action of 
their final moments is meant to visually emphasise this. The ‗end‘ is tragic but glorious 
with the element of hope that comes with resistance. None of this can be accomplished 
without ‗spectacular effects‘ that the video, song, imagery or narrative is able to provide. 
The entire account is in many ways a poetic ‗imitation‘ as one would naturally not know 




 Dialectics originate from the Greek expression for the art of conversation. The 
word has been used in various contexts and some of them are as follows:  
 
i. ―The Hegelian and Marxist notion of the dialectic as a historical process. 
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ii. Method of refutation by examining logical consequences. 
iii. Sophistical reasoning. * 
iv. Method of division or repeated logical analysis of genera into species. 
v. An investigation of the supremely general abstract notions by some process of 
reasoning leading up to them from particular cases or hypostudy.  
vi. Logical reasoning or debate using premises that are merely probable or generally 
accepted. 
vii. Formal logic. 
viii. The criticism of the logic of illusion, showing the contradiction into which reason 
falls in trying to go beyond experiences to deal with transcendental objects 
ix. The logical development of thought or reality through study and antistudy to a 
synstudy of these opposites.‖ 410 
 
Aristotle saw dialectics as the ―refutation of the hypostudy of opponents by 
drawing unacceptable consequences from those hypotheses.‖ 411  Zeno similarly had used 
‗indirect logical arguments to defeat an opponent.‘ 412  
 
In this research a dialectical argument in an extremist narrative aims to do the 
same thing. Similar to how sophist Protagoras claimed that dialectics could ―make the 
worse argument appear the better.‖413 This relegates dialectics to the role of a rhetorical 
tactic. This tactic is simply to criticize the logic of the opponent, rather than to address 
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the criticisms directed at the rhetor. To Socrates, dialectical arguments involved a search 
for truth by question and answer that involves guiding the ―opponent onto a 
generalization by getting him to accept the truth of a series of propositions about 
particular cases.‖ This is the principal behind the socratic method in which ―dialectics is 
the process of eliciting the truth by means of questions aimed at opening out what is 
already implicitly known, or at exposing the contradictions and muddles of an opponent‘s 
position.‖414 However, the latter part of the Socratic method can be quite confrontational 
and this is a common characteristic of any extremist narrative.  But in our context this 
should not to be confused with the idea of Socratic Irony in which the rhetor puts on a 
pretense of not knowing and giving guiding questions to lead the student to the answer.
415
  
Dialectics when used in extremist narrative does not have such a benign intent. But rather 
as a tactic that diminishes the effect of a criticism or condemnable action by questioning 




Plato saw sophists as charlatans.
416
 He saw them as, ―superficial, destructive, and 
at worst deceivers, purveyors of sophistry in the modern sense of the term.‖ 417 Teaching 
―….the art of fallacious discourse…‖ in which it was Socrates who, ―exposed the 
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345. 
417
 Guthrie, W. K. C., The Sophists, ( London: Cambridge University Press), 1971,10. 
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hollowness of their rhetoric…‖ 418. When Protagoras of Abdera cited how the skill of 
sophistry can ―make the weaker argument the stronger‖, Aristophanes, ―satirized 
Protagoras as one who would make unjust arguments defeat just arguments.‖419 This is a 
far more serious criticism that portrayed sophists as unethical and material exploiters of 
those upright individuals lacking in such skill. Extremist narratives are seen in this way 
whenever they are described as being misleading but persuasive in their style of 
arguments to the point of ‗brainwashing‘. This is almost akin to what Morgan advocates 
when he compares terrorist groups like al-Qaeda to a religio-political- apocalyptic cult.
420
 
This naturally takes away their political legitimacy as their arguments are now seen as 
behavorial manipulation with no rational basis. 
 
The logic behind sophistry in its benevolent sense is exemplified by Protagoras in 
stating that there is no objective truth, the world is for each person as it appears to that 
person and that skilled people can thus change other‘s perceptions in useful ways.421  
 
Although the pejorative label has been criticised by proponents for the true ideals 
of sophistry, in this research we use this form of argumentation as intended by Plato; 
namely how extremist narratives persuade audiences through the clever use of distorted 
facts, accounts of events that negate or simply leave out mitigating or alternate 








 ―…Al Qaeda represents a hybrid of these different forms of cults, which like all of them all is based on 
brainwashing, mind-control and behavioral manipulation of their members‖,  Quoted in Stephen J. 
Morgan, "Al Qaeda : Secrets of its Hidden Power",  YoursDaily.com,  
www.yoursdaily.com/different_views/al_qaeda_secrets_of_its_hidden_power (accessed August 28, 2011). 
 
421
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This constitutes the essence of what this research is referring to as the logical 
structure.  Rationalism refers to any ―philosophy magnifying the role played by unaided 
reason, in the acquisition and justification of knowledge.  The preference for reason over 
sense experience as a source of knowledge….‖ 422  One of the key components of a 
persuasive argument involves the presence of ―logical reasoning and evidence in support 
of a claim.‖ 423 A rational argument might also have the following demarcators:   
 
1) Inductive reasoning. This entails making inferences based on observed or specific 
evidence. The Toulmin model uses the legal precept of proving beyond reasonable 
doubt but not having to prove it to absolute terms. One of the components of 
Toulmin‘s logical argument involves the ability to allow for rebuttals and 
exceptions to the claim without having to invalidate it.
 424
 This is important as at 
times a counter –extremist narrative may fail not because it is not rational but 
because it does not factor well enough for rationally constructed rebuttals. 
Extremist narratives on the other hand have made it a point to directly factor 
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The Aristotelian Model uses ‗syllogisms‘ which entail the use of major and 
minor premises. The major premise has specific evidence to corroborate and the 
minor premise constitutes an assumption. 
426
 For instance, in an extremist 
narrative, it might point to an instance when some Muslim men with beards were 
singled out for detailed searches and questioning before boarding an aircraft. This 
might be taken together with the assumption that all ‗Muslims‘ are subject to 
discrimination after 9/11. The inferred conclusion might be there is now an 
institutionalized procedure at the airport that discriminates against Muslim men.  
 
2) Deductive reasoning. This entails the use of a major premise that is assumed to be 
a true statement and a minor premise which can be a specific observation. The 
conclusion is then derived from the synthesis of these two premises.
 427
 For 
instance, the major premise might be many individuals originating from Yemen 
with no carryon luggage have turned out to be terrorists. The minor premise or 
specific observation might be, Abdul happens to be a Yemeni with no carry on 
luggage and also originates from Yemen. The deduced conclusion is that Abdul is 
likely to be a terrorist.  But we can naturally see where such deductive rational for 
arguments can go wrong, but it nonetheless helps to create a persuasive rational 
argument.  
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3) A rational argument can also have elements of instrumental rationality (rational 
arguments or actions that are done in pursuance of a specific objective) or even 
epistemic rationality. (supported by evidence) 
428
  Epistemically rational 
arguments, when corroborated by empirical observations and facts make for a 
very convincing rational argument that is not easily dismissed. Instrumentally 
rational arguments create in the mind of the reader the utilitarian logic behind it. 
For instance, an extremist narrative might be trying to convince potential suicide 
bombers who question whether their actions will actually make a difference. The 
instrumental argument or actions to address this might be ones that demonstrate 
the destructive potential and realizable results of such actions.  
 
A final point to note is that just because an argument is rationally constructed does 
not necessarily mean that it is correct. The key point being made here is that 
despite this, the existence of rational compoments in a narrative contributes 
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Ideal Speech Situation vs Philosophical argumentation logics 
If the theory of communicative action and concealed strategic action were juxtaposed 
with the five philosophical argumentation logics, we might get the following conver-
gences: 
1. A truly rational argument would fall under communicative action. This is because 




2. Sophistic arguments come under concealed strategic action. This is by virtue of 
the position that they aim to mislead or lead the argument for the prime reason of 
achieving the instrumental goal of the narrator and not for seeking the ‗correct‘ or 
mutually reasonable answer.  
3. Poetic arguments are somewhat similar to the ―expressive speech‖ of Habermas 
which relates to the communication of ‗feelings‘ and the impression that this feel-
ing expressed is true and sincere.
430
 This is especially the case in the narration of 
tragedies in extremist Muslim narratives. As in the case of the suicide bomber de-
scribed in this chapter, such arguments leverage on emotions to create the impres-
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sion that the suicide bomber is feeling happy and at peace as they achieve martyr-
dom. A poetic argument based on the utilization of emotions and emotively reso-
nating ideas such as ‗tragedy‘ may not exist in the realm of true communicative 
action. This is due to the strategic basis underlying it, namely to persuade the au-
dience that the feeling expressed is true and perhaps stemming from this any ac-
count of events and issues associated with it.  
4. At the dialectical level according to Habermas, the argument has to meet the re-
quired burden of proof. 
431
 The dialectical tactic of responding to a challenge by 
addressing the flaw in the position of the opponent instead of answering the criti-
cism is in line with this understanding.  This is because a more logical argument 
should be able to withstand the scrutiny and critical discussion expected in a ―ri-
tualized competition for better arguments.‖432 
5. If rhetorical arguments are seen as a speech tactic, then it is not the more rational 
argument that wins but the more convincing one that employs rhetorical strategies. 
These too will fall under concealed strategic action if such argumentation tactics 
are used for purely instrumental ends. A rhetorical agreement is in many ways 
made to suit the temperaments of the audience that it is directed at.  For instance, 
a rhetorical argument about moral rightness will be accepted if it is in line with 
the history and tradition of values of the audience.
433
  
Examining the Habermasian idea of communicative action and concealed 
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strategic action and juxtaposing this against the five philosophical argumentation logics 
described, reveal the following possibilities regarding extremist narratives:  
1. People gravitate towards the internet chat rooms and are taken in with the ‗no- 
nonsense‘, ‗in your face‘ literature primarily because this creates the impression 
that an ideal speech situation exists there.  The audience might feel that discourse 
and narratives over the internet are more likely to be true and reflective of reality 
when it is not weighed down by political coercion. Relative anonymity on the in-
ternet also facilitates this perceived impression.  
 
2. The idea of an ―ideal speech situation‖ is again reinforced by the creative use of 
these argumentation logics.  One might develop the impression that you can say 
whatever you want on the internet and more or less get away with it. Take for in-
stance the dialectical argumentative approach used by extremist activist groups 
like the ―Hizb Ut Tahrir‖ that advocates a philosophy of ―never defend, always 
offend.‖434  This has the potential to instill a feeling of empowerment that comes 
from being the person asking the questions and who is able to put the inquisitor 
on the defensive. This is common in extremist Muslim narratives over the inter-
net. An individual might find this kind of empowerment especially appealing if in 
reality they are not able to freely question anything or anyone.  It is exacerbated if 
they have in reality been historically always on the defensive.  
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3. For any credible counter-narrative, there is a need to counter the cult of 
personality or mystique built around prominent extremist ideologues and leaders. 
Such personalities do not have to do much to promote themselves due to the 
proliferation of stories and incidents about corruption and abuse of power by the 
ruling government in question. When such narratives circulate and become 
visible, this creates a natural allure to personalities that claim to be the antistudy 
of such characters. Destroying the appeal of such personalites becomes harder 
when the sheer lack of visibility of such alternate perspectives creates a myth of 
conspiracy. Such personalites then simply have to align their rhetorical arguments 
to leverage on this overall impression. Futhermore, because such perspectives are 
less publicized and so shockingly different, readers might feel they are more 
likely to be true. The repeated emphasis on extremist forums on how 
untrustworthy mainstream media is a testament to this. This is the end product of 
having a situation where free and open discourse that embodies true 
communicative action is lacking. Therefore suppression of critique in any issue 
has the capacity to promote a counter –culture value system that feels that the 
body politic is out to surpress alternate and differing views because it threatens 
their power base. Any counter-argument by the state will then lack credibility as 
rhetorical arguments have already leveraged on such impressions.   
 
4. Even if you were to remove the power based barriers to open communication, this 
will not be enough to have a state of true communicative action in which rational 
arguments prevail. Strategic action that manifests in self – interest based speech 
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tactics might still dominate in a contest of arguments even if such power barriers 
were to be removed. Thus the most rational and true argument existing in the 
most unconstrained communicative environment may not always prevail. But we 
also need to ask whether there exists a ―universal‖ audience to give consensus to 
any argument in the first place. A heavily rhetorical argument may not resonate 
with an audience that gravitates to logical or rational elements and vice versa. 
Non-rational arguments such rhetorical, dialectical, sophist and poetic can still 
dominate over rational arguments in an ideal speech situation as there will be 
those who prefer strategic action based communication for reasons of self –
interest.    
A demonstration to address critiques to the logical structure hypothesis  
 
Notions of extremist narratives having a logical structure to their argument will 
undoutably raise criticism in the following areas.  One would entail the presence of 
rhetorical characteristics in extremist narratives. This would lead one to question if 
extremist narratives are in essence superficial, non intellectual portrayal of events. The 
absence of strong and carefully considered deliberations can also question the objectivity 
of such narratives. Furthermore extremist narratives that focus on universal values can be 
critiqued on the basis that they do not take into account social context. In summary even 
though the presence of epistemic logic in these narratives can be proven, they may be 
deemed as being essentially superficial, simplistic and emotive. 
 
To properly address such critique we first need to keep in mind what a ‗logical‘ 
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statement would entail. At its very core, this would be one in which the premise (why the 
statement is true) of the argument would support the conclusion.
435
 An argument can be 
valid, weak or strong. In a valid argument, the premise is true in all cases but the 
conclusion can still differ. Thus the distinction between strong and weak arguments is a 
matter of degree.  There are no formal principals of logic for non-deductively strong 
arguments that clearly demarcates when the premise provides sufficient evidence to 




 If we were to 
apply these same principals to extremist narratives, then the extent to which the statement 
is logical becomes a matter of degree as well.  
 
At this stage we need to keep in mind how Aristotle took rhetoric as a skill. The 
effective argument is seen as one that is strong in the three species of proofs, namely the 
ethos (credibility of speaker), pathos (the appeal of emotions) and finally logos. (the ap-
peal of logic and reasons) Therefore an argument low on logos but rated high on the other 
two species of proof is likely to be persuasive. But having said this, we need to under-
stand that what is being demonstrated in this research are ‗snapshots‘ of an entire narra-
tive. Quite naturally there will be ebbs and flows as to when logos peaks. It will be shown 
in the example that follows how the culmination of many such ‗snapshots‘ of logos result 
in creating an end result that is logically persuasive in totality but weak if analysed in 
terms of only one of its individual component narratives.  
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Furthermore a logical structure would exist in varying degrees and interspersed 
among the wide variety of extremist narratives, some of which would naturally be more 
rhetorical than logical. But this does not negate the presence of logos rich narratives. 
What is more important is that in any persuasive argument, the logos within the argument 
will not be able to create the necessary effect if it is not given the time to develop the case. 
But time is a luxury in internet discourse. To capture the attention of the prospective au-
dience, ethos and pathos are necessary to create the necessary attention grabbing appeal 
to get the reader to want to know more. It is at this stage that the culminative effective of 
multiple points of logos can secure the argument.   
 
It is also necessary to keep in mind the effect of quasi-logical arguments. A quasi-
logical argument need not be a pure rhetorical fallacy. It also does not mean the argument 
is necessarily invalid or devoid of cogent reasoning. The strength of quasi-logical argu-
ments lies in their ability to give the impression of approximating or actually approximat-
ing formal reasoning or empirical proof to appear convincing.  But upon scrutiny it is re-
alised that they appear so only when the arguments are reduced or simplified to an infor-
mal level that makes them seem demonstrative of reality.
 438
 (Syllogisms and Analogical 
reasoning)  This reduction or simplification of the argument gives them credibility.  
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Based on all the quasi-logical argumentation methods described previously in this 
chapter, a common theme seen in the use of rhetorics and their quasi-logical permutations 
is simplification or reductionism. But this does not mean that it is a form of argumenta-
tion that is most effective with those who do not think critically. On the contrary, the 
simplicity of the argument is at times its greatest strength. It is an argument that will be 
hard to refute unless an equally fundamental counter argument is given. It therefore 
stands to reason that quasi- logical arguments (quasi-logics) derive their strength from 
complex situations being reduced to elemental forms where rational and logical argu-
ments become more visible and evident. Finally as described earlier we need to keep in 
mind the culminative effect of many occurrences of quasi-logical arguments. Given the 
sheer volume of the number of extremist narratives available in cyberspace, the culmina-
tive effect of quasi-logical arguments and interspersed occurrences of logos (both weak 
and strong) is not something that can be dismissed easily.   
 
Another point of consideration for assessing the logical weight in extremist narra-
tives has to do with causality as compared to correlation. While there might be a ‗slip-
pery slope‘ rhetorical fallicy in jumping from the initial premise to a far-fetched conclu-
sion, it nonetheless does not mean that correlations do not exist. For example one might 
say increasing cases of violence inflicted on particularly Muslims can possibly correlate 
with a growing number of organised groups that promote Islamaphobia. But to draw the 
causality as extremists do, to a state sanctioned conspiracy to declare war on Islam is 
stretching the argument too far. Extremist narratives often fall into this slippery slope rhe-
torical fallacy of associating causality that jumps a number of steps to reach farfetched 
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conclusions or to propose extremist solutions. Having said this, the logical correlation 
between violence and the number of growing anti-Muslim hate propaganda is again 
something one cannot dismiss either.  
Not always are decisions made on the basis of pure logic either. Analytical think-
ers apply their analytical thinking to concepts that were actually derived from intuitive 
thinking. The latter‘s foundation is set by the belief system of the society and state. 439 As 
such we can have cases where a person‘s cultural nuances, upbringing and moral persua-
sions instil an intuitive mode of analysis that will override any coldly logical arguments. 
Simply put, just because it is logical does not entail that the action is morally right. This 
can be one reason why someone may not subscribe to the argument no matter how logical 
it will appear to be as one‘s intuitive analysis tells him or her otherwise.  We must not 
make light of intuitive thinking as it exists in the realm of knowledge based on con-
sciousness, common sense and mathematical axioms and is a component of logical think-
ing. Campbell describes how ―Logical truth consisteth (sic) in the conformity of our con-
ception to their archetypes in the nature of things. This conformity is perceived by the 
mind, either immediately on a bare attention to the ideas under review, or mediately (sic) 
by a comparison of these with other related ideas. Evidence of the former kind is called 
intuitive; of the latter deductive.‖ 440 Furthermore, first principals on any subject are of-
ten intuitive creations and there are situations in which the conclusions are correct but 
cannot be validated by formal reasoning. Campbell explains this by quoting how,  
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All reasoning necessarily supposes that there are certain 
principals in which we must acquiesce, and beyond which 
we cannot go; principals clearly discernible by their own 
light, which can derive no additional evidence from any-
thing besides. On the contrary supposition, the investiga-
tion of truth would be an endless and a fruitless task; we 
should be eternally proving, while nothing could ever be 
proved; because, by the hypothesis, we could never ascend 




Another critique to the rational nature of extremist narratives is that they are 
deemed to often present arguments that seem typical of conspiracy theories. While the 
conspiracy narrative can be based on epistemic rationality and involve elements of deduc-
tive and inductive analytical thinking, labelling an argument as a conspiracy instantly 
kills its credibility. While this might be the case, it must be recognised that this can some-
time result in creating a ‗straw man‘ rhetorical fallacy. Not addressing elements of logical 
arguments in a conspiracy narrative creates the propensity for the unanswered questions 
to go viral. So instead of defeating the conspiracy argument by rationally arguing each 
point, one might simply give a distorted / exaggerated version of the actual argument. In 
this case the narrative is labelled as a conspiracy theory without giving the points in the 
argument due consideration. This like a ‗straw man‘ makes the argument easy to defeat. 
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This wilful refusal to engage in genuine argumentation thus creates a ‗straw man‘ rhe-
torical fallacy. 
 
With regards to the issue of proper deliberation of arguments, it will be demon-
strated via the argumentation cluster theme in the findings chapter that extremist narra-




Finally the aim of this thesis is not to show that terrorist discourse is scholarly. 
The two (logical reasoning and scholarly works) are not necessarily the same. They just 
have to make sense to the ‗reasonable man‘. The point being made here is that it is not 
only the presence of epistemic rationality that makes an argument logical but also be-
cause of the analytical thought processes involved. The other two ingredients of logical 
thought go past the instrumental. These are of course referring to deductive (analogical) / 
inductive reasoning, with corroboration (epistemic rationality) that would appeal to a 
universal audience. 
 
The question that naturally arises is whether such an argument is acceptable to a 
‗reasonable‘ man. More importantly, what is a ‗reasonable man‘? Courts of law apply the 
‗reasonable man test‘ to ascertain what someone who is rational would do under the same 
circumstances. This would require us to examine the idea of what is a rational person. 
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Using a typical dictionary definition of the word ‗rational‘ 443 tells us the following. One, 
it involves the use of one‘s intellect and reasoning to analyse a problem. Two, the 
individual has full control of his senses and intellectual faculties and as such is deemed 
sane. Three, the individual is not overly driven to the decisions in question on the basis of 
emotive judgments and in that vein, personal bias. Therefore the elements of a rational / 
reasonable person would entail – reasoning, sanity and absence or minimal emotive 
influence.  
 
There is another component of rationality that is predicated sociologically by the 
society one is brought up in. Merton describes how one conforms to the norms and values 
of one place in society. Conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion are 
modes of adaptation that one uses to cope with any resentments or dissatisfaction.
444
 If 
we amalgamate the legal maxim of the ‗reasonable man‘ with textbook definitions of 




1. using reason or logic in thinking out a problem 
2. in accordance with the principles of logic or reason; reasonable 
3. of sound mind; sane the patient seemed quite rational 
4. endowed with the capacity to reason; capable of logical thought man is a rational being 
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003 
 
 
Rational - having its source in or being guided by the intellect (as distinguished from experience or emotion); "a 
rational analysis" 
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2012 Princeton University, Farlex Inc. 
 
Rational 
1 able to think, reason and judge etc Man is a rational animal. 
2 sensible; reasonable; logical; not (over-) influenced by emotions etc There must be a rational explanation for those 
strange noises 
Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary © 2006-2010 K Dictionaries Ltd.‖ 
 
The above dictionary definitions are taken from -  "rational - definition of rational by the Free Online Dictionary, 
Thesaurus and Encyclopedia",  Dictionary, Encyclopedia and Thesaurus - The Free Dictionary, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/rational (accessed May 21, 2012). 
 
444 "The Anomie Tradition", Deviance & Social Control: Online Review, 
http://deviance.socprobs.net/Unit_3/Theory/Anomie.htm (accessed May 26, 2012).  
196 
 
what is deemed rational together with Merton‘s modes of adaptation, we get a clearer 
picture of what constitutes a reasonable person. Going by this amalgamated definition, 
the modes of adaptation of innovation, retreatism and rebellion would not be deemed 
rational by the society in question as it goes against mainstream norms and values. The 
state might naturally play a major role in establishing such norms and values. On the 
other hand, conformity and ritualism as a mode of adaptation might have greater 
acceptance with the state. With the exception of those who have pathological problems 
that diminish their lucidity and those whose actions are determined by emotive 
considerations, then all other actions that involve some form of reasoned judgment would 
be rational. One can of course be faulted by the basis of one‘s reasoning. But one can also 
be faulted even if the reasoning is sound but goes against established norms and values.  
 
If we accept the idea of ‗universal values‘ that conform with accepted ideas of 
morality and decency, then the judgment of a reasonable man that is universally accepted 
would be predicated on a universal set of moral values and lucid reasoning. This is also 
why the great majority of Muslims worldwide do not ascribe to extremist solutions. 
Simply put, while they may agree to the ideas put across by a reasoned argument in an 
extremist narrative, universal morality makes one question the end states suggested. 
Many might also find the overall argument as flawed after considering other factors 
despite the sound logic existing in components of an extremist argument.   
 
As such, a reasonable person is more likely to not accept an extremist narrative on 
the basis of morality, social and instrumental considerations and a rational decision that 
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does not agree with the final end states proposed despite having logic in components of 
the argument. The persuasive appeal of extremist narratives is contigent on a few other 
characteristics. 
 
Booth in his examination of fundamentalist conversion narratives identified 
several key characteristics that define it and adds to its persuasive effect. He described 
how fundamentalist narratives predominantly base themselves on "stories" that describe 
how the protagonist makes an epic journey, which transcends everyday reality to reach a 
"promised" land. It may be a journey more in the spiritual than physical sense. But either 
way, it is a journey fraught with perils, trials and tribulations in which the protagonist is 
seen to falter and at times almost succumb to temptations or physical hardship. 
Eventually the protagonist makes "sacrifices" that can manifest in a number of forms. 
Some of these ―sacrifices‖ can be very personal and can include the giving up of a life of 
sin or some worldly material pleasure for the ultimate reward that awaits one for taking 
the path that the fundamentalist narrative is seeking propagate. The ―story‖ is important 
as it has the capacity to immerse the listener into the world of the "hero" in the narrative. 
Here the listeners dwells in the story and in some ways escapes the real world to a 
different world with a "different time scheme and ordering of values." It thus allows the 




 One of these variables that characterize a fundamentalist narrative is what Booth 
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calls the "Instrument of Conversion and Resulting Pace." This can encompass two 
situations. In the first one, the convert is party to that critical moment in a journey or 
process in which one has an awakening brought on by a moment of epiphany or through 





   For the second situation, Booth makes reference to Douglas Hyde who 'converted' 
from Communism to becoming a Catholic. He describes how it was "a transformation 
that occurred gradually as Hyde discerned logical contradictions in the Communist 
position and in his own way of adhering to it. The turning point for Hyde came when he 
was asked to debate with Catholics and realized that in order to do well in the debate he 
must carefully read the best Catholic list he could obtain. ‗That was my undoing as a 
Commie,‘ he reports. ‗As I prepared my defence, the weakness in my own position was 
gradually revealed.‘ " 447  
This is a critical point as it reveals how an individual's values and beliefs based on 
a culturally established narrative, either by one's prior religious beliefs or ideas 
propagated by the state, lose their holding potential if it gets weakened in a logical 
discourse or analysis. It need not be a case where the narrative is logically weaker in 
reality. The damage seeps in when the established narrative that is propagated is lacking 
in the elements that would make it more persuasive in a logical discourse. It is also 
damaging when the established narrative does not credibly counter or does not counter at 
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all, the logic presented by the opposing narrative. 
 
   An essential component of fundamentalist narratives is the idea of who the enemy 
is. Booth states that, "part of the bliss offered is total clarity of who the enemies are." 
448
 
This would naturally lead to a polarised view of the world in which the fundamentalist is 
awaiting patiently for a millennial end in which the final battle will give victory to the 
faithful. But until then, they have to combat all the enemies of the faith.
449
 
     A classic example of how what has been described works is seen in the narratives 
given by and about Syed Qutb. It has all the characteristics of a good fundamentalist 
"story" in which the protagonist (Qutb) starts out as a person brought up with Islamic 
virtues. But along the way he initially gets enchanted with Western values and lifestyles. 
He then experienced a transformation when he saw in America the negative aspects of 
Western culture and life for what it is. As such, he made the ultimate sacrifice of giving 
up pleasures that such a life offered to the point he was willing to be tortured in a horrific 
manner for his beliefs in the prisons of Nasser. But ultimate victory was his as he never 
succumbed to such enormous pressures and was steadfast in his beliefs about justice as 
offered by Islam. His reward came in the form of martyrdom.
450
  
  A more contemporary version of this narrative seen in extremist Muslim website 
literature would be how the young radical born in Western / secular society led a life of 
sin only to discover later on through a series of life events or by meeting the "significant 
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 Ibid., 388-391. 
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other",  the true path in the form of Jihad offered by the extremist narrative. But it will be 
a journey that is fraught with danger and the ever-present threat of detection. The young 
radical despite all objections and lack of support given by his family is willing to give up 
the comforts of material life, leave his loved ones and take the perilous journey that will 
bring him to a fight that may end his life but assure ultimate martyrdom if he stays true to 
the course.  We can see how this narrative parallels Qutb‘s life narrative as it is told by his 
supporters and how the contemporary extremist Muslim narrative is meant to emphasise 
the idea of the ‗journey‘ to the ‗true‘ path. It is sometimes the compelling nature of such 
experiential accounts that adds to the persuasive appeal in the extremist repertoire of 
narratives. In many ways such stories are meant to illustrate the ‗culture‘ of jihad with its 





Let us now look at an example of how the logical structure works in extremist 
Muslim discourse. The example here is the HUT discussion forum entitled, ―Jihad is the 
only way to Kalifah ‖ 452 The discussion thread quotes an article apparently written by a 
Mujahid. The narrative is initially quoting religious scriptures in a poetic argument that 
would create resonance by appealing to ingrained religious beliefs among Muslims. This 
is important as his starting premise on scriptural epistemic rationality presented in a 
poetic manner that would get the initial attention of his perspective audience. But what 
happens then is a move to use analogical reasoning.  
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He then uses analogical reasoning by describing a hypothetical military coup 
d'état in American society in which ―a number of military officers were carrying out an 
order to change the liberal democratic system that had been accepted by all sections in 
the American society. Furthermore the system is considered as something that is standard 
and established, and it does not yield to any replacement or substitution.‖ 
 
He then argues what the likely reaction of the people of the country will be. 
Subsequently he rationalises that the American populace will vehemently object by force 
of arms if necessary to this forced change of democratic systems. This he qualifies as 
being in accordance to acceptable and internationally recognised regulations on the right 
of defense, which would naturally free the population of accusations of terrorism and 
other associated allegations.  
 
But then he correlates the situation to Muslim communities and questions why 
this is only applicable to the West and not to Muslims when their rights and sovereignty 
is violated.   
 
―If the use of force and arms have been approved and 
allowed for every nation, in order to protect the established 
concept that had long been common between them. Then, 
how come the same method is prohibited and forbidden for 
the Muslims the moment its identity, standard practices and 
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Rabbani (Godly) system are facing confiscation and 
elimination by a military faction or others that have sold 
their honour and loyalty to the enemies of the Ummah? 
 
Why are the Islamic Ummah banned from defending its 
fundamental teachings and standard practices (eg. syariah, 
khilafah, etc) with the use of force, when every other nation 
and society are practicing the same method? 
Why, when other nations or society are defending its 
standard principles with the use of military might it is 
regarded as advanced and legitimate, and that it is one of 
their basic rights which should be given outright support 
and assistance?! 
  
Whereas, supposed that the Islamic Ummah is practicing 
similar tactic, ―jihad‖ and its manner of operations would 
right away be labeled as backward and that it is an act of 
terrorism or that it is an uncivilized way as well as many 
other false accusations! 
 
―Why is that approach allowed for you and not for us?!!‖ 
 
  Besides the analogical reasoning used, let us see if the narrative is logically 
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argued. The premise here is that armed resistance is justifiable when any community is 
threatened with an armed force that will infringe on their democratic freedom. The 
conclusion that follows is that if there are double standards in how this is applied when it 
comes to Muslims, it is not acceptable. The actual presence of double standards is of 
course debatable. In a simplified form, the statement is logical as the premise can support 
the conclusion. It naturally becomes complex when you have more variables coming in 
and especially when it is applied to particular contexts. This demonstrates the principal 
behind the logical structure. A premise that supports conclusion and hence a logical 
argument exists when it is reduced to its bare ingredients. There is a highly persuasive 
effect to this analogical reductionism as it makes ‗sense‘ to a universal audience. But does 
that mean that while the logical structure exists, it will be defeated when more variables 
and different contexts are applied? This is not necessarily the case as the findings will 
reveal that extremist narratives will produce their own set of supportive variables and 
contexts.  Let us now look at how this narrative gets weakened in the discourse that 
follows. 
 
One reader first questions the ethos of the contributor to question what he has 
actually done for Jihad and thus subtly insinuates that he ascribes to the idea only in 
words and not action. The next reader categorically counters every point in the article 
with instances in Islam and world history where armed resistance was not the case as well 
as countering the idea by citing the example set by the Prophet Muhammad. But he 
agreed with the author on only one point- that the West does not want the Islamic 




The next reader asserted that a caliphate is necessary before any ideas of Jihad can 
be entertained. Also one should be careful in contexts where Jihad is appropriate as it can 
degenerate to extreme levels, 
 
―The Messenger established the first Islamic state without 
Jihad. This fact is contradictin xxx's post. 
Jihad is only fightin kafir, to get security in Muslim hands 
so that the Ummah can establish Islam. But the apparatus 
of Khilafah can only be established and sustained if the 
Society is revived. 
Khilafah needs the support of the masses and people of 
influence, or it will not get established, and this is shown in 
the seerah, in the actions of the Messenger prior to Medina. 
You can't mix rules of Islam like the Jihadis do, like hadood 
punishment before even havin Khilafah, and fightin jihad 
on muslims, what's next if your boss didn't pay your wages 
this week youre gonna fight jihad on your company!‖ 
 
 We can therefore see how this argument gets weakened by logical discourse. But 
interestingly enough the basic premise of resistance to aggression is supported by all the 
readers in the forum. It is the means / end states and when it should be applied that are 
argued over.  
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To summarise, in extremist narratives as in any narrative for that matter, it is not 
always the correct or most rational argument that convinces. But it is the impression, ac-
tual presence or approximation to actual formal rationality in the argument that greatly 
improves the prospects for persuasion. It is also highly dependent on the social context 
and the psychology of the intended audience. Most importantly the narrative will have the 
greatest impact only when it is in an environment for social communications that approx-
imates the ideal speech situation and true communicative action in the minds of the au-
dience. In other words, the most convincing narrative is one that creates an impression of 
rationality or is actually rational and is presented in a medium that is unconstrained by 













 PART 1  
THE IDEOLOGICAL CLUSTER 
 
An analysis of the web posts, ideological literature and selected web forum posts, 
revealed a total of twenty three themes. Some of them reinforce current ideas such as 
those attributing extremism to the influence of conspiracy ideas, a supremacist belief 
system or the power of emotively resonant messages. What is different though from 
previous depictions is evidence of their logical construction and argumentation. More 
importantly, the key discoveries come from a significant number of newly discovered 
themes that contradict the idea of rhetoric being the dominant feature of such narratives. 
The last chapter will focus on themes which illustrate the type of argumentation logic and 
technique employed by extremists and their sympathisers.  
 
The twenty four themes are categorised into three clusters. The ideological cluster, 
the resonance cluster and the arguementation cluster.  In this chapter we focus on the 
ideological cluster. The ideological cluster encompasses themes that focus on ideas, 
concepts or a perspective. Many of them employed a rational argumentation approach 
that was either ‗empirical‘453 or corroborated in some other form. It also incorporates 
logical arguments that employ deductive or inductive reasoning.  The themes in this 
cluster are as follows: 
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a) ―The Accepted Idea.‖ 
b) ―Appealing to Universal Values.‖ 
c) ―Biasness of Mainstream Media.‖ 
d) ―True but little known.‖ 
e) ―Realisable results and viable solutions.‖ 
f) ―Seeing past the ruse – creating consciousness.‖ 
g) ―From Weak to Powerful to Supremacist.‖ 
h) ―The Conspiracy.‖  




a. “The Accepted Idea”:  Narratives that espoused this theme used mainstream 
academic and political discourse to strengthen their arguments.   The narratives used by 
extremists on their websites are not just peppered with religious rhetoric and expositions 
to convince readers of the veracity and logic of their assertions. Many of their narratives 
also appropriate theories, ideas and assertions found in mainstream academia (e.g. Politi-
cal science) and Western journalistic analysis to add credibility to their ideas. Some are 
simply mainstream reports on atrocities that appear in global news agencies. For instance, 
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the report on the t-shirts produced by IDF (Israeli Defense Force) Snipers that showed a 
pregnant Palestinian woman in the cross-hairs of a sniper rifle with the tag line: ―One 
shot-Two Kills.‖ Another example shows Osama Bin Laden quoting from the book, ‗Im-
perial Hubris- Why the West is losing the War on terror,‘ written by Michael Scheuer who 
was formerly with the CIA and ran the counter terrorist centre‘s ‗Bin Laden Station.‘454 
Osama Bin Laden actually says in his speech, ―…and if you like to get to know some of 
the reasons for your losing your war against us, then read the book of Michael Scheuer in 
this regard," 
455
 The use of the works by credible sources is not limited to works that 
seem to associate with ideas from the far left, but they also refer to works that are general 
in perspective.   For instance, ‗Abu Suhail‘ in his article in Inspire called, ―The Way for-
ward‖ used this quote by  John Perkins, the author of Confessions of an Economic Hit-
man to illustrate how the essence of what al-Qaeda was doing is in line with universal 
sensibilities that resist subjugation and rule by tyrants. 
 
...What Paine offered to his countrymen in the brilliant 
Common Sense was the soul that my young Indonesian 
friends had referred to — an idea, a faith in the justice of a 
higher power, and a religion of freedom and equality that 
was diametrically opposed to the British monarchy and its 
elitist class systems. What Muslims offered was similar: 
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faith in a higher power and a belief that developed 
countries have no right to subjugate and exploit the rest of 
the world. Like colonial minutemen, Muslims were 
threatening to fight for their rights, and like the British in 
the 1770s, we classified such actions as terrorism. History 
appeared to be repeating itself. 
456
   
 
There is another aspect of the ‗Accepted Idea‘ theme that resonates particularly 
with Muslims. Absolutist and narrow perspectives from extremists link themselves to 
Islamic concepts that are more widely accepted. In the Al –Muhajiroun website, issues 
regarding Takfeer (excommunication from the religion) are linked to Aqeedah (doctrine 
of faith). All Muslims accept the idea of Tawhid (Oneness of Allah) but they differ in the 
idea of Takfeer. By linking the former widely accepted idea with the latter (in which there 
are contentions), not only do extremists create resonance to their interpretation when 
pitched in terms of accepted ideas in the Muslim world, they also gain an aura of 
legitimacy.   
 
On this issue of Takfeer, this website stated, ―...Clearly, beyond doubt, all the rul-
ers of Muslim countries are Kafir Murtad
457
. In order to purify our 'Aqeedah and 
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Tawheed, we must declare them Kafir or we too may fall under the banner of kufr.‖458 
Thus Takfeer is not used solely to gain moral superiority over the other, but to abase the 
enemy who is Muslim as well for the purpose of resistance. There is a clear instrumental 
rationality behind Muslim extremists using an extreme interpretation of Takfeer, for it 
legitimises and leverages on any existing populist rationale for rebellion and change of 
systems. It is this communicative ability to create linkages with legitimate / more ac-
cepted notions and the needs and wants of people that gives extremist narratives their 
credibility and ability to persuade.  
 
b. “Appealing to Universal Values” 
Extremist narratives do not always seek to espouse a logic or value system unique 
only to their ideology. What we fail to see is how extremist narratives often tap onto 
universal value systems that anyone from any socio-economic segment in society can 
relate to. Some of the most common of these values would include altruism, nobility, 
honour, the idea of sacrificing for a greater good, courage and most importantly the idea 
of freedom. Such values are universal and they create resonance with almost anyone. 
Freedom in the extremist Muslim context extrapolates to the idea of resistance against 
tyranny and oppression. It also encompasses freedom of thought. This advocates the idea 
that one should not be slaves to a mode of thinking that the state wants but instead the 
mind should be unrestricted and free to seek the ‗truth‘. This truth, as extremists believe, 
would ultimately lead those who are ‗searching‘ towards their kind of ideology. Those 
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wishing to combat such ideologies might find this notion very hard to accept as there is 
the fear that accepting the presence of universal values in extremist narratives might give 
an impression of legitimacy to their cause.  
 
 In the ―Clearguidance forums‖, the following quote from Hassan Al-Banna was 
featured; 
 
I am a traveller seeking the truth, a human searching for the 
meaning of humanity and a citizen seeking dignity, 
freedom, stability, and welfare under shade of Islam. I am a 
free man who is aware of the purpose of his existence and 
who proclaims: Truly, my prayer and my sacrifice, my 
living and my dying are all for Allah, the Lord of the 
worlds: no parter (sic) has He. This, am I commanded and I 
am of those who submit to His Will. This is who i am, who 




Notice that in this inspiring quote, ‗truth‘, ‗humanity‘, ‗dignity‘, ‗freedom‘, 
‗stability‘ and ‗welfare‘ are universal values and concepts that appeal to all.  Similarly, a 
discussion thread appeared in the Internet discussion forum, Islamic Awakening entitled 
―Syed Qutb - John Locke of the Islamic World.‖ What is remarkable about this post 
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written apparently by a well read individual, other than it gives a benign and positive take 
on the works of Syed Qutb, are labels such as ‗responsible governance‘ that again appeal 
to universal sensibilities. In this narrative Qutb‘s idea are compared to John Loke‘s ideas 
about legitimacy of government and freedom. The author emphaised how Qutb‘s use of 
independent reasoning and the logical thinking used in ijtihad can be used to reform 
Muslim socities. Qutb‘s idea‘s also echoed John Loke‘s idea that waging war against the 
state is a necessity if it has lost its legitimacy. Qutb and Loke both emphasized on the 
concept of freedom which is a universal value.  
 
―Both Locke and Qutb imagined freedom in the same absolutist terms. For Locke, 
freedom was a God-given, inalienable attribute that took priority over civil society. Qutb, 
who argues that Islam meant freedom from human authority, echoed Locke's ideas about 
natural rights as God-given and more important than civil society and government.‖ 
 
 The author also suggested reading Qutb from the perspective of the values 
espoused as these are similar to Loke. This he says demonstrates the convergence of 
similar values from the enlightenment period and basic Islamic principals.   
 
While advancing the notion that there can be an alternate 
reading of Qutb by Muslim ideologues, I am also 
suggesting that discourses are what we make of them. Ideas 
have impact on reality, but reality too has an impact on the 
formation of ideas and on how ideas are interpreted and 
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applied. Some Muslims read Qutb and are motivated to use 
violence against their regimes and the West—whom they 
perceive as tyrannical. But Muslims should read Qutb's 
ideas as advocating freedom and responsible governance—
perhaps the most important traits missing from many 
Islamic societies today. Internal diversity. The different 
readings of Syed Qutb underscore the diversity within 
Islam and Muslims. 
 
 A sympathetic reading of Qutb reveals him as a 
philosopher of freedom and justice—and not a philosopher 
of terror. Similarly, a sympathetic view of the Muslim 
World will reveal a thirst of freedom and justice and not a 
penchant for violence or hate. The Enlightenment—a 
global movement? The most important lession that can be 
drawn from this comparison between Locke and Qutb is the 
fundamental convergence in basic Islamic principles and 
enlightenment values. The West while undergoing socio-
political and culture reform under the influence of 
enlightenment thinking may have moved away from 
Christianity and religiosity. But curiously it also moved 
closer to Islam. The most compelling irony of the tensions 
between Islam and the West is not how different the two 
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 The emphasis on universal values such as freedom is again seen in the 
MPACUK
461
 website;  
 
Bosnia marks the death of true Muslims who once lived for 
justice, equality and freedom. Each and everyone of us is 
living lies. This is not and was not Islam. 
 
―So I call for the resurrection of these dead ‗Muslims‘. I 
ask you to return to the true Islam and carry your Jihad. 
What happened in Bosnia didn‘t end there. Since then 
we‘ve had Iraq, Palestine and many more. 
 
I ask, how much more manslaughter will it take for you to 
understand your duty of jihad? They call you retarded on 
national television, they call you dogs in the Telegraph and 
now they‘re proudly implementing legislation to ban the 
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In essence, author is appealing for justice to Muslims who have been ill-reated 
anywhere in the world, freedom to practice their faith and equality in the way they are 
treated. We can see how when pitched in this frame, the argument appeals to universal 
sensibilities which extremists capitalize on. This universal value frame is also seen in an 
article that appeared in Inspire 
463
 that talked about the issue of the Niqab,  
 
 ―As mentioned above the Niqab is not mandatory on Muslim Women according to 
many scholars. But because it is a right of Muslim Women and because it has become a 
symbol of being Muslim today, Muslims must take a firm position in this battle and dig in 
their trenches.‖ 
 
 Here we see extremists use the same argument the West uses against them, namely 
women have the right to choose what they want to wear.  So in this case they choose to 
wear the Burqa. This is contrary to stereotypical ideas that they are forced to do so. The 
issue is now about the right to choose. Thus extremists when it suits their arguments will 
revert to universal values and those which the West can identity with to garner credibility 
to their argument.   
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 Similarly, the Al-Qassam Martyrs Brigade
464
 in its website quotes Yusuf al-
Qaradawi‘s 465  stance of comdemning terrorism and the idea of a global jihad but 
advoctating legitimate use of suicide bombing tactics if it is in the course of resisting 
occupation.  
 
Al-Qaradawi distinguishes between jihad and irhab- 
terrorism, or between legitimate irhab -being feared by the 
enemy to deter it from any aggression, and illegitimate 
irhab, that is terrorizing innocent people as done by groups 
using the name of Islam, which declare world on the whole 
world in an illegitimate use of jihad in an inappropriate 
setting, terrorizing innocent people- Muslims and non-
Muslims- in order to achieve alleged political ends inside 
or outside Muslim lands, flagrantly contravening the 
principles and ethics of jihad in Islam. Hence Al-Qaradawi 
condemned violent acts committed by extremist groups in 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries against innocent people, 
whether tourists or others. He further stripped the 
indiscriminate killing and shedding of innocent lives 
committed by these groups of any legitimacy. 
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 Al-Qaradawi is extremely careful to distinguish 
between extremist groups that declare war on the whole 
world, killing indiscriminately, tainting the image of Islam 
and providing its enemies with fatal weapons to use against 
it, on the one hand, and on the other groups resisting 
occupation. 
 
He does not hesitate to justify martyrdom operations, 
considering them to be the weapon of one with no other 
options, who is deprived of equivalent weapons to those of 
the enemy, in order to defend his home and his land. God's 
justice does not allow the weak to be completely deprived 
of any weapon, hence the latter's use of his own body as a 
deterrent weapon. In any case, the ethics of jihad must 





Through their condemnation of terrorism and by renaming their struggle as 
fighting against occupation, the Ezzedeen Al Qassam Martyrs brigade gain legitimacy as 
they appeal to universal values of fighting for independence and freedom. Qadrawi‘s 
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argument above lists religious and inclusivist ideas of cooperating with the international 
community and not wanting to engage in offensive jihad unless threatened by the 
neighbouring nations.  But this distinction stops at the issue of Palestine and Iraq. Its 
addresses many tolerant aspects of Islam but draws the line at Israel which he sees as an 
occupation force.  
 
This argument is even more appealing as it addresses common criticisms of 
terrorism. Terrorism by its very nature is condemnable. But when militancy is framed as 
resistance against an occupying force and assertions are made against civilian attacks and 
about confining to only military targets, it gains natural legitimacy. Such rationally 
argued legitimacy appeals to accepted universal values of ‗independance‘ and ‗freedom‘. 
This makes it all the more dangerous, as supporting any kind of militancy easily 
degenerates to harm done to civilians as conflict is seldom contained and ―civilians‖ and 
non-combatants usually become a negotiable label. There is seen in how the group still 
carries out suicide attacks on civilians despite this narrative.
467
  The narrative‘s intention 
ultimately is to remove the impression Al Qassam as a ‗terrorist group‘.  
 
 
c. “Biasness of mainstream media.”  
This theme stresses that Western media cannot be trusted as it is meant to support 
the views of the establishment. This theme provides an alternate account of events and 
issues that culminate in an alternate discourse by forum members that reinforces and 
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extrapolates this version. Readers who are inundated by mainstream media flock to 
alternate accounts that are not widely propagated. There is the general idea that the ‗truth‘ 
gets repressed and therefore alternate information that is repressed and not well 
publicised must surely represent the ‗truth.‘ We can see this illustrated in the ‗Feedback 
from readers‘ section of al-Qaeda‘s ‗Inspire‘ magazine, in which one of the readers 
wrote,   
 
―I would like to thank you all for providing us with one of the best media information the 
mujahidin could offer. With the current media under control of the Jews, it is a great 
change to have news that are from the ummah to the ummah. May Allah bless your efforts 
and make the magazine a continuous program.‖468 
 
d. “True but little known.”  
This is related to the earlier theme on the distrust of mainstream media. The 
appeal of this theme lies in the ability of the extremist narrative to provide less known 
information not found in mainstream media. On another level, the credibility of this 
alternate account is enhanced by corroborative evidence from credible historical sources 
or by citing information from Western journalistic sources that might not have garnered 
much visibility. This is also meant to challenge common impressions about extremist 
narratives. For instance, the accusation might be that extremist narratives commonly like 
to portray a picture of conspiracy and misinformation by the West. What extremist 
narratives do is then cite information that is corroborated from mainstream sources to add 
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credibility to their alternate version. We can see an illustration of this form of rational 
argumentation, in the ―Clearguidance‖ forums where one forum member quoted in 
response to news about a bombing by terrorists in Tel-Aviv, 
 
―...i tell you what, it would not surprise me if M O S S A D were involved in the 
Tel Aviv bombings..they got a long history of blowing their own people and blaming the 
Arabs for political means...‖ 469 
 
The ―Lavon Affair.‖ was then cited. This was an actual operation in which Israeli 
intelligence conducted attacks on post offices and American libraries in Egypt posing as 
extremists to undermine the then Egyptian government. This is of course a classic 
example of a ‗False Flag‘ 470  operation. The subsequent posts then explained and 
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―http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L05117574 471  
~THE Lavon affair.... In 1954, Israeli agents working in Egypt planted bombs in several 
buildings, including a United States diplomatic facility, and left evidence behind 
implicating Arabs as the culprits.‖472 
 
If a forum reader were to make independent checks, he or she would be able to 




The culminative effect of such arguments that are built up by this rational 
argumentation process, have a powerful resonant effect on any subsequent ideas 
generated by extremists. These new ideas will leverage on such ‗proof‘ to hint at further 
conspiracies or to compare present similar incidents to what happened in the past. In this 
case, their assertion would be that many ‗attacks‘ by extremists were actually ‗false flag‘ 
operations used to make Muslims look bad. Even though further research will reveal 
conspiracy theories for what they are, such narratives still create the initial cognitive 
opening in the minds of readers. This will now make them doubt everything from 
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mainstream Western sources. The alternate perspectives offered by extremists thus 
become more credible to the readers.  
 
e. “Realisable results, viable solutions.”  
A common criticism raised in both extremist narratives and web forums is that ac-
tivism which is deemed as a pacifist solution will not produce realisable and viable solu-
tions. Activism and similar pacifist methods are seen as placatory methods tolerated by 
the state as they know that it will help angry young Muslims vent their anger.  An article 
that illustrates this theme appeared in the Chechnyan militant website ―Kavkaz‖ that was 
entitled, ―If Jihad is suddenly stopped.‖474  
Let's imagine, hypothetically, what would happen if sud-
denly Mujahideen abandon Jihad. Will the peace and Islam 
prevail in Dagestan? Well the history shows us that the an-
swer is NO. Infidels first would straighten things with 
blather-Ikhwan, then with businessmen-ut-Tahrirs. The Su-
fis would not be forgotten either, and large areas of logging 
in the Siberian taiga would be prepared for them. 
  In other words such Muslim Activist groups (Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hizb 
ut Tahrir (HUT)) will still be sent to concentration camps and prisons in Siberia no matter 
how much they conform to official lines. 
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Over 70 years of "peaceful" Kufr, Muslims of Dagestan 
were subjugated to an unheard secularization, and the Sha-
riah Courts and the Jesuit talks of Korkmasov about "we do 
not forbid you to live according to Sharia" reached the 
point that water was poured into the mouth of a fasting per-
son and the prayer was banned. This is without mentioning 
the fact that the religion of Allah was universally derided 
and God-fearing Muslim exhibited as a retarded ignorant. 
Hajj was banned for decades, and of those understand (sic) 
the Quran remained only few. All this - the fruits of "peace-
ful call" of Sufis and their defeatism.  
This part of the article cites historical persecution of the Muslim community‘s 
right to practice Islam approved in theory but punished in practice in Dagestan.  There is 
sarcasm in citing how peaceful ―Sufiist‖ methods were still ultimately defeatist and a 
failure. The author then went onto say,  
Sayyid Qutb, who gave his life for his beliefs, would have 
had a big surprised (sic) of the snake tricky Ikhwans today, 
who for the sake of political expediency abandoned Aqidah 
and Sharia. Islam is the religion of monotheism and the in-
dependence from kufr turned them into a political program 
which they "bend" to the extent of their benefits and stupid-
ity. The result of nearly a century of activity has led them 
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to the fact that the "cart is still there." They do not have 
power in any country in the world, and their presence in 
parliament of Taghut only consolidated its power and split 
the Islamic Ummah. In Egypt they in their backs brought 
Nasser to power, who later was the first who brutally 
cracked down on them. Since then, the "Ikhwan" were 
made bargaining chip of democracy. Ironically, now, by the 
extent of political expediency, they are by bundles thrown 
into jail, then ascended into the parliament. They can and 
do both, almost at the same time. The educational process 
of "tahrirs" can take as long as they wish. As time passes 
they in the same way as in the time of "People-volunteers", 
known in the history for their goings to the people, will be 
forgotten and thrown into the dustbin of history. As well as 
the Ikhwans.   
This excerpt points to the compromising nature of Activist groups (HUT & MB) 
who are seen as sellouts who took the easy way out and not remaining true to their faith 
and struggle. The narrative asserts that HUT and MB have not produced any real results. 
Their ‗achievements‘ are paltry, not significant, ineffectively slow and in fact have made 
things worse. 
 “Even if all the mujahedeen at once leave the Caucasus, even if all the Sufi imams will 
wash the feet of soldiers and policemen, even if Ikhwans will walk like the pioneers, tie 
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and no beard, kuffar will never rest until the light of Islam will not go out of the mind of 
the last Muslim!‖ 
This last excerpt asserts that compromising, being subservient and stopping mili-
tancy has never and will never help, because the state and Western society ultimately 
want to remove Islam and it is a war on Islam itself. 
 
f. “Seeing past the ruse – creating consciousness.”   
 
This is referring to deception by the West, non-Muslims and their lackeys on the 
Muslim world. Extremist websites frequently take great pains to methodically point out 
the hidden and subtle deception in the narratives of this group as well as in their actions 
which may seem benign and well intended. One of the main techniques used to expose 
this deception is to use an alternate version based on an analysis of the issue or event 
from the viewpoint of the extremists, quoting ‗evidence‘ from Western sources 
themselves or simply to highlight what is supposedly being seen and experienced at the 
grassroots.  
 
  But a precursor to this argument requires having the right mindset. This is 
portrayed as the need to develop political sharpness and insight and engendering more of 
the conspiratorial view of history that Ralph Epperson advocates.
475
  In the HUT forum 
one of the readers wrote:  
What ought to be highlighted is that the Ummah keeps 
                                                 
475
 See section in this chapter on the theme of conspiracy for more details on this.  
226 
 
falling victim to political deception and constant trickery 
that obscure the sound vision of her issues. The most 
dangerous style adopted by the enemies and their tools 
from among the collaborators of thought and politics is the 
distortion of facts. They resort to infiltrating the Ummah‘s 





 The writer here is essentially emphasing that Muslims given into political 
deception and trickery of the west are unaware of this being done onto them. For 
Muslims who are already inclined to believe that politics ultimately involves a great deal 
of deception, such an argument creates further reinforcement and entrenchment of this 
idea. This quote is emphasising the need to cultivate the ability to ‗read between the lines‘ 
and to ‗wake up‘ from this internalised distortion of facts propagated by the West.  
 
  Qaeda al-Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Malahim Media) in its 
seventh issue of the Magazine Jihaad Publications spoke about the deception by the West 
as part of the plan to destroy or undermine Islam. The quote below is referring to Ameri-
can, French and British presence in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arab pen-
insula, 
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  They use several flimsy pretexts, such as maritime 
piracy, and alleged saboteurs from land. The objective of 
this new Crusade is to establish the alleged Jewish state 
from the river to the sea, demolish Jerusalem, destroy the 
steadfast heroes in Gaza, and to completely control the pen-
insula of Islam. You should understand the dimensions of 
their plan and plot. By Allah, it is one war, in which they 
mastered deceit, and they were assisted by the  traitors 
(note: They heavily criticise the Al-Saud government as be-
ing these ‗traitors.‘), as they did in Gaza and Bagh-
dad....This military campaign amassing in Ma`rib, Al-Jawf, 
Shabwah, Abyan, Sana‘a, and Hadramawt, which they kept 
it away from the media, is just a step towards striking on 
the tribes and their sons with flimsy and false pretexts that 
are really aimed at breaking the dignity of the tribes, dis-
arming them, controlling their land, and killing their sons in 
order to make it easy for the foul agents and the Crusade to 
humiliate them.
477
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 In other words any benign reasons given by the Americans or their allies for mili-
tary presence are not to be believed as their actual actions when analysed reveal the truth 
of their intentions. In this case their analysis leads to the sinister conclusion mentioned in 
the quote. The appeal of such an argument is not so much in the proposed conclusion. 
That in itself is enough to enrage but the ‗credible‘ evidence comes from the ‗observable‘ 
evidence being cited. Namely, American and Western military presence in the Arabian 
peninsula being a fact no matter what the reason might be.   
  
 In the Clearguidance Forums, one writer wrote,  
 
There is a documentary called ""Secret Wars of Desert 
Storm" (or something similar
478
) that details the deception 
of the KSA gov. by the U.S. Apparently, there were never 
any Iraqi troops near the Saudi border. So there's another 
layer to the deception. This documentary also explains the 
health effects of the depleted uranium munitions that have 
been dropped all over Iraq and now Afghanistan. The 
longterm effects of these weapons is similar to the dreaded 
biological/chemical weapons of other illegally unelected 
thug regimes outside the U.S. So there's another layer to the 
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   Thus by citing a rational basis for their worldview based on evidence from neutral 
Western journalistic investigations, other readers might find subsequent accounts by 
extremist writers equally credible.   
 
     The next example uses a similar form of corroboration but this time using back 
what Western leaders themselves cite. In the HUT website in an article entitled 
―America's designs for the region (New World Order)‖ it was mentioned,  
 
 US has categorically mentioned it wants to change 
the way Govts are run in the mid-East according to what it 
feels are the hallmarks of a democratic govt and human 
rights. – The‘ third pillar‘ July 1992  Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Edward P. 
Djerejian delivered an important speech at the Meridian 
Centre. But most importantly it will forcibly ensure the ‗3rd 
pillar‘ supporting activism, and media. 
 
 Therefore, America's progress according to the 
policy of the "Third Pillar" and the illustration of her vision 
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towards the roots of terrorism indicates the extent of her 
hatred towards Islam and towards the Muslim people of the 
region, as well as the extent of her work towards 
plundering their riches and the faculties of their lands. 
Islam is the root of "terrorism" according to them and the 
terrorists of the world and the lands that harbour them are 
almost exclusively confined to the Muslims and the Islamic 





  We can see how the last sentence is a conclusion that has skipped a number of steps 
to arrive there. This is in some ways an ignoratio elenchi argument that proves a number 
of items but leads to a different and not well linked conclusion. I.e. America‘s emphasis 
on the ‗third pillar‘ means that it hates Islam. The article also states that America wants 
control over the people and resources of the world. Now these claims are expected to be 
substantiated by implicit reading between the lines of the factual narratives. This is 
possible is one were to work backwards.  ―Plundering the riches‖ can be worked back to 
factual statements made by the US about wanting to change the Middle East. Claims of 
noble intentions such as wanting to introduce democracy and rights are being portrayed 
as a US ruse to attain hegemony over the region. This implication gets validated when 
statements made by US leaders are quoted back and readers are asked to ‗read between 
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the lines.‘ It was quoted in this forum that Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz 
said, "Democracy will start from Iraq to all the Arab countries." This can also mean 
toppling other Arab regimes. This emphasis to ‗read between the lines‘ that HUT is 
propagating helps validate extremist analysis and conclusion of events and issues. Thus 
everything the Americans do will be viewed and read with suspicion. It does not help that 
there is ‗factual‘ evidence that can be contextualised to support some of these claims.  
 
 In the Inspire magazine, a question was e-mailed to the editor from a ‗moderate‘ 
American Muslim reader that directly critised al-Qaeda (AQ). What is remarkable is that 
AQ is trying to show that they can stand up to the worst challenge and scrutiny of their 
ideas and they do not have to resort to deception. This has immense implications. The 
writer is supposedly a voice from the grassroots of the US and is an American Muslim. 
The answer that came back categorically addressed the criticisms. 
 
 For instance, the criticism from the US reader said,  
 
For example, your latest issue of Inspire condemns the lies 
within the American media, however, you too confuse your 
reporting in writing that ―Obama is deceiving in claiming 
that his war is a war agains al Qaeda rather than Islam.‖ 
This is a lie from your own end. America has seven million 
Muslims who live in peace here with no conflict with the 
government or public. 
232 
 
 To wit the reply given was,  
 
We‘ll give you an example. The British Colonialist rule 
upon the Muslim world was a horrible page in our Islamic 
history. When the British ruled our lands, did they carry out 
a mass slaughter on every last Muslim they could find? No. 
Yet they waged war on Islam. How? By intending to 
control us, and eventually dividing us into many nation 
states. They were responsible for the destruction of the last 
remains of an Islamic Caliphate in March of 1924. And 
how were they able to do that? By the use of pawns in the 
Muslim world, people who don‘t have any honor for the 
sake of the religion. For them to destroy it and replace it 
with completely un-Islamic puppet governments is an act of 




  Here the reply is using historical exemplifications and applying the same logic 
used by the critique but in a different context. They are able to address criticisms by 
presenting alternate contexts the reader has not considered before. But most importantly, 
in a context or logical frame that makes them look favourable. In this case, the critique‘s 
assertion is that there is no ‗war on Islam‘ as the majority US Muslims are living 
peacefully there. The counter to this is, no, that is not true because US Muslims not aware 
of their subjugation. This allows the West to exert control over them and keep them 
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divided, similar to how the British did in the past.  This casts doubt in the minds of 
readers making them question if they have been indoctrinated by mainstream rhetoric and 
logic that makes them unaware of their subjugation.  
 
  In the discussion forum following the YouTube lecture by Awlaki entitled, ―Allah 
is Preparing us for Victory‖ & ―True Warrior‖, one of the readers said,  
 
87 years they enslaved us for ever more... they took away 
our khilafah and among themselves "they" rejoiced and 
made pacts to never allow Muslims to be free and unite 
globally. But how can they deny the people who follow 
Allah Azzawaajal - look how we awaken from our long 
sleep. How did those before us deny Islam in it's entirety. 
Al Khilafah will come to us, our children just as it was 
taken from our ancestors. May it be a light for the world a 




  This forum quote shows the ‗injustice‘ frame that is typical in such discussion 
threads. But more importantly, the underlying theme is that this injustice has become so 
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normalised that Muslims no longer even recognise it. They are therefore ‗sleeping‘ and 
need to get awakened by following the ‗true‘ path of Islam.  
  
  Another reader reinforced this idea of ‗awakening‘ in the same discussion thread 
by saying, 
 
 "So true, Look around, we are awaking to see the world for what it is. We seek to 
restore our global status, our lands oppressed and conquered and our honour is mud.? 
We are reviving our history, we will rise again and look at khorasan. so much is going on. 
Look at Al Sham and Irak of this hadeeth. Subhan Allah." 
 
  Observe how the writer connects ‗awakening‘ with what comes after that. This 
next step is the struggle to regain the state of supremacy that Islam used to have. This 
state of Islamic supremacy is thwarted by being desensitised to the ‗injustice‘ happening 
to Muslims.  This is also part of the ‗ruse‘ to keep Muslims ‗asleep‘ and compliant. This 
‗ruse‘ is aided by the very nature of contemporary society and materialism.  
 
  Another writer in the same discussion thread again reinforces this theme of 
‗awakening‘ but contextualised it to the material world that keeps Muslims ‗asleep‘ to the 
injustices being perpetrated again them, 
 
 Mash'Allah so true, 12 years to 13 years ago my 
brothers around me spoke of conflict against Islam, 
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Khorasan, Al Mahdi. Back then a young boy, lost in the 
material world I had no interest but today the world is so 
different. Muslims crave for Islam, Muslim crave for their 
global identity and status to be restored and we ALL 
recognise each other as Muslim. Gone are the nationalist 
differences. Look at the world Hotspots? and read Hadeeth 
of Rasool Allah - Subhan Allah  
 
  The idea of a ‗ruse‘ and how one can only appreciate the true nature of what is 
transpiring if they are woken up to it, has promoted some groups such as HUT to produce 
a lot of ‗political analysis‘ articles. HUT is heavy on ‗political analysis‘ for two main 
reasons. One, Muslims must be politically savvy to be aware of the injustice being done 
onto them. If not, they will be unaware of such injustice and worse still being 
desensitised to it, actually promote it. Secondly, such political analysis encourages 
readers to ―read-between-the lines.‘ This ability they repeatedly emphasise will help them 
discover such ‗ruses‘ by the West.   
 
g. “From Weak to Powerful to Supremacist.”  
Extremist narratives are also appealing because of the inferiority complex reversal 
they do. They do not just emphasize on the golden age of Islam but rather on the inherent 
moral and spiritual inferiority of non-Muslims which leads to an equally inferior lifestyle 
and capabilities. This role reversal is especially appealing to someone who might feel that 
in a secular system they are made to feel inferior, or to someone in a Muslim country, not 
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faring as well as their counterparts in non-Muslim countries. 
 
This role reversal then degenerates into supremacist notions. Many extremist 
sympathizers have also described how ‗new‘ extremist Muslim ideologues, like Abu 
Yahya Al-Libi and Khalid bin Abd al-Rahman al Husaynan,  give an impression of a 
strong, fearless and uncompromising Islam that can stand up to the West that appeals to 
the young.
483
  Here, extremist sympathizers have moved from their inferiority complex to 
feeling equally powerful as the non Muslim ‗other‘ and finally to feeling superior to 
them. Extremist narratives need to foster this supremacist mindset as it is a necessary 
precondition to develop the confidence to go against a powerful enemy. Take this quote 
from the Clearguidance forum for example, 
 
―…These kuffar are not strong, rather their system is the most fragile and weak system, 
and their individuals/people are the most fragile and weak people if you only look at how 
they live. The only reason that they are dominant at the moment is that the Muslims have 
sat back from their obligations...‖ 484 
 
 This self flagellation of blaming oneself has another purpose; it is meant to create 
the notion that Muslim apathy is what is causing their state of degradation and from 
claiming their rightful place of power. 
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In the HUT discussion thread called ‗Can there be an Islamic Democracy?‘, there 
is an emphasis on the historical supremacy of Islam in terms of better governance 
systems. The author highlights the supposed origins of the defeatist mindset / inferiority 
complex among Muslims by citing historical evidence seen in Western documentaries 
and research. In this instance quoting Professor Jim Khalili's documentary on the BBC 
called 'Science and Islam', 
 
―As Islamic civilisation declined they looked at the west and decided, erroneously, that 
the reason they had bettered themselves was because of their separation of religion from 
temporal affairs (which is true enough because the Church couldn't really rule as it had 
used it's archaic rules from the Rome of 2,000 years ago) and through democracy and so 
began to follow them...‖485 
 
This is a logically constructed argument using historical precedence to instead 
support supremacist ideas. The same pattern is repeated. The non-Muslim system is made 
to look inferior. i.e. ―…the Church couldn't really rule as it had used it's archaic rules 
from the Rome of 2,000 years ago…‖ Then the narrative does self-flagellation by 
describing the source of further Islamic decline as a result of having lost sight of their 
superior system and instead following the inferior / flawed system of the non-Muslims.  
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The historical precedence is also meant to show to readers how turning to the 
West is not better as they already have a superior system. A caveat again needs to be 
made at this point. There is nothing wrong in being proud of one‘s cultural position or 
making a conscious choice to follow it as it is deemed better. It only becomes extremist, 
when the ‗other‘ is belittled for the purpose of confrontation and to forcibly impose one‘s 
ideas. A middle ground would be to be proud of one‘s system of belief / culture but 
respecting and even learning from anything different. Unfortunately, the supremacist 
mindset extremist narratives foster are meant to culminate towards extremist solutions.  
 
The supremacist theme is best reflected in Ed Husain‘s experiential account of 
his journey through Muslim extremism. Husain spoke about the indoctrination process 
during the formative period of recruitment into such movements. The observed tactics 
included an open door policy and a willingness to have a debate or discourse.
486
 This 
made him feel special and not like a kid as he would have within the traditional Islamic 
circle of his parents. To him it was an act of rebellion against the traditional authority of 
his parents. So with his new found friends he had a place in the world. Furthermore 
being a teenager, he was impressed by the ‗tough guy / bad boys‘ image that YMO 
(Young Muslim Organisation) created on the streets, one with morals but no vice. 
487
 The 
other aspect of appeal was in the sense of belonging to a cause and pride he felt when the 
lectures in YMO reinforced the idea of Islam‘s superiority.488 A departure from how he 
felt previously belonging to a minority group. Later this extended to HUT instilling a 
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notion of them being a ―superior sort of Muslim.‖489 
 
For Husain, another source of appeal towards HUT, was that he noticed that 
members were of a higher intellectual calibre. To him they always had answers to hard 
questions that others would give only political or dodgy answers to. One of his main 
reasons to move to the HUT was that he felt they had concrete ideas as opposed to vague 
ideas (he considered Mawdudi‘s ideas as vague) of how to create an Islamic state.490 
This enabled one from being in a marginal state to become one of superiority instead. 
YMO had too narrow a focus, HUT to him transcended into global Islam which made 




h. “The Conspiracy”  
The narratives that espouse an underlying theme of conspiracy in any issue or 
event are in many ways endemic of the thinking prevalent in the Middle East. Abdel 
Salam describes how, ―Conspiracy-centred thought in the Arab Press, in Academia and 
Public opinion frequently promotes the notion that Arabs or Muslims are ―targeted‖ by 
outside powers.‖492 The thinking is that these countries are out to undermine and keep 
Muslim nations in a state of weakness and subjugation. Abdel Salam explains that this 
mindset promotes a worldview that is typical of the ―us-versus-them‖ dialectic.493 He 
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also cites how a conspiracy worldview depends on myths and hearsay as opposed to 
‗scientific thought that relies on logic, causality, observation, experimentation and 
methods or theoretical frameworks that assist in the study of various phenomenon...‖494 
The question here is whether this is an accurate description of how conspiracy ideas cited 
in extremist websites gain traction with readers. Or do these conspiracy claims also 
employ the use of rationally constructed arguments through which they gain credence in 
cyberspace? Or is it purely one that is meant to incite an emotive reaction that helps to 
transfer blame away from extremists?  The final question we need to ask is if the origins 
of such conspiracy theories and worldview really have a culturalist origin or if this is 
endemic of the literature that originates from the West itself.  
 
The findings show that while some of the conspiracies cited in the narratives are 
sometimes based on hearsay and myth, many of the writers go out of their way to provide 
‗empirical‘ evidence to prove their validity. Another important caveat needs to be made at 
this point. This does not mean that such arguments are therefore true or correct just 
because they are rationally constructed. Rather it shows how a technique of using such 
‗corroboration‘, makes these claims more believable to readers. The next few examples 
from the research done will demonstrate how conspiracy claims gain traction with 
readers.  
 
In the Malay extremist blog ―Barisan Jihad‖, a link was given to a blog on con-
spiracy theories in which there was a discussion thread in Malay with the title, ―THE 
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CONSPIRATORIAL VIEW OF HISTORY IS NOT THE ―CONSPIRACY THEORY‖ OF 
THE LAZY AND THE LOSERS!!!‖ 495 496 The author of the blog was a fan of the works 
of A. Ralph Epperson, a conspiracy theorist, historian and writer. His post then went on 
to quote Western sources and spoke mainly about how this worldview is in fact only for 
those with keen insights to look past the obvious. He adds that such views are also meant 
for those who are not conditioned to accept the deluge of mainstream account of issues 
and events that are in fact products of the powers that be. It is instead the worldview of 
those who have shed this to see things for what they really are by discovering ‗facts‘ that 
have been suppressed.  
 
The purpose of this blogger‘s argument was to initially rebut a criticism made 
from a renowned Indonesian Uztaz called Eep Sayaefulloh Fatah, who had criticised 
Muslims who believed and supported conspiracy theories. One word that is emphasised 
on in the narratives is the Malay word, ‗Pecundang‘ which means ‗defeatist.‘ ‗Defeatist‘ 
is a word that is frequently cited in extremist narratives from Middle East and Europe as 
well. He then mentions how those who ridicule and scoff at conspiracy theories are actu-
ally pro-American. These are the kind of individuals who ‗worship‘ a standardised ver-
sion of history unquestioningly, ―..pemuja sejarah standard!!‖497 
                                                 
495
 "Barisan Jihad: Video / Lirik We Will Not Go Down Versi Baru - Michael Heart Song For Gaza." Bari-
san Jihad. http://barisanjihad.blogspot.com/2009/03/video-lirik-we-will-not-go-down-versi.html (accessed 
October 18, 2011).  
496
 "THE CONSPIRATORIAL VIEW OF HISTORY IS NOT THE ―CONSPIRACY THEORY‖ OF THE 
LAZY AND THE LOSERS!!! « Agoeng Go(yim) Blog", Agoeng Go(yim) Blog, 
http://attestantofthetruth.wordpress.com/2009/01/07/the-conspiratorial-view-of-history-is-not-the-
%E2%80%9Cconspiracy-theory%E2%80%9D-of-the-lazy-and-the-losers/ (accessed October 18, 2011). 
 
497




He then goes onto say that those who support a conspiratorial view of history are 
in fact more critical and are among those who think deeply. They are the ones who re-
search deeply into facts and can ‗connect the dots‘. He deeply hated the criticism which 
labelled those who believed in conspiracies as ‗instigators.‘ Intellectuals, academics and 
government officials to him were all brainwashed, one dimensional and shallow people 
who are not accustomed to being criticised. The blogger then challenges his critics by 
asking who is really lazy and defeatist, those who are revolutionaries like him or such 
intellectuals? He lamented how people like him who deviated from standard interpreta-
tions were prone to character assassinations. He then went onto give a very telling accu-
sation that was thrown at those who ridicule conspiracy theorists and infantilise their ar-
guments. The blogger hypothesised that this was because such anti-conspiracy theorists 
and those who support the state were upset, insecure and angry at the fact that more peo-
ple actually respond to their views rather than the views of the ‗intelligentsia‘ represented 
by academia and the state despite their scoffing of conspiratorial views. In other words 
the state and its supporters cannot tolerate the resonance with the masses that such con-
spiracy theorists enjoy.  
 
Towards the end, he explained that the crux of his argument and stance were part 
of his efforts to defend the Prophet Muhammad against the Jewish conspiracy to under-
mine Islam.  At this point he took a religious perspective to illustrate how prophets of old 
were similarly victimised and killed as a result of conspiracies against them. There was 
also frequent usage of Quranic verses contextualised to support the work of conspiracy 
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theorists. His blog post was also dedicated to Western conspiracy theorists that he felt 
were also warring against the campaign to undermine such thinking.  
 
The discussion forum that followed reinforced the ideas brought up by the blog-
ger. This was done by the various readers mutually reinforcing such ideas. One of the 
readers was actually moved by the emotions expressed by the blogger. He concluded by 
saying how there is a need for his fellow brothers ‗to open their eyes and ‗strike.‘ Finally 
he asserts that all the dilemmas in Indonesia are because the people have been ‗set up‘ 
over the years by foreign agents and so he advised readers to stop ‗prostituting‘ them-
selves to foreign powers.  
 
There are two important points we can infer from this blog narrative and the dis-
cussions that followed. One, readers who sympathise with extremist ideas already have a 
keen awareness of common criticism about conspiracy theories and cite written works 
from even Western sources purporting conspiracies in history to back their worldview. 
Secondly, conspiracy theories offer a ‗rational‘ argument that justifies the transference of 
blame to external agents. It is in many ways cathartic to those who feel that the origins of 
their problems have an external source which they can vent their anger towards. But its 
real appeal comes from the systematic manner in which this external source is rationally 
constructed to ‗prove‘ that this is indeed the case. For this blogger, the source of appeal 
also takes the form of a poetic argument that leverages on its emotive appeal. This is evi-
denced when one of the readers of his blog actually remarked how he can feel the emo-
tion in his words. This gives the impression of sincerity of intention and ‗truth.‘ The hid-
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den and the improbable by its very nature then becomes convincing as the impression is 
that the more information is suppressed and less well known, the more it is likely to be 
the truth.  
 
In Anwar al-Awlaki‘s lecture, ‗A Call to Jihad - Part 1 of 2‘ one of the discussion 
forum readers in youtube said this in response to an allegation that the speaker is not 
Awlaki,    
 
This is not Anwars voice? I've listened to over 100 hours of 
this guy. He does not speak in this manner and would never 
draw these conclusions. He preaches knowledge and lets 
the Muslims know about the satanic occultists behind every 
major terrorist attack in history. Now they expect us to 
believe that he is preaching this. He has rationality and 
logic, this man doesn't. If you believe this is him, sorry to 





This is indicative of the extremist mindset that refuses to believe anything that 
diminishes one‘s worldview. The appeal of Awlaki to the member was that "he has 
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rationality and logic.‖ So when a narrative does not meet his expectation of his vision of 
the charismatic authority figure, he would prefer to say it is a conspiracy to blacken the 
name rather than believe that his idol has let him down. Thus conspiracies sustain 
preconceived impressions and worldviews that such individuals prefer to have.  
 
In Imam Anwar al-Awlaki‘s lecture ‗Jihad Fi Sabilillah‘ that appeared on 
youtube, one of the readers in the discussion forum said,  
 
It was not the era of dajjal's deception when they can't get 
you? to commit a crime, they usually do it themselves. so it 
is important to understand who you are really fighting for - 
and those hypocrites (may God curse them) who say don't 
fight back when they stage false flag terror attacks and kill 
your family are also trying to deceive you - know who you 
are fighting for - God or your "leader" or cia or halliburton. 





The thinking here is that a pacifist attitude is meant to keep Muslims subjugated. 
Therefore empowerment that comes with resistance starts with creating such awareness 
to see past the obvious.  
 
In the Clearguidance Forums, one of the members wrote regarding the debate that 
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9/11 was part of a Jewish conspiracy,  
 
It was a federal building not a kindergarten! It provided 
funds to the Israelis, if you ask why would the Jews plan 
this if it provided them funds, America was slipping into 
major recession and they needed this to control the oil 
fields in Iraq and run pipes through Afghanistan to get back 
on their feet. If it was Muslims who flew the plans (sic) we 
stand up for them, even if it wasn‘t we should still say that 
it was Muslims to rub the salt into the wounds of the 





Here we see that logic is not always necessary for those who have internalized 
extremist ideas as the sheer weight of their revulsion against injustice warrants any 
means. The intention here is plain vengeance. So it does not matter whether conspiracy 
theories are believable or need to be made more convincing. The focus is simply to use 
any claim or narrative citing conspiracies or otherwise that supports their account of 
events or makes them look favorable. This is simply another means to an end. 
 
In the HUT Forum, one of the members said,  
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Don't get me wrong, there probably are radical violent 
Muslim groups out there with their own agendas, but they 
don't have the manpower or resources to pull of many of 
the biggest headline making attacks that they're blamed for. 
Inside jobs are for the purpose of creating the public 
hysteria that makes it easier to bring in new laws for spying 





Here we can observe how conspiracies begin with preconceived ideas of what the 
‗enemy‘ is about based on what they experience. The grievance is about the intrusion into 
the private lives of Muslims as a result of anti-terror state measures. This is something 
that constitutes a very negative experience that is likely to be experienced by some 
Muslims in the US. The negative experience is then rationalised as being indicative of a 
greater conspiracy.   
 
In the HUT forum again, another member wrote, ―Divide and Rule, the old 
colonialist policy still goin strong. History of the Capitalists is pretty damnin (sic), they 
only know how to destroy nations or are enslavin them for the interests of a few. People 
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ain't gonna buy your lies anymore!‖502  This demonstrates how conspiracy theories also 
gain their appeal and persuasive power as a result of provable historical precedence. In 
this case with reference to the colonial tactic divide and rule.   
 
Conspiracy theories also arise out of plausible inferences from political analysis 
of current events. In Kalifah.com, one of the readers demonstrates this when he says in 
reference to anti-sea piracy patrols by Western nations in Muslim countries, ―Is it 
possible that the pirates thing is just a mere american trick to justify further intervention 
in the country??‖503   
 
Finally, we need to understand that despite all this, conspiracies theories equally 
rely on demonstratable evidence to be persuasive. In the Chechnyan resistance website, 
Qaqaz.com, a reader said in reference to one of their resistance leaders Ibn al- Khattab, 
who is accused of being behind the September 1999 Moscow apartment bombings,  
False media propaganda has accused Khattab of carrying 
out terrorist acts around the world. Anyone who has read 
this article with an unbiased mind will know that Khattab's 
nature is to confront the enemy face to face. And if fighting 
soldiers and armies who destroy your peoples' lives, turn 
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your  women into widows and your children into orphans, 
amounts to terrorism, then let history bear witness that 
Khattab is a terrorist 
504
  
Just like the legal maxim requiring a valid defense to exist on a balance of proba-
bilities, the idea here is to create a doubt. The doubt here is rationally possible, i.e. that 
the Moscow Apartment Bombings in 1999 was a false flag operation staged to rally po-
pulist support to justify and escalate military operations in Chechnya. 
Such claims get corroborated by credible Western sources while at the same time 
dismissed as conspiracy theories by other credible Western sources. Apparently Khattab 
in this case told the Russian Interfax news agency in Grozny that he had nothing to do 
with the Moscow explosions; he was quoted as saying, ―We would not like to be akin to 
those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells.‖505 Because other news sources 
corroborate such ideas, the allegation of a conspiracy to do character assassination of the 
militant leader becomes more believable. If a reader wants to be more critical, he or she 
will also be able to stumble upon or through their own searches other sources of informa-
tion not mentioned by the extremist website that corroborate such claims as well.
506
 For 
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this example cited, there are of course equally credible perspectives that conversely 





This last example from the HUT forum shows how conspiracy theories quoted by 
extremist websites get all the support they need from credibly challenging scientific 
experts from the West using similar rational arguments based on equally ‗scientific‘ 
observations. In a discussion post called 9/11 Flight U93 pg 1, a member wrote with re-
gards to,  
Going back to the video at the start of the thread, the ques-
tion remains:  A jumbo jet crashed into the ground but there 
is no sign of any part of a  plane? And a plane that crashes, 
how can its debris spread across a 3-mile radius? ….The 
editors of Popular Mechanics Magazine, which deals with 
science, engineering, and technology related issues debated 
these guys on a neutral forum (Democracy Now!) and 
made them look like fools 
509
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We can see by the above examples quoted that there are ‗gradations‘ to be found 
in the appeal of conspiracy theories. There are conspiracy theories which depend on the 
persuasive power of controversy, sensation and emotion at one end and at the other we 
have highly ‗empirically‘ provable arguments. But mostly arguments usually fall in 
between these two extremes.   
 
i. “Lackey Muslims and Hypocritical leaders.”  
Muslims who are apathetic to the plight of other Muslims are singled out for such 
criticisms. Extremist narratives suggest that such Muslims who conform to what the state 
advocates are in fact happily agreeable to be subservient and willing to compromise on 
their rights and religious stances. By conforming, they feel they will be better accepted 
and be at the receiving end of any benign but paltry handouts from the powers that be. 
This version of the self-serving and hypocritical nature of such apathetic / defeatist 
Muslims is expounded in extremist narratives. But the most hateful comments in both 
extremist narratives and web forums are reserved for Muslims who support the state or 
Western society in return for power, status and money. These of course traditionally refer 
to Muslim leaders who are seen to be supported by Western powers.  They are portrayed 
as being authoritarian, corrupt and self serving.  
 
But this label is not just limited to such Muslim leaders. It also extends a great 
deal to religious scholars who are seen as being supportive of the views of the state and 
helping to propagate a version of Islam that is non-threatening to the state even if they 
252 
 
have to reinterpret religious scriptures. The latter is another heavily cited criticism.  The 
great irony is that this is the same criticism that mainstream Muslim scholars throw at 
extremist Muslims. i.e. that they are taking Quranic verses out of context, misinterpreting 
or not making reference to related verses that qualify differing stances. Extremist 
Muslims call such mainstream Muslim Imams as ―Scholars for Dollars‖ and cite the 
exact criticism of being out of context and misinterpretation at them instead. In fact 
Samir Khan, the editor of al-Qaeda‘s ‗Inspire‘ magazine in an article entitled ‗The 
Central Issue‘ said, ―No matter how many times we in al Qaeda may respond to certain 
accusations that are made against us such as takfīr, khawārij, killing Muslims and so on, 
these scholars for dollars keep echoing the same rubbish repeatedly without ever giving a 
proper scholarly reply to our responses.‖510 
 
The assertion here is that any counter radicalisation approach that takes a heavy 
religious approach is in for a battle of attrition. As in the words of one commentary 
written in the Internet site ―Yawning Bread‖, the author wrote how such an approach will 
result in a situation of attrition and a case of ―You say, I say‖ with neither side gaining a 
clear upper hand. 
 
…But authority in Islam is highly decentralised, and there 
will always be the problem of "you say, I say". The texts 
themselves are ambiguous, as Esposito's examples show, 
which means the "peace" faction may call for selective 
reading even as they accuse the "war" faction of doing the 
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same. A small band of Muslims intent on being extreme can 
just as logically choose their own authority and their own 





  Extremist Muslim scholars are portrayed in extremist Muslim websites as being 
those who are brave enough to go against the tide for the sake of standing up for the truth. 
For this they are persecuted and vilified. Extremist narratives cite similarity of the 
situation of such extremist scholars to the prophets of old in Islam who were persecuted 
for the same reason. Those who are persecuted must thus be standing up for the truth and 
persecution creates sympathy. In the discussion forum following Al Awlaki‘s video 
lecture on ―Jihad Fi Sabilillah‖ one of the readers wrote back ,  
 
Mashallah Wallah i love sheikh anwar, he speaks the truth 
regardless of whether or not the kuffar are pleased with it, 
this is very rare today as we see many who claim they are 
scholars but in fact are agents of the west, and when they 
try to discredit him or label him as terrorist, fundamentalist, 
extremist this only adds to what we all know already that 
when you speak the truth they try to silence you either 
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But the greatest critique seems to be reserved for ‗lackey‘ Muslims themselves. In 
the Website ―Revolution Muslim‖, an article by extremist Muslim ideologue Sheikh 
Abdullah Faisal entitled ―The Devil‘s deception of the goofi soofi‖ appeared. The article 
described Sufis as committing kufr (actions that show disbelief to the principle of the 
oneness of God.). Besides trying to prove the ‗silliness‘ of their beliefs, they are vilified 
because they ultimately side with the West. Even though the argument is based on shaky 
historical precedence, this alternate perspective nonetheless instigates suspicion and sows 
an element of doubt in the mind of the reader.  
 
Another problem we have with the Goofi Soofis is that they 
don't practise al walaa wal baraa, loyalty to the ummah and 
disloyalty to the enemies of the ummah.  The Goofi Soofis 
always take sides with the crusaders when they invade 
Muslim lands.  I was told by my Algerian classmates in 
Riyadh that in the 1960s the Mujaahideen used to kill the 
Goofi Soofis in Algeria because they used to help the 
French to brutally occupy Algeria.  Likewise i was told that 
the Mujaahideen of chechya blew up and killed the Mufti 
of chechyna because he was a Goofi Soofi who passed a 
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In SEA, the book by Imam Samudra, one of the Bali Bombers entitled ―I fight 
Terrorists‖ was meant to justify his actions on the basis of the hypocrisy showed by 
Western nations in their own perpetuations of ‗terror‘ against Muslims. He also cited 
how he saw other battle wizened ‗Ulema of the frontier‘ such as himself as the only en-
lightened ones who recognized this injustice as compared to lackey Ulemas who con-
formed to the status quo. Therefore, they are the only ones who can and will address this 
injustice.
514
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CHAPTER 7  
STUDY FINDINGS  
PART 2  
THE RESONANCE CLUSTER. 
 
The resonance cluster relates to themes that illustrate how appeal is generated 
through mainly poetic and rhetorical arguments that evoke and resonate emotive senti-
ments. This does not mean that there is no rationality or logic involved. Many of the sen-
timents need corroboration to be persuasive as well. Any idea that inspires needs to be 
believable as well and this requires some form of rational or logical basis. The themes in 
this cluster are as follows:  
a) ―Noble character of the Jihadist.‖ 
b)  ―They want to change Islam to be subservient and passive.‖ 
c) ―The Culture, mysticism and miracles of Jihad.‖ 
d)  ―Prophecy.‖ 
e) ―We represent grassroots concerns.‖ 
f) ―You can never fit in.‖ 
g) ―Do not become defeatist.‖ 
h) ―Al-Ghuraaba: The Stranger.‖ 
i) ―The Chosen.‖  
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a) “Noble Character of the Jihadist.” 
This must not be mistaken as referring to the influence of charismatic authority as 
Weber would have referred to it. Here we are referring to an ideal construct in the minds 
of extremists – that of the noble Jihadist. This is akin to how one envisions the idea of a 
‗knight‘ but not directly referring to any particular knight. A jihadist‘s humble character is 
a major source of appeal in extremist Muslim narratives.  Humility sells in extremist 
narratives especially when the state and West is seen as being haughty and belittling of 
other ideas outside its own. The other appealing character is the value of self sacrifice and 
altruism. The idea here is that if one is willing to give up everything for a cause how can 
they possibly be self –serving when compared to corrupt and authoritarian leaders in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. There is special resonance to the idea of youths who go 
against their family‘s wishes and join a Jihad. Family objections and dynamics appear to 
be one of the key problems that stand in the way of youths wanting to join a Jihad.  Thus 
when the narrative speaks about how the young Jihadist is willing to disobey his parents 
for a noble case for the sake of God, this resonates a lot with other youth in similar 
positions facing similar family resistance. The next quality appeals especially to the 
youth. This quality is the idea of a fearless warrior who laughs in the face of danger and 
is able to undertake and overcome incredible odds. Stories of Jihadists and their exploits 
are popular in extremist narrative. It is not simply about this culture of Jihad
515
  but about 
the concept of courage. This quality especially inspires those who ‗fear‘ and are anxious 
about many things in contemporary mainstream society. To have this quality also entails 
liberation from their fears towards a lifestyle where one is able to live without anxieties 
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as death and martyrdom that follows is actually a sought objective. Honour is another 
quality that resonates in extremist narratives. This also incorporates strength of religious 
faith and how jihadists are steadfast and do not compromise on these ideals. Example of 
Jihadists showing honour and a sense of ethics and honesty is usually contrasted with 
qualities of the ‗enemy‘ (US/ Western nations and their lackeys) who resort to trickery, 
subterfuge and dishonourable tactics which result in Muslim civilians and honourable 
jihadists being killed.  
 
In the Ummah.com forum, a discussion thread appeared that talked about 
Chechnyan militant leader, Basayev‘s book, ―Book of a Mujahid.‖ A reader wrote his 
comments on the book,  
 
Mujahids are trying not to make the radiance in the eyes 
fade away. They are living in this world, they are not 
shunning other people, they start on their journey with an 
open heart. Quite often they get overwhelmed by fear. Not 
always do they do a right thing. At times they suffer 
because of trifles, at times they are small-minded and vain, 
and at times they think that they cannot grow. Quite often 
they are assured that they are not worthy of grace or 
miracle. Not always are they self-confident. They spend 
sleepless nights and suffer from having done something 
wrong. But Mujahids always seek calmness and strength in 
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This highly emotive and inspirational comment will find resonance with those 
who ‗fear.‘ It creates the impression that Jihadists are human like their readers and prone 
to anxieties but it is the strength of faith that gives them the ability to overcome this and 
do wonders. Readers will find the humility in this approach very refreshing as it brings 
the idea of a ‗jihadist‘ as someone real and similar to them. Here it is not the ideology that 
appeals but the virtues being expressed. These virtues are impressions anyone would 
rationally derive based on the described actions, i.e. if someone were to do such actions 
or express such feelings genuinely, this would constitute corroboration and empirical 
proof of the quality these actions demonstrate.  
 
In Ummah.com, a discussion thread called, ―Senior Saudi Cleric calls 
the Mujahideen useless criminal,‖ appeared. The comment that followed gave a very 
personal testimony that was meant to demonstrate how Osama Bin Laden was humble, 
generous and alturistic:  
Regarding Usamah bin Ladin, 'Abdullah 'Azzam said: ―…I 
would like to ask Allah - the Mighty and Majestic - to 
preserve our brother, Abu 'Abdillah, Usamah bin Ladin. I 
have never laid my eyes on a man like him on this Earth; he 
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lives in his home like one who is in a state of poverty. I 
used to stay at his home in Jeddah when making Hajj or 
'Umrah, and he did not even have a single chair or table in 
the entire house! He had four wives, and not a single one of 
their houses had a chair or table in it. Any laboror from 
Egypt or Jordan has a better house than Usamah. Despite 
this, if you ask him for a million riyals for the Mujahidin, 
he would pull out a check and write it for you in a matter of 
seconds. He once went to one of his sisters and presented 
her with Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwa regarding Jihad with one's 
wealth. So, she pulled out her checkbook and wrote a check 
for eight million riyals. All of a sudden, those who were 
around her came to talk her out of it, asking her: "Are you 
insane? You give out eight million in one shot, while you 
live in a rented apartment? It will cost at least one million 
for you to build your own house!" So, she went back to 
Usamah and said to him: "Usamah, my brother, I need one 
million of these riyals to build a house for myself." So, he 
said to her: "By Allah, I will not give you back a single 
riyal, as you live in an apartment, relaxed, while the people 
are dying and cannot even find a tent to shelter themselves 
with!" If you were to sit with him, you would think that he 
was a servant from the servants, with his manners and 
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manhood. By Allah, I hold him to be like this. I asked 
Sayyaf to announce a decision to prevent him from moving 
from here (in Peshawar), but he was always eager to be in 
the midst of battle. His blood pressure would drop often, 
so, he would fill his pockets with salt and carry a jug of 
water with him. He was unable to walk, as he would 
constantly have to swallow some salt and drink some water 
in order to raise his blood pressure. Believe me when I tell 
you that when he would visit me in my home, when he 
would hear the telephone ring, he would get up and bring it 
to me, so that I would not have to get up from my place! 
Such manners, humility, manhood...we ask Allah to 




In the MyIWC forum a thread entitled ―the Imam Anwar Al Awlaki in prison!!‖ 
appeared which showed what could be one of the most inspiring points of appeal of 
Awlaki to extremists besides his ideas. These comments apparently came from a member 
who had actually met him and was impressed by his humility and down to earth appeal. 
―I found him to be incredibly down to earth, happy to chat and a really nice guy. I've met 
a couple of other scholars before who I wasn‘t that impressed with, but Imam Anwar is 
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the real deal. I was inspired by his simple manner,‖518 Another reader from Ummah.com 
also resonated this idea of Awlaki‘s humility in a thread entitled ―Shaykh Anwar Awlaki - 
A Message upon release‖, it read, ―Tremendous joy upon his release with his fans. 
Impressed by his humility. ―Humble brother‖‖519 For young Muslims who might feel 
preachers and academics take an infantilising approach to ‗educating‘ them; the appeal of 
humility as has been shown by these comments carries enormous persuasive power and 
should not be underestimated. 
What Anwar Awlaki appears to do is the exact opposite of infantilizing.  In his 
lecture, the battle of the hearts and minds: Awlaki says,  
 
So we should be more concerned, about what is in the 
hearts and minds of Muslims rather than what happens on 
the battlefield! In this area, brothers and sister, praise is to 
Allah, even though it is true, that many Muslims might be 
deceived by this plan of the US, there were many Muslims 
who were asleep before, are probably by now they could be 
declared brain dead, but on the other hand, it is amazing to 
see the revival, specially among the youth. The clarity of 
thought and the maturity of understanding that we find in 
some youth today is amazing! Specially, if you talk about 
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some youth in the West, who are second or third generation 
Muslims, they are carrying on to clear understanding of 




If this is compared to traditional Muslim preachers who might talk down to youth, 
there is a natural attraction to someone who supposedly values their worth and recognises 
their knowledge and opinions. This is apparently not always the case with traditional 





Likewise Muslim youth might also gravitate to the new breed of extremist Muslim 
ideologues like Awlaki who can ‗speak the same language as them.‘ 523  Likewise 
Roshonara Choudhry, who stabbed a British Lawmaker, was principally only inspired by 
Awlaki whom she says, ―explains things really comprehensively and in an interesting 
way…‖524  
 
Noble qualities are also expounded upon in eulogies given to Jihadists who have 
been martyred. In the Ansar Al-Jihad website, there was a eulogy entitled ―Protectors of 
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the Sanctuary‖525 which talked about Doctor Arshad Waheed, a Pakistani al-Qaeda leader 
526
. It was apparently written by his wife in a letter to her mother-in-law and mother. The 
letter gave a human face to the Jihadist when it described how good a family man he was. 
It also went onto describe how he had given up a life of luxury and comfort for a greater 
cause, expounding on the life he left behind. It was also meant to shame the reader for 
their apathy while giving a highly romanticised notion of freedom fighters fighting 
oppression. But the authenticity of the letter and how much it was doctored by extremists 
themselves arises when other agendas such as the arrogance of those who preach to the 
Mujahids is mentioned while praising Dr Arshad‘s religious piety. This personal account 
given by his wife who mentioned how she faithfully moved with him to the lands where 
battles were being fought. She described a romanticized ‗noble savage‘ 527   type of 
pristine life that was seen in the simplicity of the pious villagers. In many ways this is 
meant to show the return to honest basics that the Jihadist life offers.  
 
In Ummah.com, there was a post called, ―If only I was a Mujahid‖ apprarently 
written by a woman, 
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Since childhood, in my heart, I have had this wish, this 
desire, this longing, Oh! If only I was a Mujahid I would 
keep my trousers above my ankles My face would be 
decorated with the Sunnah of Rasul Allah (SAW) A middle 
parting I would have in my hair Upon my shoulder I would 
carry a rocket launcher and in my hand there would be a 
Kalashnikov A bomb would adorn my chest and the band of 
Laa Ilaaha Il Allah would be across my forehead Then, 
crossing the blood-stained valley I would launch myself 
into the thick of battle Shouting Allahu Akbar I would 
attack His enemies Each of them I would eliminate, one by 
one, avenging the blood of my Shaheed brothers I would 
free the weak from tyranny and oppression.  Yes! This is 
the Mujahid I would be! A Mujahid who would pile up the 
bodies of the enemy, like Khalid Bin Walid (ra) Who would 
shatter the idols, like Mahmood Ghazanwi Who would 
burn the ships on the seashore, like Tariq Bin Zayad Who 
would battle against the crusaders like, Salaahuddin Ayyubi 
And then… fighting Jihad, I would become Shaheed…… 
But, Alas! This cannot be! For, a lion-hearted, Mujahid 
warrior I am not In fact...I am a fragile woman.‖ In the 
discussion thread that followed one of the readers wrote 
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back, ―Such Chivalry and Bravery the mujahideen hold 




  We can clearly see a romantic notion of ‗kinghthood‘ in this account. In 
relation to this, it describes how the Jihadist is a ‗hero‘ who fights ‗tyranny and 
oppression.‘ 
 
At times there is historical reference to heroic characters from Islam‘s past and not 
always to the jihadists of today. A frequently cited character is Khalid ibn Al-Waleed, a 
companion of the Prophet known for his conquests, military skills and tactics. His poetic 
vision of battle glory is seen in this ancient quote written by Khalid ibn Al-Waleed  that 
was  featured on the Clearguidance forums, 
 
 I reached every possible place for Shahadah, but it was 
written in my fate that I should die on my bed. In my 
opinion there is no deed more dearer than my waiting with 
my horse and shield in the darkness of night, the sky to be 
glittering due to the rain, waiting for the onset of dawn, so 
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This poetic vision of a Muslim savior and the need to liken him to any of the 
militant leaders today can be seen in this quote that appeared on the Qoqaz website about 
deceased Chechnyan Militant leader, Ibn Abdul Khattab, ―..Khattab has been likened by 
many Muslims as the 'Khalid bin Waleed of our times.‖530 Thus in many ways this is the 
‗noble‘ knight idea that many extremist narratives use to appeal to readers who envision 
themselves in the same fashion.  
 
The apparently altruistic and selfless values of Jihadists are also exemplified in 
this quote that appeared on the website ‗Jihad Unspun‘ It is meant to demonstrate how 
Jihadists are not in it for power and personal gratification (unlike the lackeys of the West 
and states that support them) and therefore their words must be trustworthy: 
 
 The Mujahideen aren't students of power and don't com-
pete for power like others do. We are students of truth and 
work for establishing this truth and for this cause we sacri-
fice our power. Indeed we have abandoned power and as 
Ameer ul Mu'mineen has said, if we only had wanted the 
power, we would have accepted America's demands and 
America wouldn't have only restrained from waging a war 
but it would have also supported us with money and men 
and with everything necessary to remain in power just like 
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all regimes in the Islamic world. However we refused the 




For any reader who has been disillusioned by untrustworthy leaders or with state 
institutions that have never been truthful, the value of honesty that arises from people 
who are supposedly not in it for personal gain or power is very attractive. 
 
Extremist narratives thus make it a point to directly confront any notion or criti-
cism that shows them to be in it for personal gains. There is a great need to maintain this 
‗selfless noble values‘ front. In the shut down website, ‗The ignored puzzle pieces of 
knowledge‘ by Samir Khan532, this quote appeared,  
 
…Dr. Khalid Abou al-Fadl533 criticizing the Mujaahideen - 
as if he knows them - assuming that they fight on the battle-
field for materialistic gains of the next life, such as the 
Hoor al-‘Ayn, instead of fighting purely for Allah‘s sake. 
Without giving much attention to this fool, we simply ask 
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him: Have you opened up their hearts and have seen what 




 Here the argument is meant to counter the common criticism that extremists fight 
for silly beliefs which are ultimately materialistic. I.e. the idea of being with 72 virgins in 
heaven when they are martyred. Instead they counter that theirs is a noble cause for the 
sake of God alone. Extremist narratives stress on the idea that there is no material reward 
in what they do nor do they do it for their leader no matter how noble he is but purely for 
the pleasure of God alone.  All actions of the militants are couched in the language of 
‗Tawhid.‘ (The ‗oneness‘ of God). This is a religious concept all mainstream Muslims 
identify with and see as being the core tenant of Islam. Thus when pitched via a concept 
all Muslims agree upon, other ideas including extremist ones become persuasive. 
 
The apparent patience and calmness of extremist Muslims is another virtue that is 
touted. In this same website, these virtues were emphaised on by their supporters and in-
vited readers to see a video debate that proved their point. It was quoted,  
 
This a video debate between the Shaykh, ‗Abdullah al-
Faisal
535
 (hafidhullah) and a Christian. Like usual, the Mus-
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lims tear apart the Christians and make them look stupid 
and illogical. That‘s exactly what happens here. Falsehood 
has no chance against the Truth. May Allah hasten the de-
scension of ‗Isa (‘alayhis salaam) so that he can break the 
Cross and kill the swine! A point to note is the Sabr of the 
Shaykh. Compare it to the Kaafir. The Shaykh shows pa-
tience, calmness, and all the same time, eloquence coupled 
with strength in evidences. The Kaafir, on the other hand, 




 These virtues apparently have video evidence in which they are demonstrated.  
Extremist supporters here also intend to prove to readers that extremist ideologues are 
equally able to argue just as rationally and convincingly as any Western academic.  
In the Chechnyan resistance website Kavkaz, the appeal of ‗sincerity‘ as a virtue 
that can only be seen in adversity and not by armchair leaders and critics was emphasied. 
There was an article in this website by a Sheikh Sayeed of Buriatia entitled: ''How I went 
                                                                                                                                                 
ideological arguments, Anwar al-Awlaki and Abdullah al-Faisal present very clear, concise and direct 
behavioral guidance for their adherents.  It‘s what I‘ve been calling, ―Jihad for Dummies..‖ The problem 
with this assertion is that while he correctly recognizes what the findings in this study demonstrate, he has 
not made the connection to how this is indicative of epistemic and instrumental rationality in the narratives 
of Muslim extremists. See Jarret Brachman, "Jihad For Dummies‖, Shaykh Abdullah al-Faisal | JARRET 
BRACHMAN", JARRET BRACHMAN, http://jarretbrachman.net/?p=311 (accessed August 27, 2011). 
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to Jihad and what I have seen here‖537 that showcases how this virtue can only be seen 
by those who go through hardship as the Mujahideen do: 
 
 I learned that those people who are here, and I don't have 
any doubt about it, are the best from today's Muslims, be-
cause when you are inside a warm house, with plenty of 
food and good nutrition you will never realize whether a 
person is truthful or he is a hypocrite. And when cold, dirt 
and ordeals start, when there is no food, when you have to 
carry heavy load, only then Allah shows those who were 
right and those who were wrong. 
A quote from this same narrative that went onto praise the militant Chehnyan 
leader Umarov, ―…and I see in him sincerity, the kind of which I rarely saw among the 
people. He has firm resolve and strong intention, and he demonstrated it when Chechen 
infidels, apostates abducted his elderly father and said him to surrender, and he re-
fused,….‖ Thus we see again how it is not about the leader‘s charismatic authority that 
appeals per se but rather the deeds that testify to his character. i.e. Umarov in this case 
living like the others do, unrelenting and steadfast despite oppression etc. A point to note, 
in this narrative the word ‗sincerity‘ is cited often. (6 times in this one page narrative!)  
                                                 
537
 "Sheikh Sayeed of Buriatia: ''How I went to Jihad and what I have seen here'' - Kavkazcenter.com", 





One of the core ideological texts for al-Qaeda was written by Abu Bakr Naji in his 
work entitled ‗The Management of Savagery.‘538 Here he wrote,  
 
In the beginning, we stressed that our battle is a battle of 
tawhid against unbelief and faith against polytheism and it 
is not an economic, political, or social battle. However, we 
must not forget that part of sharia politics is to address 
those who have weak souls among the different classes of 
people with the promise of reclaiming our money and our 
rights, or rather plundering the money of God which evil 
people have taken....Afterwards, it is clear that these weak 
souls improved their condition by living among the people 
of faith and the furnace of battle, and their motivation was 




What is happening here is that Naji is connecting the need for altruism with 
winning over those Muslims whose concerns and grievances are more material. The point 
here is that while one of the central themes in extremist Muslim narratives is about the 
virtues and noble character of jihadists, there is a sense of practicality in their strategy 
that requires them to address the concerns of those who have less of such ideals. By 
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doing this, they eventually hope to bring them around to identify with their higher order 
virtues. This is something that Naji feels needs to be done by ‗Education by Exhortation‘ 
540
 which requires the use of Stories and Analogies as most people irrespective of their 
intellectual background can relate to this. This preferred communicative mechanism 
among extremists is also employed by Anwar Awlaki who is famous for using this form 
of argumentation. In his case he frequently uses stories from Islam‘s past.  
 
Naji then talks about ‗Education by deed and Example.‘ This requires doing 
‗noble‘ actions that attract individuals to the group, i.e. altruistic, ‗humble‘, brave or 
pious acts. When this is expounded on, people are naturally attracted to these universal 
‗good values‘ that extremists supposedly exemplify. Naji for example says, 
 
 The Companions (may God be pleased with them) were 
living models and exemplars of patience, fortitude, lofty 
ambition, courage, and humility along with might, power, 
and justice. …Therefore, we should teach the people during 
action and use every momentous event as a means of 
connecting them to servitude, obedience, and seeking 




Thus this form of ‗Education‘ or indoctrination especially during momentous 
events and action during conflict persuade by deeds and not words. This has the power to 
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‗exemplify‘ what extremists are advocating to actual actions on the ground or events that 
appear to correlate what they are saying. In some ways this is indicative of epistemic 
rationality that uses ‗corroboration‘ by actually incidents or by the actions of members.  
 
One should not mistake this for charismatic authority in its pure sense as Weber 
might have put it. Weber defined Charismatic authority as ―resting on devotion to the 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him." 
542
 In this case, Muslim 
extremists are referring to the exemplary qualities of the ‗group‘ and generally what all its 
members are seen to demonstrate. Even though we see do often see them make reference 
to many such inspirational Jihadist personalities and individuals, it is not always to just 
one particular individual and not always the leader. The praise is directed towards the 
noble values the Jihadist naturally espouses.  
 
Maajid Nawaz, an associate of Ed Husain and Director of the Quilliam Founda-
tion, an anti-extremist ideology think tank, was also a former popular and well known 
leader in the HUT of UK. He described how he became aware of a distinct Islamic iden-
tity in his youth when he related to American rappers who used radical Islamic messages 
and the empowerment and identity that Malcolm X brought to African-Americans. Al-
ready anti-establishment, he found a connection to the man who introduced him to HUT. 
This man, he felt could credibly answer all his questions: ―Here was a man who could 
speak my language, who felt my pain and who most importantly of all could answer my 
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questions concerning identity and faith in radically different way. Since Malcolm X, I 
had never heard Islam presented in this way.‖543 
 
In the earlier part of the testimony, he talked about the racist violence that he was 
subjected to in his youth. If we examine his path towards radicalisation, we might be 
tempted to simply associate the causal factor to marginalization and an identity crisis 
stemming from racism. But alternatively it may be due to the alignment of personal ex-
periences and the significant encounter described above that inspired the actor. Radical 
group recruitment at its very foundation may be an alignment in experiences of personal 
suffering and shared values that inspire them. Sometimes, that more than anything 
creates movements and mobilizes them. 
 
b. “They want to change Islam to be subservient and passive.”  
 
 One of the key contemporary protagonists of this view is none other than Anwar 
Alwaki and Feiz Muhammad. Quite simply, the assertion is that the West finds certain 
ideas and practices from Islam likely to incite violence and hate against them and hence 
these need to be reconstructed by ‗moderate‘ Muslims scholars to create a form of Islam 
that is more passive, accepting and conforming to Western ideals of society, law and 
governance.  A great deal of criticism has been levelled at what is known as the ‗sword 
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verses.‘ To achieve this form of Islam that is suited to their liking they would require 
mainstream Muslim scholars to give an interpretation of Islam that the state can accept. 
This distorted allegation would naturally create anger in mainstream Muslims and the 
extremists know this.  
 
  There was a forum discussion thread on Kalifah.com called ―Sufism and the 
Revival of the Ummah.‖ It went on to initially cite how Sufis are not the pacifist form of 
Islam as might have been assumed. It said,  
 
Throughout history Sufi's have been pivotal in Islamic 
reform and Jihad. Western foreign policy pundits are 
desperately employing various styles and means in their 
strategy to reform Islam and create a ‗new' secular Islam 
similar to what happened to Christianity during the 
‗Reformation' period. Much of this campaign is aimed at 
rewriting Muslim history and attempting to portray 
modernist interpretations of Islam as well-established 
Islamic traditions. Those Muslims working to revive Islam 
according to an independent Islamic agenda what the west 
calls ‗extremists' or ‗Islamists' are portrayed as innovators 
whose ideas have no basis in Islamic tradition and history. 
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Even today, Sufism is encouraged and permitted in 
especially non-Muslim countries, due to the apolitical 
stance of many Sufi orders today and their renunciation of 
worldly affairs, while authentic Islam is classified as 
―fundamentalism‖, radicalism‖ and ―terrorism.545 
The comment here is putting it quite directly that the West wants a form of Islam 
that is pacifist and does not challenge their dominance. So they wish to dictate the type of 
Islam that is permissible according to their standards and change it. This creates natural 
indignation among even mainstream Muslims. In many ways just as extremists here are 
challenging the labels given by the West such as fundamentalist, radical, Islamist and ter-
rorist, they are in fact reciprocally throwing labels back at any Muslim sect that go 
against their ideology as pacifist lackeys of the West.
546
 Extremists do this while giving a 
simple ‗catch all‘ explanation that theirs is the authentic form of Islam that has been 
wrongly labelled and vilified. The point here is that while either side can claim to be 
right, the indignation has empirical validity when mainstream Muslims experience in-
tense scrutiny on their faith and by how Western leaders and academics have openly 
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come forth to say there needs to be a reformation in Islam.
547
 In his lecture, ‗The battle 
for the hearts and minds‘ Awlaki takes a direct quote from credible Western sources to 
leverage on this point:  
According to the US news and World report:  
 "Today Washington is fighting back after repeated 
missteps since the 911 attacks, the US government has em-
barked on a campaign of political warfare unmatched, since 
the height of the cold war. From military psychological op-
erations teams and CIA covert operatives to openly funded 
media and think tanks, Washington is plowing tens of mil-
lions of dollars into a campaign to influence not only Mus-
lim societies but Islam itself."  
  
Now hear this again "The US is trying to change 
Islam itself!!!". Without any shame, they are openly stating 
that we have a desire not only to influence the Muslim 
societies but we want to change the religion itself! Probably 
at the time of Bani Israel those Rabbis who were changing 
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the book of Allah never dared to say so openly! These, 
without even hiding it, are saying that we want to change 






This indignation that the very basics of Islam are being criticised then becomes a 
natural point of leverage for extremists to resonate the idea that the West is therefore 
trying to change Islam. Awlaki then makes it a point to categorically attack every single 
point in a report published by the RAND Corporation called "Civil democratic Islam".
550
 
His main focus was the points of recommendation she made on how to defeat extremists 
and create a moderate form of Islam.  
 
Besides taking direct empirical evidence from Western mainstream (US 
Department of Defence, RAND Corporation) sources that say that they are trying to 
change Islam, he also equates what ‗moderate‘ Muslims are doing to please the state with 
what the Jews did to please the Romans in the past. His counterarguments demonstrate 
the apparently condescending view of Muslims held in these reports which show how 
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they are infantilised. He cites the arrogance of the West in wanting to impose a brand of 
Islam that they find acceptable on Muslims. Later he asks, would not anyone get angry 
when someone tries to change them for the sake of the other party? This is something that 
people anywhere would feel indignant about. He also tries to show the lack of 
understanding by the West when he sarcastically cites a RAND articles that suggests 
giving a questionnaire to Muslims to judge if they are extremists according to their view.  
 
Finally in the Clearguidance forums in a discussion thread called, ―In the First 
Anniversary of the Blessed Attack,‖ the writer quotes Abdullah Azzam who said,  
 
They want a religion that is flexible, in agreement with the 
whims of the Americans. They want a people who are open 
to all the American whims, and the whims of the Shayateen 
of man and Jinn. They want 'moderate' people. Those, who 
do not differ with the West in any opinion. And they lower 
their heads, to every order that comes to them. It is only 
fear that Islaam returns again, and now the plot has become 
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There is a double meaning in the idea that the West wants to change Islam because 
they feel threatened by its return to power. One is that it gives a plausible reason for the 
perceived targeting of Muslims.  On the other hand, it is also meant to mobilize Muslims 
to realise that they are actually powerful and a force to be reckoned with. This creates a 
sense of worth and empowerment which they might not have felt before.  
 
 
c. “The culture, mysticism and miracles of Jihad” 
 
 Being an ardent follower of an ideology can be a lifestyle onto itself. The jihadi 
lifestyle can be at times a more pertinent source of attraction than the ideology. The 
ideological reasons for jihad may constitute only part of the journey towards extremism. 
The other component is the supposed culture and wonders that Jihadi life offers, which 
extremists have correctly identified to be especially appealing to potential jihadists.  
 
The al-Qaeda magazine, ‗Inspire‘ has sections dedicated precisely to propagating 
this ‗lifestyle.‘ This usually constitutes ‗war stories‘ about actual jihadi experiences, 
reasons for why they joined and the lifestyle they experienced. The sections which do this 
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have catchy names such as ―The Jihad Times‖ or ―What to expect in Jihad‖ that reads 
like a ‗how to‘ manual for those who are contemplating joining a jihad. It addresses 
practical issues such as how to get along with your fellow jihadists, safety tips and advice 
on how to overcome depressive moods during jihad, loneliness etc.  Many of these 
experiential accounts are exciting and speak of glory in battle. A highly recurrent theme is 
the presence of miracles actually witnessed in the midst of Jihadi battles, where a few ill 
equipped jihadists were able to overcome incredible odds through divine miracles. Or 
about martyr bodies that never rot and in fact smell of ‗jannah.‘ (Heaven) Mysticism 
creates appeal to those who feel the supernatural offers more to their mundane existence. 
Jihad thus becomes the platform from which one can experience the mystical and divine. 
At times, extremist Muslim narratives potray jihad to be akin to a spiritual journey of 
fulfillment, re-birth and a life changing experience. Another common theme is the 
brotherhood experienced among jihadists and the camaraderie they share.  
 
In the forum, ummah.com, a discussion thread appeared called ―A death of 
a Mujahid and a death of an apostate‖ which is meant to comment on a video that 
compared the reaction of a Jihadi who died to soldiers in similar circumstances from the 
West:  
Subhanallah, many of us would be screaming in pain etc 
but look at him! -On the authority of Mu'adh ibn Jabal 
states that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said: "He whose 
last words are 'La ilaha illa-Allah' shall enter Paradise." 
Here is another video, again the brother is on the verge of 
283 
 
death but isn't crying/screaming in pain like many would be 
doing. He is obviously bleeding and is being bandaged but 
is still very calm and reciting the kalimah then at around 20 




 The article ‗The fight over the mountains‘ by Adnan Muhammad Ali Saigh in 
Issue 1 of Inspire provided an experiential account about the blowing up of the Bamiyan 
Buddah idols in Afghanistan. Rain immediately pouring down was described as a 
spiritual sign of heavenly agreement for their actions. There was another account which 
spoke about warding off an enemy with a single faulty tank shell.  Or about large bees 
which prevented moving of a martyr‘s body according to his last will. All of which are 
supposedly indicative of divine intervention. It also talked about the beauty of the Afghan 
mountains and about scenes of old tribal life. ―10000 goats crossing..Sheppards on 
horses… ―It was reminiscent of the old days of sheparding...‖555 This is meant to show 
the beauty of this kind of experience and that of a noble, beautiful, rural and simpler past 
that some might yearn for. This is potrayed as being part of the overall Jihadi experience. 
 
 In Issue 2 of Inspire, there was another experiential narrative called ―My life in 
Jihad: The story of Commander Uthman al-Ghamidi.‖556 This narrative began by talking 
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about the reasons why he joined jihad. The author explained how he was looking for a 
sense of purpose and to do good. ―The Muslim Ummah needed more than just relief work 
and sponsoring orphans and widows. It needed to be saved from the enemies that were 
surrounding it.‖557 It then went onto talking about overcoming obstacles through the help 
of God. ―With the help of Allah, the mujahidin are able to get over the most difficult of 
obstacles.‖558 For many who feel the wonder in life has been lost or they feel jaded and 
disillusioned with modern contemporary society, the need to experience this 'lifestyle' and 
witness such miracles can be a major source of appeal.  
 
 The author also talked about the lure of warmth, camaraderie and brotherhood in 
Jihad. He mentioned how he received a lot more kindness from his fellow jihadists as 
compared to what he experienced in the Saudi navy. 
 
 As for his training, he described it as, ―...the factory where real men were 
fashioned: the al-Faruq camp.‖559 The image of the tough masculine hero is another 
frame such narratives like to employ. This is coupled together with the need to be 
something more than what one used to be. There was also emphasis on how jihadists, 
even when small in numbers, can hit at the powerful. Strong reinforcement of such ideas 
helps to spur on even bolder attacks. Many extremist narratives which describe battle, 
frequently cite ‗david vs goliath‘ situations where Muslims are triumphant against 
overwhelming odds.  
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 Ibid., 12 
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 The author also talked about his range of experiences from the time he was 
incarcerated in Guantanamo to the time he was at the receiving end of Saudi counter 
radicalisation programmes in prison.  This experiential debunking of such programmes 
has the potential to resonate more credibly with readers as it is being related by someone 
who was actually there. The main criticism is about the superficial arguments used by 
counter radical preachers. For instance he spoke of how religious scholars who came to 
‗de-radicalise‘ him in Saudi prisons failed to argue convincingly when the issue was 
reduced to simple logic and analogies:  
 
 One brother was being advised by this sheik, who 
told him that 'doa' alone is sufficient and there is no need 
for jihad. So the brother asked him: If someone comes into 
your house and wants to rape your wife, would you just 
make dua and not defend her? ―The Shaykh said ―Yes, I 
would make dua and I would say to him: I ask Allah that 
you do not enjoy her!‖ These are the shykhs of these 




 Finally when he rejoined jihad in Yemen, the warm welcome he received felt like 
liberation.  All such accounts of their suffering is not meant to put off readers but to 
leverage on their sense of altruism and inspire them to come help their fellow Muslims 
against a common vilified enemy.  
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In Inspire issue 2 under ‗What to expect in Jihad‘, the author described Jihad as a 
life changing experience. ―...I was always under the impression that fighting either 
directly or indirectly was what I would be doing most of the time. The reality is not quite 
like that. I have realized that living with the mujahideen will actually re-transform one's 
life style and habits to something that is closer to Allah's pleasure...‖561 
 
This theme is in line with a common graphic advert that appears in Inspire that 
says ―Don't cling onto ‗Dunya‘.562 (Worldly life)‖ This is meant to remind readers to not 
cling onto material things. In many ways Jihad is potrayed as offering liberation from 
materialism and anomie. This opportunity to escape from contemporary modern society 
and transform one‘s life may be a major source of appeal to some.  
 
In Inspire issue 2 Samir Khan wrote a piece called, ―I am proud to be a traitor to 
America.‖ Jihad is described by Khan to being akin to a spiritual odyssey for the 
purification of the soul and for self discovery. Surrounded by death, it makes one realise 
the really important things in life. The need to return to basics and to get away from the 
'rat race' of modernity is a great source of appeal in his narrative. He alludes to the purity 
that is found in the path of Jihad that comes from this disassociation with modern, 
cosmopolitan society and the purification of the soul through hardship in a 'raw' and basic 
environment while constantly under the shadow of death.  
 
As my eyes passed over the mysterious twirls of the sand 
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dunes, I was reminded of the enigma of Jihad in the 
Contemporary world...‖―So being in Jihad makes me focus 
on my soul's wellbeing for the purpose of being accepted 
by the Lord of the Worlds since death surrounds jihad 
although the guarantee of Jihad is not there. 
 
How could I become a traitor to myself by throwing away 
this holy odyssey? Living with myself would be then be 
like a fish taken out of water. Thus it brought me gleeful 
tears and great joy to hear that America labels me a terrorist 
due to my love for correcting and straightening my soul out 
for the better. I have become a traitor for chasing my love. 
What more evidence does one need that America and her 





 In this way extremists espouse Jihad to be one of the fundamental components of 
their religion that is denied to Muslims. Jihad to them has been vilified to become 
something criminal and therefore hard to attain.  
 
Similarly in Issue 4 of Inspire, Abu Zakari Al Eritri wrote another ‗war story‘ 
called the ―The Jihad in Abyan.‖ The narrative spoke about exciting successes despite 
strong odds and how jihadists demonstrated bravery and creativity. It also went on to 
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relate about divine intervention against close calls, even though they welcomed 
martyrdom. This was to impress upon the reader that there is actual evidence to show that 
God is on their side. The impression the narrative also wants to create is the idea that the 
enemy is not invincible despite common impressions. ―Overall, what I‘ve learned from 
these battles is that the Yemeni soldier, whom I used to think they knew how to fight well, 
are actually chickens and the only thing they know how to do well is run from the 
mujahidin and tell lies to the Americans that they captured so-and-so or killed so-and 
so.‖564 
 
In Inspire issue 4 the section entitled ―What to expect in Jihad: The Jihad 
Times,‖565 spoke about the internal struggle that will happen in the midst of battle stress. 
There is the promise of paradise in the midst of fear during bombings. The account being 
very experiential went into practical details of how to take care during jihad. Again the 
miracles during jihad were emphasised. Such raw and experiential narratives create an 
impression of authenticity that is appealing to readers.  
 
d) “Prophecy” 
This is in fact related to the earlier theme about the supernatural experiences in 
Jihad, but focuses on the element of prophetic predictions based on religious scriptures 
which offer the promise of a better tomorrow to Muslims. When the authenticity of such 
prophecies gets ‗proven‘ by reference to religious scriptures or trusted scholars, they gain 
credibility with even mainstream Muslims.  
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Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Al-Malahim Media‘s Seventh Issue of the 
Magazine Jihaad Publications featured an article called "...and They Devised Plans and 
Allah too had Arranged a Plan‖, written by Shaykh Nasir al-Wuhaishi in the Ansar al 
Jihad website. It was targeted at those who believed in the idea that they are in some 
ways the saviour foretold in religious prophecies who will come to save Islam. It quoted a 
hadith that described how apparently 12000 men will come from Yemen to save Islam: 
 
 Out of `Aden-Abyan will come out twelve thousand; they 
will give victory to Allah and His messenger. They are the 
best of the people living in the period between my time and 
theirs.....  
 
...I swear by Allah, this is a holy war that erupted in your 
land, and in your peninsula, to which you were led and 
chosen by Allah, so that Islam spreads from where it 
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 All this gives readers the opportunity to make a causal link to the rise of al-Qaeda 




In the HUT forum discussion thread ‗Al-Qaeda Supporters‘, a member wrote, 
―Muslims must be 'supporters' of those in the Ummah who have the characteristics of the 
Taifah al-Mansurah described by the Final Prophet (saw). Inshallah trying their utmost 
to be part of this Party standing shoulder to shoulder with them... and if their Party does 
not have these characteristics, to strive in order to incorporate these characteristics into 
it.‖568 Here they are putting forth the claim that people is al-Qaeda are in fact the prophe-
sised ‗Taifah al-Mansurah‘ from the hadith. 
 
Likewise in the Kavkaz website under the article, ''Two ideologies can never get 
along peacefully on the same territory,'' it was written, ―Islamic scholars say that Allah 
grants the Muslims the conditions for victory once every hundred years. In this century 
we should like to take advantage of those conditions. We shall try to make it happen in 
our lifetime.‖569 This demonstrates how prophecy represents hope and the promise of 
victory to the reader. It has the power to create confidence in the reader to any act of 
resistance as victory is ensured.  
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In the classic Jihadist narrative, ―Defense of the Muslim Lands‖ by Abdullah  
Azzam which appeared in the Sallafiyah Jadeedah website, Azzam talked about the "The 
First Obligation After Iman." In this he mentioned that according to Hadith; the time will 
come when people would hate to fight for Islam for ―Wahn‖ (love of this world).  There 




Extremists live out this self-fulfilling prophecy which they can relate to as they 
see themselves as being in the same situation where they are vilified and alienated for 
wanting to fight in a jihad which many shun from.  Much of this narrative is to encourage 
readers to mentally prepare for the hardships and societal rejection that will follow if they 
choose such a path. But as has been prophecised, it will be ultimately rewarding for them 
on the basis of their perseverance and faith. 
 
One of the most common jihadi prophecies has to do with the rise of the Mahdi, 
the prophesised saviour of Islam who will come in the end times.  This is an idea that any 
mainstream Muslim can also identify with. Extremists have used the idea of the rise of 
the ‗army of black flags‘ to allude to themselves. The ‗army of the black flags‘ is suppo-
sedly fortold in the hadiths
571
 by the prophet Muhammad and other established Islamic 
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sources. It revolves around a Muslim army that will arise from Khorasan (present day 
Iran or Central Asia) that will follow the Mahdi to reconquer Jerusalem and restore the 
status of Islam. What is remarkable is that the the writer apparently saw evidence of this 
belief entrenched amoung everyday Muslims,   
I was once talking to a group of young Muslim men and 
asking them some questions.  I asked them if the obvious 
superior militaries of America and Israel compared to the 
militaries of any Islamic nations were a source of difficulty 
for many Muslims.  One of these men then became very 
angry at my question and snapped out, ―You Americans and 
Zionists better get ready, because the black flags are 
coming!‖  At the time, I had no idea what he was talking 
about.  Later I learned the meaning.   
The idea of the Army of the Black Flags also appears in extremist websites. In the 
‗Gawaher‘ Islamic forums, a reader cites a comprehensive research paper on this prophe-
cy which indicated where the army of the black flags will rise from. The author also 
wanted to show how current developments in the world inductively point to this prophecy 
being true,  
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vice, New Delhi, 2004), p. 42  and Prof. M. Abdullah, Islam, Jesus, Mehdi, Qadiyanis and 
Doomsday, (Adam, New Delhi, 2004), p. 54  
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 In all these ethnic groups, there are only two groups that 
are Muslims and only one group that is geographically 
present in Khurasan i.e. the Pathans of Afghanistan and Pa-
kistan. The only group that is warlike, undefeated and un-
tamed throughout the course of history, staunch in religious 
fervor, filled with honor and pride and is unforgiving of its 
enemy; one that will fight its enemy until one of them is 
dead. One now starts to understand why Afghanistan is the 
center of the world and why Pakistan became Independent 
of United India? God has His own ways of making histories 
and turn fates.‖ 
…Not very surprisingly, if one identifies US or Allied 
bases in the Central Asian and Middle East region, one 
would realize that the Allied powers have shockingly cir-
cled Syria i.e. the host of the last war of the world….  
…The US‘s War on Terror is a deceptive game and a mind 
boggling riddle. The term terrorism is itself vague and un-
defined and built on repetitive lies upon lies as evident in 
the case of 9/11. It is almost always blindly used against 
Muslims. The unilateral, pre-emptive extra-judicial vi-
olence by the western powers is always named as wars of 




But if one makes an unbiased examination of the term and 
the war itself then one would realize that all these terrorists 
demand is the right of self-determination and self-rule and 
their wars of insurgencies are nothing but wars of self-
defense against foreign occupational forces and aggressors 
against their land, sovereignty and religion. 
…It is also imperative to understand that, unlike Ronald 
Reagan or evangelical Christians, no Muslim can be sure of 
End of times and the time of appearance of Imam Mehdi 
and second coming of Jesus Christ (AS). We shall only 
look into these critical state or non-state players in the re-
gion considering the American and Jewish mentality of 
preparation of the last war, and to realize what important 
Muslim players are there who pose a vital threat to Western 
interests…. 
….Very interestingly, Al Qaeda has a black flag as well 
with a yellow/orange Shahada embossed on it. According 
to Syed Saleem Shehzad of Asia Times Online, Al Qaeda 
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shares this belief with the Taliban that Afghanistan is the 
promised land of Bilad-e-Khurasan.
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The author of the research paper was clearly sympathetic to extremist Muslim or-
ganizations. But he had done a highly comprehensive and well referenced academic re-
search paper that gives a rational analysis of the idea of the Army of the Black Flags.  In 
short he alludes to major militant groups such as Al-Qaeda or politically activist but ex-
tremist groups such as HUT and a few others as possible contenders for the Army of the 
Black Flags. But the main emphasis of his article is on how military intervention or haw-
kish, jingoist policies of the West and their occupation and interference in Muslim lands 
will give rise to this prophecy being fulfilled as historically provable facts discovered and 
events cited in his paper, all point to it. Such narratives have the capcity to be very persu-
asive as they argue the case in a rational, corroborative and coherent manner.  Judging 
from this, it is very easy to make a simplistic connection between the prophesized Army 
of the Black Flags and almost any militant Muslim organization, be it al-Qaeda in Afgha-
nistan or to militant groups in Iran. Not only does the theme of divine prophecy have the 
capacity to create confidence and inspiration, it more importantly gives religious legiti-
macy to any of their actions. Any terrorist act then becomes part of a greater prophecy 
already ordained by God. 
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  e. “We represent grassroots concerns” 
 People Power. This is what al-Qaeda and other extremist movements claim they 
have - the support of the grassroots. Grassroots in the context of extremist narratives is 
meant to refer to Muslim communities, be they as diasporas in the US, Europe or other 
nations where they constitute the minority, or as part of the majority in Muslim nations 
across the world. Local grievances are naturally distinct from nation to nation. Extremist 
narratives carefully pitch their narratives to bring across the idea of the Global ‗Ummah‘ 
to create the idea that the concerns of a Muslim in any part of the world are relatively 
similar and with equally similar origins. These similar issues relate mainly to being sub-
jugated, marginalized and alienated by the non-Muslims and Muslims who are their lack-
eys. In some ways they are making their appeals to a kind of global Islamic ‗grassroots.‘ 
But they also make it a point to pitch to the specific local grievances of the nation in 
question. Whether it is the third generation Muslim in the United States or someone in a 
Middle East nation living under an authoritarian regime, extremists frame their narratives 
tactically at these two levels – the global and the local.  
There are three principal ideas regarding grassroots concerns such extremist 
narratives need to convince readers of. One is that they have correctly identified and are 
much attuned to the grievance of the grassroots in question. Grievances which have been 
misconstrued, marginalized or simply ignored for greater state interests. The second idea 
is that the masses actually resonate the views and actions of extremist groups. Extremist 
narratives do this by showing instances in both speech and action by which the masses 
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support their ideas. For instance, in ―Signs of ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan‖ 573 
by Abdullah Azzam he spoke about how Afghan people were selling their meager 
possessions to buy weapons for Mujahedeen. ―…I witnessed an Afghan selling his goat 
and sheep to buy a single round of ammunition.‖ 574  Likewise the dissent in the 2011 
Arab revolution which saw the overthrow of Mubarak and Ben Ali has been linked to 
show how the grievances cited by al-Qaeda has resonated with the masses. 
 
This gave readers the impression that they are not alone and that there is populist 
Muslim support for the ideas they are reading. These readers in the forums mutually 
reinforce such ideas to create the self-fulfilling notion of a community of supporters. 
Finally, extremist narratives pitch the idea that they are akin to a lighthouse for the 
masses as they warn the masses about the insidious intentions the West and its ability to 
keep the Muslim grassroots docile and misled. 
Evidence of al-Qaeda capitalizing on this strategy of capturing the label of being 
the champion for the Muslim grassroots can be seen in how it came up with a special is-
sue in ‗Inspire‘ dedicated purely to the recent Arab revolutions. The entire issue was en-
titled the ‗Tsunami of Change.‘575 In the article, ―The way forward‖ by Abu Suhail fea-
tured in this Inspire Special Edition,  the author quotes, ―It (Arab Civil Protests) has also 
proved that al Qaeda‘s rage is shared by the millions of Muslims across the world 
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whether they are in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Yemen or elsewhere.‖576  This is 
meant to portray to readers that there is alignment in the grievances of the masses and 
that of Al-Qaeda‘s.  
Likewise Awlaki in his article the ‗Tsunami of Change‘, counters the claim that 
al-Qaeda has failed because of the success of the Arab revolution. He retorted back by 
highlighting that al-Qaeda got the same thing they wanted all along for the masses, name-
ly, their freedom.  
But this idea of victory is extrapolated towards what al-Qaeda wants the masses to 
see as a real victory – a government ruled by Sharia. In his article, ―The overlooked 
Backdrop‖, Zawahiri starts casting this doubt, “It is a new government that gives the 
people minor aspects of freedom, slight reforms and the freeing of some detainees with 
bails for a period of time. However, holding the reins of the government‘s rule remains in 
the hands of America‘s representatives, agents and soldiers…‖577 
 
With regards to the Egyptian protest leader, al-Barada‘ai, Zawahiri highlights the 
fact that he only showed up well into the protests and was not really there for the people 
in the midst of their suffering by being overseas and pandering to the West to provide him 
legitimacy and favour. In sum, what he is implying is that the protesters are replacing one 
lackey for the West with another. Although there might be placatory and superficial 
freedoms at the onset, it is a ruse as things will be no different eventually. Only the 
Islamic state solution of al-Qaeda will entail ‗true‘ liberation.  He entrenches this notion 
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by citing how al-Qaeda is with the people in the midst of their suffering.  
 
…And that is exactly what America wants from Egypt; 
they want either a tyrannical government or a democratic 
one that is ruled by one party or many, clashing with each 
other in succession to rule. However the threads of the 
game remain always in the hands of the American 
ambassador whose armies are positioned in Ras Banat, the 
Western airport of Cairo…578 
 
He thus brings in empirical ‗evidence‘ demonstrated by American military 
presence to show how power is still indirectly in the hands of Americans and not their 
new leaders. The democracy of the sort the Americans want is a ploy to keep their control 
over Muslims. They want the ‗in-fighting‘ that would feature when there is a clash to 
rule. The West wants Arabs to stay disunited and confused over who should rule them. 
This ‗confusion‘ will allow them to exercise better control.  
 
The ideology here is that Islam is the only overarching solution that will guarantee 
unity and ‗justice‘ and secular government / ruling systems are a tool to retain control 
over Muslims and keep them divided.  The rational argumentation logic to support this 
claim employs citing observable empirical evidence of US intervention and presence in 
neighbouring areas and in Egypt. This issue of Inspire also puts in a quote from a Western 
academic to corroborate their idea that the West will still try to rule by proxy through 
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military and civil intervention. They cite Phil Rhees who says that the rebirth happening 




In this same issue, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Rubaish wrote an article called, ―Al – Saud: 
Lodging a Criminal.‖ A quote from this narrative says,  
 
But I don‘t think that this will help the situation of the 
Muslims because oppression won‘t disappear and a ţaghut 
is often substituted by another. Rather it will be replaced by 
lesser oppression because of slight reforms like some 
aspects of freedom and increases of income. However the 





Again reinforcing the idea that until Shariyah and an Islamic government is 
implemented, Muslims are simply replacing one oppressive apostate tyrant for another 
with marginal and superficial improvements to mislead them from realising the extent of 
their oppression and keep them quiet.   
 
Indonesian Jihadis are also evolving with new perspectives coming from the 
Middle East. In this case taking inspiration from the works of Hazim a-Madani, Abu 
Musab Al-Suri and Al-Maqdisi in a local Malay article called Visi Politik Gerakan Jihad. 
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(Political Vision of the Islamic Movement). This article highlights the fallacy of painting 
all Jihadi writings as having recommended solutions that reduce the solution to 
straightforward militancy. It suggests that there are discerning Jihadi ideologues that 
advocate probing more deeply into the socio political context of proposed solutions. This 
entails looking into the primacy of winning grassroots support on local issues that the 
populace can identify with. For instance, this can be the growing concern over the 
proliferation of vice, narcotics etc. It stresses on the importance of doing a ‗cost / benefit‘ 
calculation over proposed actions, how public opinion will react and support it, how the 
‗enemy‘ can be rationally delegitimized and most importantly having a well thought out 
strategy that encompasses sound political analysis. This is a move that is contrary to the 
idea that religious dictates are the sole or primary ideological force to determine 
solutions; it recognizes that quoting Quranic verses to support the argument to use 




If we bring in America and Israel as the enemy, we‘re not 
channelling or empowering the potential of the Islamic 
resistance very well, because America and Israel are too far 
from the reality of the ummah (Muslim community). 
Because of this, the ummah must be mobilized to crush 
Ahmadiyah, Shi‘ism, vice, gambling, narcotics, idolatry 
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and other things that are closer to their daily lives. By 
opposing these things, the ummah will experience clashes, 
and from the clashes, larger conflicts that will produce 
solidarity and brotherhood. Then we will become ever 




Finally Husain mentions that when HUT activists spoke in Universities it was on 
topics that were considered taboo by traditional mosque authorities and which were 
swept under the carpet by their families. This was ideal for recruitment as the ―First 
generation of British Born Muslims were now in university in large numbers and 
suffered from common problems that the Hizb tapped into.‖583  
 
These issues range from marriage, discrimination, the social party culture and the 
place of Muslims in it. Once HUT activists found identification with the audience over 
such personal issues in a very jovial and informal manner, they would link them to 
broader global issues and politics. Every issue, such as not being offered a prayer room, 
was politicised and the activists were trained to do this. The authorities, like school 
management were then villanised. UK foreign policy was another favourite punching 
bag.
584
 Then the idea of the Islamic state in which there would be no racism would be 
presented as the solution to such grassroots concerns.
585
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g. “You can never fit in.” 
 
One of the strongest themes to create emotive resonance is the idea that Muslims 
will always be marginalised and alienated because of their religion. Even if they were to 
conform by showing flexibility in adhering to Islamic practices or by recontextualising 
practices to make them more acceptable in a secular society, it would still not be good 
enough. They will be hated and will never be accepted. So extremists build their 
argument from this foundational basis and then propose that being true to their faith 
entails pleasing God and not secular man. This will at least ensure them ultimate victory 
in the hereafter and dignity in the present. But this dignity in the present will come at a 
price. The divine injunction to be faithful to God is not just about being firm but also to 
resist the imposition of secular ideas in all aspects of life that Muslims will experience. 
For secular ideas violate the absolute submission to God and his decrees for man-made 
ones. This ranges from issues of governance entailing Western notions of democracy to 
societal living among the rest of a nation‘s secular population. This theme of never fitting 
in resonates especially with Muslim youth who might feel they need to ‗fit in‘ by not 
making their ‗Muslimness‘ very obvious. Be it conforming by drinking alcohol and not 
wearing a headscarf to more major issues such as conforming to Western notions of 
democracy and all that it entails. Extremist narratives cite examples that many of these 
youth might have gone through. They apparently prove their point by asking the 
fundamental question of whether they still feel accepted despite compromising and 
conforming. For many Muslim minority populations throughout the world, there will be a 
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portion of youth whose answer to this question is a flat ‗no.‘ The actual reasons for this 
may be varied but this is the precursory experiential alignment such extremist narratives 
hope to leverage on.  
 
  In the Muslim discussion forum, MyIWC a thread discussing the article, ―Now 
That the Elections are Over‖ by Anwar Awlaki appeared. 586 A member wrote,  
Brothers and sisters you can vote, you can run around 
supporting the campaigns, you can stay silent about the 
aspects of your religion that do not appeal to your fellow 
citizens, you can speak out against your Muslim brothers 
and sisters who support the Muslim causes around the 
world, you can try your best to fit in and be accepted and 
the end result will be that you will always be seen as the 
enemy and you will never be accepted unless you do one 
thing: give up your religion.  
One of the characteristics of a humiliated and oppressed 
community is their submission to their oppressor and their 
tolerance of oppression. On the other hand they are 
arrogant and intolerant among themselves. This is how it 
was with Banu Israel when living under the Pharaoh. I am 
sorry to state this but unfortunately this attitude is been 
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reflected by many American Muslims who humiliated 
themselves by voting for candidates who have no serious 
concern for their issues.I mentioned in my previous post: 
The perception the American Muslims are giving is that by 
giving them nothing substantial and by giving them just a 
little bit of recognition you can get their support, vote and 
loyalty even if you carry on your war against their brothers 
and sisters. Just like a dog owner abusing his dog but as 
long as the bone is thrown out the dog will still give his 
owner all his loyalty. It is sad but true. The American 
Muslims who decided to vote have made a fool out of 
themselves and the whole world knows it.  
Again we see the deference to an experiential perspective some American 
Muslims might be inclined to identify with, to illustrate the indignity in which Muslims 
live where they are mentally defeated and subservient. A number of other comments 
resonate this point of secular processes such as democracy being a sham and efforts to 
include Muslims being superficial in nature:  
If they didn‘t even bother to visit a mosque, which is no 
more than a ceremonial thing anyway but does make the 
house Negros happy, how can one expect from them any 
support on our issues?  
 Proven by those who do not want to vote. Sayed Qutb, Dr. 
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Israr Ahmad, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and the Salafi Jihadi 
movement. In Yemen prominent scholars from the Muslim 
Brotherhood have finally come to the conclusion that the 
democratic process is no more than a game that wastes the 
efforts of Muslims with very little gain. 
Muslims will be allowed to pray, fast, and practice Islam as 
long as it is contained within the spiritual compartment. But 
they will not be allowed to be Muslim in the full sense of 
the word. The issues of Sharia law, Jihad, wala and bara, 
hudud, khilafah, the Quranic teachings concerning the Jews 
and Christians, and support of Muslim resistance fighters 
around the world will not be tolerated. Now the spiritual 
aspect will also be under attack, probably not by the 
government but by the society at large. The American 
culture will destroy their families.  
Readers might we see this as real and happening if dissent by Muslims is viewed 
with suspicion and gauged firstly for its propensity for extremism. 
There is a striking similarity between the American Muslim 
community and the Muslims of al Andalus who chose to 
stay behind after Muslim Spain fell into the hands of the 
Catholic monarchs. There are some writings that reveal that 
after all the oppression they suffered they still had hope that 
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their situation would improve, even after the Catholic 
monarchs showed them the worst treatment. 
Again we see the association with a historical incident and its similarity to today‘s 
events, attempting to give credibility to the argument on the basis that ‗history repeats 
itself‘. The point stressed is that Muslims throughout history have never been able to fit 
in even if they went along with those who rule them.   
There are rebuttals on the forum. There are those that claim that Awlaki‘s 
arguments are flawed because they are ‗weak arguments‘ and they challenge each of his 
claims by producing counter claims in the form of questions. E.g. ―if a person feels this 
way, why are they still in this country?‖ and ridiculing the attitude expressed, i.e. they 
Muslims ‗pout like a baby‘ when they do not get what they want or that their grievances 
are the same as any other American. ―Where is the oppression of Muslims in this country 
that the author is crying about?‖ This remark would have received numerous rebuttals if 
not for the following possible reasons: 
1. Awlaki‘s responses are leading and based on questions that one cannot disprove 
without extensive research on public perceptions.  
2. A post mentioned that the forums are being monitored and contain hidden agents 
of disinformation.  Any person who critiques Awlaki falls neatly into this category and 
would be ignored or avoided for this reason.  
3. Also the question, ―Where is the oppression ...?‖ is practically inviting those with 
grievances to spill the beans.  But again the warning given that the forum is being moni-
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tored effectively thwarts further unbiased forum comments. Thus killing off the Haber-
masian ‗Ideal Speech Situation‘ that might have existed in the forum. 
 
 To prove the extent of Ismaphobia, al-Qaeda in Inspire Issue 1: ―Newsflash‖ cites 
the example of Molly Norris‘s facebook entry, ―everybody draw Mohamed day.‖ It has 
over 100 000 members. The aim behind quoting such incidents was to provide empirical 
corroboration to prove there is a ‗war on Islam‘ and that the ‗West hates Islam.‘  It also 
entrenches extremist notions of Al Walla Wal Barra and the idea that Muslims will never 
be accepted in the West so there is no point in trying to integrate with the ‗enemy.‘  
 
 In Inspire issue 1 another article appeared entitled, ―The West should ban the 
Niqab covering its real face‖ by Yahya Ibrahim. It was meant to show the hypocrisy and 
double standards of the West that claims to champion human rights but is highly 
intolerant towards its Muslim population. He sarcastically attacks Sarkozy‘s quote on the 
symbolic dangers of the burqa
587
 by saying, ―This is quite a lot to pile on top of this 
garment…‖ He then says, ―As mentioned above the Niqab is not mandatory on Muslim 
Women according to many scholars. But because it is a right of Muslim Women and 
because it has become a symbol of being Muslim today, Muslims must take a firm 
position in this battle and dig in their trenches.‖ Here we again see how extremists use 
the same argument the West uses against them, i.e. the Burqa issue is now about the right 
of women to choose what they want to wear. Thus extremists when it suits their 
arguments will revert to universal values and those which the West can identify with to 
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garner credibility to their argument.  The main issues being highlighted here are about 
resistance, the right not to be told how one should practice their religion and not being 
forced to ‗fit in‘:  
 
 For this reason we promote that Muslim Women in 
the West who do not view wearing niqab as being a 
religious duty to wear the niqab as a sign of their rejection 
of forced assimilation, as a symbol of their pride at being a 
Muslim, as a public statement that is carried as a badge of 
honour in face of a decadent Western way of life, and a 
statement that proclaims that even if I am not obliged to 
wear the niqab, I will wear it because I refuse to have the 




 As demonstrated by the above comment, the symbolic fight over the niqab 
589
 is 
not simply over the need to defend religious practices. We might assume that extremists 
advocate and feel very strongly about the need to wear the niqab because they follow 
puritan ideas of Islam. On the contrary, here they publically cite how the niqab has 
become a symbol of resistance and they are aware of that there is discretion, flexibility 
and choice in Islam over the need to wear it. The implications of this are that we need to 
frame counter-extremist narratives to take the focus away from escalating the niqab to the 
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ideological arena of extremists. There is a need for counter narratives to confine the issue 
of the niqab within the religious sphere and not allow it to become exploited as a 
symbolic expression of resistance. It does not help when Islamaphobes inflame the moral 
panic that it is a symbol of puritan Islamic expansionism and bring the debate out of its 
context.  This article clearly demonstrates that extremists know that it works in their 
favour to have such issues become a symbolic fight as it furthers the argument that 
Muslims can never fit into secular society.  
 
 He further adds that it is irrelevant if the minaret or niqab is cultural and not really 
‗rooted in Islamic tradition.‘ But because it is now a symbol of Islam, it needs to be 
defended. He also explains how placatory statements that assert that it is only the niqab 
that is opposed, not the veil and not Islam are a ‗step-by step process that is meant to 
assimilate the Muslims gradually rather than overwhelm them at risk of alienating 
them.‖ He then cites the cartoon controversy in Denmark and mentions places in the 
United States that have taken this issue over the niqab further to ask Muslims to not even 
wear any headscarves. Finally he cautions how this attitude towards Muslim practices 
will be an eventuality in any non-Muslim country.  
 
The use of religious quotes from the Quran adds a powerful final justification to 
prove the extremist theme that Muslims can never fit in. In the youtube video lecture 
Jihad in Darfur 
590
, Ayman al Zawahiri quotes the Quranic verse citing how Christians 
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and Jews will never be satisfied with Muslims until they give up Islam.
591
 This is a 
frequently cited Quranic verse used to prove this theme.  
 
In the article, ''All that is happening today is a mirage'' (interview with a Chechen 
Mujahid) 
592
, the following interview appeared to prove the idea that placatory measures 
to appease Muslims are a ruse and the state will eventually impose measure that restrict 
and control Muslims,  
 
1. PW: Many of Chechnya's civilians are pleased at 
what the authorities are doing: the authorities are building 
homes, they constructed the largest mosque in Europe, 
they're improving people's lives. Don't you see any changes 
for the better?  
 
2. A.-M.: Kadyrov brings Tyson to Chechnya, and he'll 
be bringing Michael Jackson. Then it will be some artistes, 
some Arabs. Why? He's conducting a policy of the stick 
and carrot.. Beat the man, beat him and beat him, then 
throw him a piece of bread. He thinks that's the way to deal 
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with people, but it's all just temporary. I swear, even the 
Muslim prayers they're allowed to hold today will be 
banned tomorrow. For no one in Chechnya today can fol-
low the ways of the Prophet. Young people complain to us 
that they're being told at home not to go to the mosques. 
They're even being taken out of the mosques. And all the 
rest is just for show, there's nothing to it... If they were tru-
ly supportive of Islam, do you think we'd be against it? No, 
of course we wouldn't.  
 
3. And all this show is being paid for by our oil. The 
republic doesn't even get 10 percent of the oil revenues. So 
why do we take their bait? They're grabbing all the oil and 
throwing us handouts. Telling us meanwhile that "Russia 
feeds us". No, it doesn't. Today, if it wasn't for the mujahi-
deen they'd be able to send us into exile as they did in 
1944. We have to remember that. They're the people who 
tormented our fathers, and now they're tormenting us. So 
everything that Kadyrov does is hypocrisy. It's just that 
they have control of information, of television. And they 
can deceive people. And our people are very willing to be-
lieve what they're told on TV. There is almost no one left in 
Chechnya who is able to openly speak the truth. Everything 
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is under the thumb of the authorities. Even religion is inter-
preted in the way they want.  
 
4. If we had an independent state, our oil would pay 
for a fine standard of living. That's why we've taken the 
path of struggle - so we can have our state, so that the Mus-
lims can live in peace. All that is happening today is a mi-
rage. And it will pass.. Allah is testing the Muslims.‖ 
In this interview, he also alludes that Muslims give an illusion of support to the 
state as they are dependant on it and fear persecution.   
Finally in Awlaki‘s lecture, Jihad part 1 that appeared on youtube, a viewer says 
on the forum below the video,  
On one hand we have idiots who are looking for loopholes 
in Islam to have peace with the kaffir. On the other we have 
idiots who use Islam to get to their own political objectives. 
And very few people, who truely fight in the name of Allah 
to establish shariah and protect their honor in blood and 
sweat. Maybe this is the group our prophet (saw) who 
stated that the ummah will be divide into many sects and 
only one sect will go jannah? 
593
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By saying this he entrenches the idea that only those Muslims who go against the 
grain and stand firm to their beliefs by not capitulating and collaborating with the state or 
with non-Muslims are in fact the chosen ones. Thus ‗not fitting in‘ can in fact be a sign of 
belonging to God‘s chosen.  
Identity is another personal narrative that has been the victim of common 
explanations based on surface observations. This is the idea that being a minority, one 
would simply gravitate to their ethnic identities under incidents of alienation and 
marginalisation.  But a variation of this that came as a result of my discussions with 
Muhammad Hee 
594
 was the idea of socially imposed identities. In other words Muslims 
may not choose to see themselves primarily as Muslims, but the hype over the issue 
keeps forcing them to accept this as their primary identity. Just as the Muslims in 
Nadia‘s research were ‗tired of being talked about‘595, Muslims who see themselves 
simply as national entities or in terms of other identities
596
,  are now told that they are 
different. This may be done in subtle ways, through sensationalisation in the media about 
the Islamist threat or from their own communities that shun or criticise them for turning 
too much towards Western ideals.             
                                                 
594 Mr Muhammad Hee is a Danish Muslim convert who was once a leading member of the HUT in Denmark. After 
getting disillusioned with the movement, he left and later wrote a book about his experiences called ―the defector". He 
has recently completed his Masters Degree. I had an opportunity to speak to him regarding his experiences leading to 
recruitment in Copenhagen on 4th and 10th March 2009. His poignant and insightful answers shed much light on the 
entire debate surrounding this issue. 
595 Nadia Jeld in her research paper on European Muslims who do not belong to any associations. Namely cultural 
Muslims who took a more pragmatic view on practices such as drinking during social occasions in order not to stand 
out and not practicing praying 5 times a day) mentioned in her lecture how some of her respondents remarked that they 
were simply tired of being talked about. (Talk given by her to students in the Copenhagen University Masterclass on 
‗Islam and Muslims in the Modern World‘, 1 April 2009.)  She elaborated later to me by e-mail to explain how, ―The 
informants who express this attitude, say it in relation to majority contestation and negative debates about Islam. They 
express that they want to learn and know more about Islam in order to be able to ―defend themselves‖ and ―know for 
themselves about Islam, and just what others tell them.‖ See also Nadia Jeldtoft, "Lived Islam – Religious Identity with 
‗Non-organized‘." Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 7 (2011): 1134-1151.  
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 e.g. in terms of their profession or simply a normal citizen like anybody else. 
315 
 
Radicalisation may not always arise from outright cases of racism which one may 
never have experienced. But one might take an extremist stance gradually with enough 
accumulation of these exclusionist subtleties that leave a mark on anyone‘s 
subconscious.  Muhammad citied how identities are ever changing for someone based on 
what one is experiencing. This is seldom recognised and the overriding identity that may 
be usually imposed is based on one‘s ethnicity or religion. This religious identity is now 
brought to the forefront of one‘s consciousness due the overwhelming attention it is 
given and by the level in which he religious label is used to identify the individual.  
 
The factors that contribute to this in Europe were also brought up in our discus-
sions. Muhammed citied how over expounding marginal phenomenon related to any cul-
ture or religion serves only to paint the grisly picture that feeds the narratives of extrem-
ists from either side of the spectrum.  
 
h. “Do not become defeatist.” 
 
Extremist narratives often cite the word ‗defeatist.‘ By this they are suggesting 
that pacifist Muslims have a defeatist mindset. Extremist narratives imply that in the 
minds of such defeatist Muslims, the state or Western capitalist society is all powerful 
and Muslims see themselves as weaker. Therefore such defeatist Muslims feel that to go 
against the state or Western capitalist society is idealistic and self-defeating.  
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Awlaki‘s article in Inspire, ―The Tsunami of Change‖ 597 is also meant to caution 
those who feel helpless and powerless from having a defeatist attitude and instead to keep 
on persevering. Its main argument cites the defeatist attitude in the minds of Muslims 
after unsuccessful Islamist movements. But the recent Arab uprisings have proven 
otherwise and are a victory against this defeatist attitude. It proves that an oppressive 
state even when backed by the West is not invulnerable. Such positive motivations are 
naturally inspiring to those whose main grievances are a sense of helplessness to 
oppressive events around them. Religion is brought into this argument to say how Islam 
helps one awaken from this defeatist attitude.  
 
In the Inspire magazine, Shaykh Abu Yahya Al-Libi who wrote about ―The Mid-
dle Path and the enemy‘s plot‖ described how a defeatist mindset is linked to those who 
have been misled and those for whom Islamic morals are absent to begin with. 
598
   
 
Al-Libi also talked about how the West through its rhetoric and propaganda 
slowly internalizes its ideas in the minds of people. The intention of such propaganda and 
ideas is to drive Muslims away from Jihad and the Mujahideen. This is because these two 
terms as a result of such dissemination of ideas, now have a label that instantly associates 
them with terrorism and extremism. These two concepts are seen as something abhorrent 
in the West. He goes onto to explain how the West controls labels and definitions. When 
Muslims use words like moderation it pleases the West as it takes a pacifist meaning and 
does not propagate resistance to their rule and structure. Therefore he alludes that labels 
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Islam on the other hand, he says is not dictated by man, Ijtihad (critical reasoning) 
or by changing times. It is a constant that is divinely ordained and perfect. Anything man-





We can see how he appropriates away the use of the label ‗the middle path‘ used 
often by ‗moderate‘ Muslims to indicate a position of non-extremism. ―Therefore, this is 
the religion of Islam with its middle way, complete justice and clear call. Not of that 
propagated by those who have defeated souls, diseased hearts and deceived minds even if 
millions of people applaud them.‖600 The criticism is clearly levelled at counter-radical 
Muslim ideologues that are seen to ‗moderate‘ Islam to suit and please the state or their 
rulers and therefore receive accolades for it. This to al Libi is a prime example of those 
with a defeatist mindset which have given up their honour to please their masters: 
 
 Among the greatest ways of which they use to conceal 
their deviation and to propagate their errors is their claim of 
affiliation to the middle way, moderation and balance. They 
have coined meanings for these words which they become 
content with. Their meanings‘ source is their thoughts. 
Their meanings‘ structure is fabrication and compromise. 
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 Looking again at the HUT discussion thread, ―Can There be an Islamic 
democracy‖ and the discussion on Professor Jim Khalili's documentary on the BBC 
called 'Science and Islam', we see a proposed explanation about the origins of this often 
cited ‗defeatist‘ mindset.  Apparently as Islamic civilization fell into decline, they looked 
to Western systems of governance as they wrongly assumed that the system of their 
conquerors would be better. This idea has unfortunately been,   
 
...the domain of nearly all 'Muslim' intellectuals for the last 
150 years or so especially in all the national liberation 
movements (except perhaps the central asian republics who 
fell under the ambit of communism - but are now espousing 
similar sentiments) that is because they are what ibn 
Khuldun called the conquered - learning and  imitating the 
way of the people who conquered them. Unfortunately too 
many people have bought into the idea that defeated 
Muslims are the same as a defeated Islam.
602
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This is meant to illustrate what extremists see as constituting defeatism. It is about 
conformity to those who rule and compromising on Islam‘s tenets in the process.  This is 
done because the conquerors are seen as being superior in all aspects. As such, Muslims 
are already mentally defeated, to survive, they not only become subservient but believe 
progress in life is about pleasing and imitating their masters as Ibn Khuldun had 
described. The author is alluding to the idea that Muslims are doing exactly this today. 
But to the author, to do away with this mentality requires first understanding the 
historical supremacy of Islam in all aspects of social life. His point is that Islam had a 
better system of governance which Muslims of today because of their inferiority complex 
in contemporary society have forgotten or have never realised.  
 
Extremist narratives therefore target those who have low self –esteem or feel 
humiliated and dejected by the state Islam is in. They offer an alternate mental attitude 
that is meant to reverse this. The word ‗defeatist‘ is mentioned a number of times in their 
narratives to reverse a mindset of subservience and acceptance of the marginalised 
situation some Muslims might perceive to find them in. The very promise of an alternate 
mindset that is positive and empowering can be a great source of appeal in extremist 
narratives. But more often than not, the label ‗defeatist‘ is used pejoratively to shame 
readers into adopting an alternate mindset that encompasses the supremacist and 
confident attitude needed for resistance. 
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Making reference again to the Kavkaz website article ―If Jihad suddenly 
stopped‖603 , we see how defeatism is equated with compromising with non-Muslims and 
their rulers. It jogs the cultural memory of the people in the region to remember the his-
torical persecution of Muslims whose right to practice Islam was punished. Besides the 
Sufis, other Muslim groups who might have been labeled as extremist one time or anoth-
er by the West were equally criticized in this article. For instance, the compromising na-
ture of activist groups such as the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) was equated to them 
being sellouts. 
In the website, ―The ignored Puzzle pieces of knowledge,‖ written by Samir 
Khan, the following quote appeared which emphasises the theme that Muslims have a 
defeatist mentality that looked up to the West. To have any form of awakening required 
first eliminating this ‗defeatist‘ mindset. The ‗noble‘ vanguards in this were the classic 
extremist Muslim ideologues, Syed Qutb and Mawdudi: 
 
The prevailing outlook in the Islāmic countries was the out-
look of inferiority compared to the West. Then some of the 
righteous scholars and writers were deputized with defend-
ing the ‗Aqīdah and the Islāmic Shar‘īah against the dark 
orientalist attacks with a heroic defense. And the point of 
the intellectual shift and what led to a revolution and coup 
in the Islāmic consciousness were the writings of Abū Al-
A‘lā Al-Mawdūdī and Sayyid Qutb, may Allāh have Mercy 
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upon them both. And these two men did not settle [just] for 
defending the Islāmic values; rather, they became hostile to 
the prevailing conventions, and they began to attack West-
ern civilization and its worth and the prevailing notions in 
the West with the speech and logic of superiority. And this 
revolution was similar to a blaze in the awakening of the 
Arab mentality that had [previously] wallowed in humilia-
tion and defeat, so it was necessary to eliminate both men, 
and especially Sayyid, may Allāh have Mercy upon him, 
for his standing at the center of intellectual importance in 
the Islāmic world. Sayyid was killed at the order of the 
West, but by Egyptian hands. But his words revived the 
hearts and moved the emotions. His books spread after his 
death the way fire spreads in straw, and they became an in-
tellectual methodology that freed the Arabs from polytheis-
tic servitude to the foreign gods so that the hearts would 
turn freely toward Allāh. This was the intellectual begin-
ning that was followed by many sacrifices by the giants of 
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This quote implies that the ideas that Qutb and Mawdudi started were an impetus 
for the mental / intellectual revolution to break away from a defeatist mentality. Only af-
ter this is achieved can Muslims be confident enough to undertake concrete steps to liber-
ate themselves and regain lost supremacy.  
 
Qutb and Mawdudi were therefore seen as heroes and founders of a mental / intel-
lectual revolution against a defeatist mentality following defeat in wars that internalised a 
sense of inferiority among Muslims. Quite naturally extremists place great importance on 
getting rid of this idea of defeatism as they need supporters who feel confident about re-
sisting the militarily and economically more powerful Western world and her allies. The 
author is suggesting that Qutb was villanised and killed for starting this intellectual revo-
lution against defeatism. The appeal of this concept of resistance against a defeatist men-
tality can resonate with anyone who feels inferior and powerless. We need to understand 
how at times, it is such themes that create greater resonance with people rather than as-
pects of extremist ideology such as the caliphate, Sharia etc. For they touch on the intrin-
sic need for people to feel dignified, have a sense of standing as compared to a feeling of 
being inferior and defeated. This theme of resistance against defeatism thus makes one 
feel empowered and is very attractive to anyone who feels otherwise.   
 
h. “Al-Ghuraaba: The Stranger.” 
When Shaykh Abu Musab Al-Awlaki wrote an article in Inspire Issue 5 called 
―Why did I choose Al-Qaeda‖, he brought in the theme of ―Al-Ghurraba.‖- The Stranger. 
This is not the first time this revered term was used in extremist narratives. The concept 
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of the stranger has a special place. He is an anomaly, strange, misunderstood, isolated and 
vilified for his convictions. His uprightness is a threat to those in power and very few like 
him are aware about the true nature of things. So he is always targeted by those in power 
for this. Abu Musab sums this best in his article when he says,  
 
Thereupon, regarding this prophetic description for the 
people of the truth about their status of estrangement, there 
is no doubt that the one who lives in a state of fear about 
his soul being taken for death as a result of his ‗aqidah and 
jihad is the one who lives in the status of being strange. He 
lives in state of estrangement because he is accused of 
having deficiency in his ‗aqidah. This is not the case; 
rather it is because he is steadfast upon the truth in a time 
where the supporters have become less in number. Indeed 
he is a stranger. He lives while fearing that his phone is 
monitored, he is afraid that his car might be booby-trapped 
and he can‘t move freely throughout the land because the 
ruler is looking for him. Many people of his tribe are an 
enemy to him and it is even possible that he finds enmity 
from his family‘s side. He is accused of having a deviant 
‗aqidah. Accused that he might disturb the security, and 
accused that he will be opening a door of harm or 
otherwise. He will be - without delay – connected with 
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unjust descriptions. Undoubtedly the attribute of being 




 This idea has a natural appeal to any ―estranged‖ individual who can identify 
with the idea of being called ―strange‖ or a ‗misfit.‘ Such individuals might feel alienated 
and perhaps even vilified for having different ideas. If they resist, they are punished for 
having different ideas and acting on them. Such an individual might also perceive that the 
―normal‖ ones are instead ―praised‖ by those in power for their conformity to state 
sanctioned values. More importantly, those who wish to have the label ―Gurraba‖ see 
themselves part of a special in group who feel they alone are privy to the truth and are 
thus oppressed for it.   
 
 In the clearguidance forums, there was a discussion thread regarding an American 
Muslim girl who wore a headscarf and wooed the audience in a football field when she 
sang the American national anthem with passion. A comment appeared,  
 
I wonder when she last time she read the quraan with such 
passion? if she keeps doing what she is doing, when she 
will be singing her way into hell!!! flipping munafiqs!!! 
and they look down at us, and pray we change our ways so 
that we could attain that which they have, who are 
they???...Such modern so called moderate muslims are the 
real ones who are hurting the image of Islam. May God 
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Quite simply, the reader here is implying that it is better to be a stranger than 
associate with moderate Muslims who are accepted by the state but are apologetic 
lackeys who look down on others who do not conform like they do.  
 
In the Cageprisoners interview with Awlaki, in Ummah.com, this comment 
appeared in the discussion thread,  
 
we need to be more aware of all of the trials and 
tribulations that Muslims are enduring maybe it will wipe 
that stupid, ISLAM MEANS PEACE grin from our faces 
maybe we will stop getting so giddy because IKEA has 
blue khimars for the sisters maybe we will realize that our 





In a very raw manner, the reader is saying how the rhetoric about peace and Islam 
is apologetic, defeatist and distancing Muslims from realizing the oppression that is 
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happening around them.  If achieving this realization and being able to do something 
about it requires becoming the concept of the ‗stranger‘ in Islam and thereby distancing 
oneself from the mainstream, then it is a fate far better. 
 
We must not directly equate the concept of the ‗stranger‘ with a simple reference 
to an alienated or marginalized individual.  Its meaning is deeper than that. The ‗stranger‘ 
is a position that is only for a chosen few who are willing to make the sacrifice. This 
sacrifice would entail purposefully distancing oneself from the mainstream and friends 
and family if needs be. Status does not come with it, only hardship. But ultimate victory 
belongs to the ‗stranger‘ as he is favored by God to do his will. In many ways it is a 
positive take that reverses ones status of being estranged into something noble and 
privileged.  
 
i. “The Chosen.”  
In most of the themes mentioned there is an inevitable allusion to the idea of the 
‗Chosen‘. But this theme works bidirectionally. One is that the individual is chosen by 
God for this role and he or she should accept all the hardship it entails as final victory 
belongs to this privileged few. The other idea of the chosen is that the individual 
deliberately chooses this path as a means of salvation and for the betterment of the 
Muslim community. This will result in certain qualities being ascribed onto him or her 
and developed in the course of one‘s journey. This choice is therefore as a result of a 
‗calling‘ to serve Islam‘s oppressed and to redeem its honour. For instance, take a look at 





  You are the only ones in the peninsula of Islam who 
possess the weapons. Support the oppressed, and assist the 
distressed. Your brothers in Gaza wait impatiently for you. 
Rescue them; prevent their killing, and lift their siege. Your 
ancestors were the ones who conquered Palestine, the Le-
vant, and Iraq; whose armies reached the gates of France 
and the border of China. Your sons depicted the greatest 





In Defence of the Muslim Lands
609
 Abdullah Azzam mentioned how the holy 
prophet had predicted that there will come a time when Muslims would hate to fight for 
Islam. There would be ―Hatred of fighting‖ as well as those who will discourage those 
who want to. But only a chosen few will remain true and fight for Islam. Extremists live 
out this self-fulfilling prophecy 
610
 which they can relate to as they see themselves in the 
same situation. For instance, there might be objections from their family and friends. A 
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lot of counter radical ideology and mainstream Muslim scholars will not only discourage 
but vilify such a move. Thus much of such narratives encourage the reader to mentally 
prepare for the hardships, objections and vilification that will follow if one chooses such 
a path. But it will be a path that will be ultimately rewarding for the individual on the 
basis of their perseverance and faith. 
 
 In a Youtube lecture by Muhammad Sheikh entitled ―What Hassan Al-Banna said 
about Jihad,‖ a quote by Al-Banna was mentioned in the forum, ―Allah has specifically 
honoured the Mujahideen with certain exceptional qualities, both spiritual and practical, 
to benefit them in this world and the next.‖611  This quote reveals that the ideal of the 
‗chosen‘ which classical extremist Muslim ideologues such as Al-Banna envisioned has 
not lost its resonance and is in fact being propogated.  By being part of the chosen Muja-
hedeen, you are part of an elite group that is chosen to be ascribed with great qualities, 
leading to great results in this world and next.  
 Being chosen or choosing the path of Jihad is something that has to be 
demonstrated. It all boils down to deeds and not mere words. It was mentioned earlier in 
this study that Syed Qutb likewise refers to the concept of ‗Haraka‘ (referring to 
activism)
612
 in his writings. Qutb had stressed how ―there is no faith without action…‖ 
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which accentuates the primacy of activism.
613
 In the Ummah.com forum, during a 
discussion on Alwaki‘s lectures, Qutb‘s was quoted as having said, “Indeed our words 
will remain lifeless, until we die in pursuit of those words, then those same words will be 
brought to life and live amongst the people, inspiring them and bringing their hearts to 
life.‖614 
 
In on-line forums such as the clearguidance forum, this idea of those who choose 
the path of Jihad needing to demonstrate their faith by action is clearly expressed: 
 
 I advise all those who exert their time in matters like this 
without going to the lands of the muslims to remove the 
oppression to repent. NO matter how much you scream 
gihad and remove the tawagheet from the muslims lands 
your word mean nothing. Where is the action? where is the 
loss of limbs? ….May guide those internet mugahideen or 
humiliate those internet mugahideen. They are cowards real 
cowards.  
 
This narrative clearly communicates the idea that it is shameful for those who 
choose such a path to resist only in words. Very much in line with what Qutb was 
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expressing when he talked about ―Haraka‖. This central message that commitment to 
Jihad should be expressed in action and not words has never changed from the time of 
Qutb and it is has been only reintroduced and reemphasized in on-line forums. In the 
Jihadist forums, members laud Jihadists who carry out actual attacks and provoke each 





 The ‗chosen‘ in the world of Muslim extremism are required to travel a difficult 
path with equally difficult choices to make. As expressed in earlier themes, this might 
require seeking out the truth even if it means going against mainstream ideas and conven-
tions, being vigilant against state sanctioned rhetoric and learning to be conscious of any 
ruses and conspiracies and guarding oneself against a defeatist mentality. But most of all 
choosing the path of the ‗Ghuraba‘ (Stranger) and turning one‘s back on all that repre-
sented their earlier life.  Extremist Muslims exhort the idea that apprarently only a ‗cho-






                                                 
615
 David Stringer, "Newsvine - Brash and violent: al-Qaida's new mouthpieces",  Newsvine - Get Smarter 
Here,  http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2011/06/01/6763959-brash-and-violent-al-qaidas-new-





STUDY FINDINGS  
PART 3  
THE ARGUMENTATION CLUSTER. 
 
The argumentation cluster embodies themes that illustrate the persuasive tech-
niques that rely on purely rational arguments or sophist and dialectical arguments that 
have rational components imbedded in them. This is placed as a distinct cluster as it re-
lates to themes that become appealing mainly due to the method of argumentation used. 
These themes move away from poetic arguments that rely purely on emotive resonance 
and instead revolve around the argumentation techniques mentioned below.  They are as 
follows:    
a) ―Clarity of purpose.‖ (Rational Argument) 
 
b) ―Linking verifiable ‗truths‘ to form an ignoratio elenchi argument. (Sophist / 
Rational argument) 
 
c) ―Reductionism.‖ (Rational argument) 
 
d) ―We know what you are saying about us and this is what we say to that.‖ 




e) ―Corroborative and empirical analysis.‖ (Rational argument) 
 
 
a. “Clarity of Purpose” 
There is little or no ambiguity with extremists in their interpretation of issues, 
events, how religion is interpreted and in their proposed guidance and solutions. Even in 
highly debatable issues and complex arguments with many variables.This makes their 
aruguements and proposed solutions very coherent and persuasive.  
 
For example, in the discussion thread following Awlaki‘s youtube lecture entitled, 
―Allah is Preparing us for Victory‖ & ―True Warrior‖, one of the readers wrote. ―Always 
his lectures are simple and have a deep meanings.‖ 616 This demonstrates how simplicity 
in the narrative helps create coherent and unambiguous arguments that are more 
convincing. The reader feels that the author does not fudge or hide in the complexity of 
dialogue.  
 
The coherent and straightforward arguments also create the impression that the 
author has a clear and uncompromising stand. These popular lectures potray Awlaki as 
unwavering in his beliefs and that endears him to his readers and gives them confidence. 
One reader actually says in the discussion thread, ―...because he doesn‘t compromise the 
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Quran and sunnah for any man made law and as we can see he is being chased by 
America and its puppet nations because he speaks the truth..‖617 This also suggests that if 
readers feel that particular authors are persecuted for their sayings and beliefs, then what 
the authors say must be true, as the assumption is that only those who have the courage to 
tell the raw truth and who are uncompromising in their beliefs are persecuted.  
 
Likewise the religious stance in extremist narratives is also very explicit and there 
is little room for any ambiguity in interpretation. When counter- extremist ideology 
religious scholars portray an alternative interpretation and cite the need to apply the 
meaning according to context, they come across as being ambiguous in contrast to the 
extremists who carry an impression of being are very direct and clear in their messages.  
 
AQAP‘s Inspire magazine also features a quote by Phil Rees618  which says,  
 
I think Bin Ladin is constructing a coherent philosophy. 
Again the West doesn‘t want to hear this. They want to 
think that he‘s a kind of mindless bomber. But basically he 
does offer an alternative to what he considers the growth of 
market capitalism, neo-liberalism if you will, that 
developed in the West after 1979-1980 with Reagan, with 
Thatcher. And he believes now that Islam offers challenge 
to that. Hence the importance of climate change. He 
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believes that Western Industry is responsible for that. 
Western industrial growth which is going to destroy our 
planet. So I think he is tapping into something more 
fundamental and that the only challenge to global market 
capitalism now, he would ague comes from Islamism and 
come from the possibility of a caliphate.  
 
Citing such comments also demonstrate how extremists themselves want to 
promote the impression that their ideas are clear and coherent. It is a theme they want to 
espouse.   
 
Ed Husain‘s experiential account also demonstrates how the theme of ‗clarity of 
purpose‘ appeals to the private ambitions of members in the closed world of extremist 
movements like HUT. He explained how this was not an explicit feature but one that was 
subtly encouraged. There was competition and praise to be earned in the religious study 
circles of these groups to the point that success in life meant advancement and success in 
the organization.
619
 This was taken to the point that the activism became the religion in 
some sense. ―My God, however, was no longer at home, he had to be sought out in 
activism, drive, energy, mobilizing and expanding the Islamic movement.‖ 620  This 
underscores the power of activism over the religious doctrine as the real mover behind 
the force of numbers and collective behaviour. To many of them they felt as they were 
―pioneers at the cutting edge of this new global development of confronting the West in 
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its own backyard.‖ 621 The end effect of all this was a clear vision and purpose socially 
internalised in extremist Muslims belonging to such groups.  
 
Another source of appeal of HUT to Husain was that he noticed that members 
were of a higher intellectual calibre. To him they always had answers to hard questions 
that others would give only political or dodgy answers to. One of his main reasons to 
move to the HUT was that he felt they had concrete ideas as opposed to vague ideas (he 
considered Mawdudi‘sh ideas as vague) of how to create an Islamic state.622  
 
When HUT activists spoke in Universities it was on topics that were considered 
taboo by traditional Mosque authorities and which were swept under the carpet by their 
families. Which was ideal for recruitment as the ―First generation of British Born 
Muslims were now in university in large numbers and suffered from common problems 
that the Hizb tapped into.‖623 These issues included marriage, discrimination, the social 
party culture and the place of Muslims in it.  
 
This experiential account by Husain demonstrates the clarity of purpose that is 
created in the minds of an extremist‘s audience. In extremist narratives, issues cited 
directly resonate with the audience and on matters they can again directly identify with. 
These issues are presented clearly in manner that makes the audience feel that placatory 
rhetoric is filtered out to present the issue in the ‗raw‘ – thus making it clear and 
coherent. Solutions proposed are also equally direct. There is no portfolio of choices to 
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create uncertainty or doubt but only one – Jihad in all its manifestations. 
   
Another interesting point that came as a result of my discussions with 
Muhammad Hee was on the importance of valid issues and greviences. He agreed that 
issues that are affecting Muslims can be a prime factor for making an extremist narrative 
persuasive. The role played by valid issues contributing to extremism can be above 
social, individual or structural conditions. The issues many a times have clear and valid 
grounds that need resolution. Be it cases of discrimination or atrocities done against 
Muslims elsewhere in the world. Simply telling Muslims not to be overly affected by 
them to the point of joining radical groups is not enough. The issues need voice and 
concrete actions towards real solutions, which extremists will exploit and claim to 
provide. Without which the impetus for radicalisation will always remain. Muhammad 
also cited how education and the experiences of meeting many people in the academic 
world helped open his mind to other coherent discourses and ideas. This helped to 
explain to him the state of things and his own experiences which previously was only 
addressed by the repertoire offered by HUT. 
 
 
b. “Linking verifiable „truths‟ to form an ignoratio elenchi argument. (Rational/ 
Sophist argument) 
An, ―ignoratio elenchi occurs when an argument purporting to establish a 
specific conclusion is directed, instead, to proving a different conclusion. This version is 
often termed the red herring fallacy—an irrelevant subject is interjected into the 
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conversation to divert attention away from the main issue.‖ 624 
 
But is this happening in the al-Qaeda magazine Inspire? Everything Inspire builds 
up in its articles is meant to point to end states they advocate such as resistance to 
tyrannical rulers and their supporters, Sharia as the ideal solution for governance, 
militancy as the only viable resort etc. They do not divert attention per se but give 
different conclusions (e.g. from the West) to arguments, incidents and issues. For instance 
in the Inspire article, ―Al – Saud: Lodging a Criminal‖ by Shaykh Ibrahim al-Rubaish, 
when the Saudi monarchy gave asylum to deposed Tunisian ruler, Ben Ali, the author 
said ―So the criminal does not become a criminal unless if he is wanted by the dogs of al-
Saud?‖ The crux of the argument about this action is that since Saudis support such 
‗apostate‘ rulers, they are as ‗criminal‘ as Ben Ali. But they get away with it as they have 
the power to label who is ‗criminal.‘ This of course will incite readers. The argument now 
diverts the attention from Ben Ali to other ‗rulers‘ (e.g. Saudi Royalty). That is the 
conclusion AQ wants to get at which is in line with their objectives. Thus what AQ is 
doing is taking one ―incident‖ or phenomenon and building an argument to a conclusion 
that validates their objectives. It is not an ignoratio elenchi argument in the true sense as 
the argument is merely bringing up a variable that can lead to other plausible conclusions. 
It has a logical premise in that Ben Ali is a criminal in the eyes of Tunisian people but the 
fact that the Saudi Monarchy granted him asylum leads to a plausible conclusion that the 
Saudis do not see it this way. This is irrespective of whether the Saudi‘s might have had 
other strategic reasons for doing this. It was cited in al-Jazeera,  
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By taking him in, the Saudis wanted to "defuse" the ten-
sions on the streets of Tunisia. It was certainly "not out of 
sympathy" for Ben Ali, Mustafa Alani, research director 
at Dubai's Gulf Research Centre, said. The Saudis had two 
options -- either they "contribute to solving the problem by 
giving him refuge" or "let him stay in the country ... 




But what all this shows is that their argumentation logic employs a lot of 
argumentum ad hominem. In that it employs a circumstantial ad hominem argument to 
create the necessary pejorative effect by linking the issue of Saudis being ‗criminal rulers‘ 
to their action of supporting someone the Tunisians hate. There is also an element of 
argumentum ad populum. For example, since many of the readers regard Ben Ali as a 
criminal and hate him, therefore he is ‗criminal‘; and stemming from that anyone who 
supports him is as well, i.e. the Saudis. This is how AQ leverages on populist sentiments 
of those in the Middle East as well as those critical of the West to build up their 
arguments. These populist sentiments are not invalid by virtue of being sentiments of the 
masses per se but they do provide another angle by which the conclusion to an argument 
is made persuasive.   
 
In summary, what al-Qaeda does is that it rationalizes and builds an argument 
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based on facts that can be verified. But the conclusion they advocate is directed towards 
validating their goals and not necessarily what such arguments would alternatively point 
to. Coupled with populist and emotive sentiments, the final conclusion they propose then 
becomes very persuasive. If we were to look at this same example in more simple terms it 
would go something like this. Ben Ali is not liked by the masses. This is verifiable and 
true. The Saudi government supports him and the evidence is in the fact that they grant 
him asylum. The granting of asylum is verifiable and true. The Saudis‘ have the power to 
label whomever they feel has violated their rules as criminal. So does any government for 
that matter. So it is verifiable and true.  The conclusion by the extremists - the Saudis 
who dictate who is a criminal are hypocrites as they are strong supporters of such 
dictators who are in the same league as them so they deserve to be deposed of someday 
soon. Whether this conclusion is correct or not is another matter. But when they invoke 
the sentiments of the people who hate Ben Ali (argumentum ad populum) and use 
inciteful circumstances and language, (argumentum ad hominem), the end effect of the 
conclusion they propose becomes highly persuasive.  
 
Muhammad Hee in our discussions also cited how right wing associations and 
state apparatuses that operate from a culture of fear of the other and extremist radical 
groups that go the other extreme to demonise mainstream society actually empower each 
other. Meaning to the extremist, life makes sense once you find the demon in 
mainstream society to blame for their grievances in all spheres of their life. Every time, a 
right wing politician paints a picture of the Islamist threat and alluding to the 
incompatibility or revulsion of incidents of feudal, violent and intolerant actions by some 
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Muslims, they give extremists the fodder to say how Islam is under attack.
626
 Extremist 
Muslims on the other hand compound the situation by giving xenophobes exactly the 
nightmare they fear. The victims of this mutually reinforcing attrition are everyone in the 
middle. Muslims and non-Muslims alike who find it very hard to take walk the middle 
ground without giving into perceptions, stereotypes and most importantly fears.  
 
The dynamics of how this happens is also interesting. Muhammad cited 
reinforcement by similar personal narratives. He then gave the example of someone from 
a minority group who lost a job application to someone less qualified but belonging to a 
majority group. Now imagine if that same person met another person who went through a 
similar experience. Then these personal narratives reinforce each other to the point that 
the individual might say ‗yes! It is true then! We are being victimised by who we are!‘ 
The power of these personal narratives should not be underestimated. For they more than 
anything else can provide the conduits to entrench and internalise grand ideologies that 
connect personal accounts (which can be verifiable truths) to concluding explanations 




c) “Reductionism.” (Rational / Rhetorical argument) 
Aragones_et. al explain how ,  
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The art of rhetoric may be defined as changing other 
people‘s minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing them 
new information. One technique heavily used by rhetoric 
employs analogies. Using analogies, one may draw the 
listener‘s attention to similarities between cases and to re-





The use of analogies is a trademark of many an extremist narrative. This also 
extends to reducing the variables of a complex issue to simple equivalents that anyone 
from any intellectual background can relate to. This might seem as if the narratives are 
taking a simplistic view and not taking into account the myriad number of unmentioned 
factors that exist in a complex issue. But on the other hand, such reductionist arguments 
find appeal in people who are so inundated with arguments that never get to the root of 
the issue and seem to be covering the ‗truth‘ in layers of complexity. The attitude of ‗truth 
is simple‘ might resonate very well with readers in internet forums who have to make a 
quick and strong point using minimal words. Take for example the following. 
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Awlaki in his lecture, ―The dust will never settle,‖628 was debating the issue of 
whether permission from the ruler of a nation is needed before one can undertake jihad. 
In fact, this is precisely the stand that appears in literature from counter radical ideology 
scholars,  
 
  Under the leadership of an appropriate authority 
Scholars are in agreement that the issue of armed jihad 
should be decided by the leaders of a country. Individuals 
and organizations do not have the authority to launch 
armed jihad in the name of Islam or on behalf of the 
Muslim community. This is because the issue of armed 
jihad has huge repercussions on the general public. Hence, 
only those in power and have received the mandate of the 




While this is indeed the correct reasoning on Jihad in mainstream Islam, 
extremists through the use of reductionist analogies put a bare bones argument that is 
hard to refute at the surface. In this case Awlaki uses the simple analogy of someone who 
wants to attack your house, so you fight to defend it. In this dire situation, an individual 
certainly does not need the permission of a ruler to defend oneself or his property.  
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While the logic of this reductionist argument can be defeated by bringing in more 
variables to the issue, such a statement has already created a powerful effect on the online 
reader, who will not be privy to a counter argument. The extremist argument naturally 
gains credence by virtue of having no credible rejoining answer or new information to the 
claim based on the reductionist argument.   
In the Clearguidance forums, the following posts appeared.
630
 This is with regards 
to the issue of US troops being allowed to stay in Saudi Arabia. The question being 
debated is; if the Saudi monarch has agreed for US troops to stay in Muslim lands as 
guests, is it permissible to fight them? :  
 
Is killing such 'guests' in the country with or without the 
permission of the government according to the sharriah of 
Allah? WELL ITS LIKE ASKING IF ITS PROPER TO 
KILL THE KILLER WHOM MY BROTHER HIRED TO 
KILL ME, BECAUSE HE IS THE GUEST OF MY 
BROTHER WHO LIVES WITH ME 
 
Yes We are Sorry about that children but We have to look 
thousands of other Muslim children who r under attack of 
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just an example, a looter entered yur home and threat you 
to give money otherwise they will kill ur child. If u accept 
their demand to save yur child it means u r allowing that 
looter to do same wid other ppl. 
 
so in my personal thinking, attack that looter and dont care 
yur child. If u succeed to arrest that looter and yur child 
martyred by him then it will be better to save other children 
and familes.  
 
We see in this narrative, anological logic being used to answer a complex 
question. This is combined with a cold and deadly logic that gets morally justified by 
attributing it to altruism. In short, having collateral victims is acceptable if it serves a 
greater need. The cold utilitarian logic of the needs of the many is the emphasis here.   
 
 The narrative goes onto say the following, 
 
…whats the difference between the Crusaders who were 
there in Muslim lands with the permission and support of 
the Fatimids, and the Americans who are there now also 





Whats the difference between the Mongols who were there 
with the permission and support of the Alawites, and the 
Americans who are currently in the same place with the 
support of various Muslim governments? 
 
What is the difference between the mujahideen of back then 
like Salahudden who fought against the Crusaders and 
opposed the established governments like the Fatimids? 
 
Or what about the mujahid Sayfud-Deen who fought 
against the Mongols? 
 
What is the difference between them, and these "terrorists" 
of today? I mean, really... 
 
This narrative uses a reductionist argument based on historical precedence that 
equates the Saudi government allowing the US to be on their soil with events from 
Islam‘s past. Multiple analogies are used in the absence of further variables. The strength 
of this argument lies in the historical corroboration behind the analogies employed and 
the logical similarities between the episodes described. The conclusion to this narrative is 
that in the past enemies of Islam were attacked irrespective of whether they had the 
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support of reigning Muslim rulers. When not countered back directly with new 
information, such statements fester in cyberspace and any delayed retort by moderate 
Muslims would have lost its impetus by then. 
 
Such reductionist argumentations can have a rational basis. In Inspire issue 1, 
under the title, ―Questions we should all be asking,‖ the following narrative appeared, 
―Why does the vast majority of Western media outlets refer to Jihadi media as 
‗propaganda‘ when every media outlet in the world has an agenda to propagate for the 
purpose of altering mindsets in one way or another?‖631  
 
This is a rational argument that uses comparatives based on similar models. 
Extremists in Inspire are highly aware of the labels ascribed onto them and their 
implications. ‗Propaganda‘ for instance has a pejorative connotation which implies that 
the narrative is meant to emotively sway and has no rational basis. The Inspire magazine 
editors know this and want to prove otherwise. Their starting premise is that ―every media 
outlet in the world has an agenda to propagate for the purpose of altering mindsets in 
one way or another.‖ The narrative then puts forth the idea that because of this similar 
model, their media narratives are no different from the ones in the West. Therefore, if the 
latter is taken credibly, so should theirs. By reducing the argument to simple 
comparatives that are easily accepted, the argument gains credibility. In this case, why 
should their narratives be called propaganda, when similar Western narratives do the 
same and escape this label? 
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Such sort and sharp quotes which use analogies and other reductionist arguments 
create the necessary impact at strategic points in a narrative to make the reader ponder on 
alternate perspectives they would seldom think off.  This section in Inspire labelled 
‗Questions we should be asking‘ is meant to serve as this very instigator. Thus an open 
ended question with reductionist comparatives leaves the avenue open for readers to be 
easily led to extremist worldviews.   
 
d)  “We know what you are saying about us and this is what we say to that.” (Ra-
tional / Dialectical Argument) 
Husain in his experiential account described members in groups such as HUT to 
be very secretive and they worked in small cell groups known as the ―halaqah‖ which 
became akin to an alternative family.
632
 The dynamics of the halaqah involved asking se-
rious questions, no frivolity, secrecy and discipline which cemented the group. Jihad was 
on anyone who opposed the Islamist cell. There was ―an inbuilt culture of aggressive ar-
gumentation, dogged debate and an inherent ability to cause offence.‖ In fact they were 
taught to ―Never defend, always offend!‖ 633 Their aggression actually bolstered their im-
age and their sensational views were good for the news.
634
 This helped create the image 
that they had the loudest and clearest voice.
635
 This account by Husain can be indicative 
of the sense of power that such confrontational group actions instil in members 
―Never defend, always offend...‖ is one of the predominant arguementation 
techniques in extremist narratives which take the criticism over to the ones accusing.  
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This can also involve showing how the opponent is guilty of the same act they are 
being accused of. Bali Bomber, Imam Samudra‘s quote in ―Aku Melawan Terroris,‖ (I 
fight terrorists) is a classic example. The terrorists he is referring to is of course, the 
United States and her allies. While this might sound like simplistic almost childish 
mudslinging, extremists have many examples of sophisticated narratives that combine a 
rational construct to this approach. Put simply, it is dialectical argument with rational 
corroboration, which naturally enhances its credibility with critical readers. Anwar 
Awlaki is one extremist ideologue who specialises in this form of argumentative style.  
 
Awlaki in this article in his article, ―The Tsunami of Change‖ 636 about the Arab 
uprisings mentions how the West is, ―unhappy for the departure of some of its closest and 
most reliable friends, but yet willing to betray them and ride on the wave of change that 
is sweeping the area.‖  This is of course in reference to the Arab leaders deemed to be 
lackeys of the US and the West who have been overthrown by their people.  
 
This is an example of a dialectical argument that throws back the same accusation 
that the West is accusing al-Qaeda of. Academic and journalistic analysis from the West 
have suggested that  al-Qaeda is riding on the change in the region and hoping to benefit 
from it and claim it as their victory as well.
637
 Al-Qaeda here is saying that it is actually 
the West that is instead trying to ride on this sweeping change, support the new people in 
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power who are on their side and claim it is a victory for democracy instead. It is also 
meant to show that the West is opportunistic and hypocritical in its support of the regimes 
in the Middle East and does not have the welfare of the Muslim people at heart.  
 
  ―The Western leaders realize that it would be unwise to reveal their true feelings 
of what is happening. The West knows that it would be unwise to stand by their friends 
when the masses have spoken out and asked for freedom, a principle the West claims that 
it stands for.‖ In other words the West needs to hide its hypocrisy. The dialectical 
argument here is meant to expose this hypocrisy.  
  
He then directly quotes the criticism against Al-Qaeda used by Western leaders 
and journalists. In particular, he cites the following quote by Hillary Clinton, who said, 
 
 The success of peaceful protests discredited the extremists 
and exposed their bankrupt arguments.‖ Robert Gates 
thinks that the Arab protests represent a major setback to al 
Qaeda. Fareed Zakaria asserts: ―there is an interesting 
debate on whether the events in the Middle East are good 
for the United States, the West, good for peace and stability, 
but I think there can be little dispute about whom they are 
bad for: al Qaeda. In fact the Arab revolts of 2011 represent 




Awlaki then tactically counters these accusations by categorically stating that that 
it is still a victory for Muslim people as it is ultimately indicative of the fact that the West 
is losing its hold on power in the Middle East. As this is also what al-Qaeda wanted all 
along, it is a victory for all Muslims including al-Qaeda.  
 
The outcome doesn't have to be an Islamic government for 
us to consider what is occurring to be a step in the right 
direction...Even if the upcoming governments wanted to 
continue with a policy of appeasing the West and Israel, 
they would not have the strength and depth of power that 
the previous governments had developed over the past three 
decades. In addition to that, it would be difficult for a 
government that came into power, in order to fulfill the 
aspirations of the people for freedom, to restrict their 
freedoms even if it wanted to and was pushed by the West 
to do so. If the West is counting on an Animal Farm 
scenario to follow the revolution, they are definitely 
mistaken.  
 
So in this case, when the West accuses al-Qaeda of becoming irrelevant and losing 
control of the Middle East, the same accusation is thrown back at the West. I.e. That it is 
in fact the West instead that it is losing its hold on the Middle East as a result of the 
recent Arab revolutions. Corroborations come in the form of simple but logical end states. 
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Very simply as the end state of removing an authoritarian, corrupt lackey leader of the 
West is the same as what al-Qaeda wants, how can this be a bad thing for them? Is it not a 
victory for them as well? Thus this represents an example of dialectical argument that has 
epistemic rationality.  
 
He then adds, ―Yemen would also represent another great opportunity for the West 
to show their hypocrisy of calling for freedoms while supporting a dictator just because 
they do not want Muslims to be ruled by Islam.‖  
 
Another form of dialectical argumentation style is seen here. ―Calling for freedom 
while supporting a dictator‖ is a dialectical argument that throws back the accusation 
commonly cited in US political rhetoric against extremists.
638
 There is mainstream 
critique to back this allegation
639
 and events that can be made to seem corroborative. But 
the phrase ends with a statement that will cause an emotive reaction - ―Because they do 
not want Muslims to be ruled by Islam.‖ This is what the author (Awlaki) hopes to 
achieve in this paragraph. Those who might be inclined to believe the statement that 
alleges the hypocrisy of the West might also be inclined to believe the next sentence 
which presupposes why they do this. Thus we can see in extremist Muslim narratives, 
arguments which leverage on earlier ‗rational‘ arguments to make the subsequent claims 
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Awlaki then says, ―Doesn‘t the West realize how the jihadi work would just take 
off as soon as the regimes of the Gulf start crumbling?‖ By citing the exact fear of the 
West (A regime sympathetic to Islamists making them stronger) as a possible outcome, 
the argument becomes believable. He corroborates it by citing increased Jihadi activity in 
the region. ―Increase‖ while not empirically verifiable, is taken as a given: 
 
―Even without this wave of change in the Muslim world, the jihad movement was 
on the rise. With the new developments in the area, one can only expect that the great 
doors of opportunity would open up for the mujahidin all over the world.‖  
 
Here he is directly taking the earlier dialectical/ rational argument about the Arab 
revolution being bad for the West further by extrapolating it to mean that it would 
therefore conversely be indicative of even better times for the Jihadists.  This is a 
counterargument to the accusation that the Arab revolution is bad for al-Qaeda‘s Raison 
d'être. The argument becomes even more persuasive not by the former statement but by 
the latter statement because it extrapolates what is rationally possible.  I.e. the removal of 
authoritarian Muslim leaders who used to crack down on them can only be a sign of 
better times, ―the great doors of opportunity would open up for the mujahidin all over the 
world.‖ Again showing in their narratives how as long as one part of their argument has a 




e) “Corroborative and empirical analysis.” (Rational argument) 
The research reveals that many of the themes that have been presented thus far, 
even some of the ones that primarily create emotive resonance, are rationally constructed. 
Extremist narratives do not always follow a form of rationality that is unique only to 
them. What is very disturbing is that they often follow a form of epistemic rationality that 
is universally recognisable and sound because it has corroborative evidence. These 
narratives also make logical deductions or sound inductive analysis and are rationally 
instrumental in their desired outcome. This is coupled with a social context that is 
provided to corroborate their reasoning even though the conclusions they propose are 
morally abhorrent and flawed. 
 
 To show how extremist narratives use epistemic and instrumental rationality let us 
look again at the example of Molly Norris‘s facebook cited in Inspire issue 1, which had 
an entry called ―everybody draw Mohamed day.‖ It had over 100 000 members. The idea 
for citing this in Inspire, is to prove that there is a ‗war on Islam‘ on the basis that ‘the 
West hates Islam‘ which of course gains empirical corroboration by such incidents. You 
now have epistemic rationality coming into play. This is then used to substantiate ideas of  
Al Walla Wal Barra and the idea that Muslims will never be accepted in the West so do 
not try to integrate with the ‗enemy.‘  The quoting of such injustices from Abu Gharib to 
the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia as we know is common in extremist discourse. A possible 
retort might say that this is not symptomatic of a global war on Islam which is an 
exaggeration that fails to take into consideration the instances of tolerance and respect 
that is seen in communities. But this retort loses its effect, in light of the ‗evidence‘ that 
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has a social context. The social context here is referring to the Muslim communities 
which like any community are bound to have grievances. The reasoning also has a clear 
purpose, to tell Muslims they will never be accepted for what they are. Thus this 
instrumental reasoning takes into account the fact that in the targeted social environment, 
there are bound to be Muslims who are marginalised and alienated at one time or another 
just like anyone in any community.  So there is a ready source of support that will help 
them meet the objective of convincing others that they will never be accepted and there is 
a war on Islam. It is a message such an audience has already internalised before the 
narrative which only reinforces and entrenches this belief. 
 
Epistemic and instrumental rationality is best demonstrated in extremist Muslim 
narratives by the way they do political analysis and critique Western narratives. Take for 
instance this narrative, ―The Beginning of the end. Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki. Audio reply. 
A Response to Barack Obama‖ which appeared first in the website alqimmah.net. 
 
This narrative talks about Obama‘s Cairo speech. It says that Obama might be 
seen to be extending his hand to the Muslim world but this is pure rhetoric and that the 
extremists will not stop until Muslim lands are freed. His tactic is seen as a ruse to win 
the hearts and minds of Muslims similar to what the crusaders did when they were losing. 
This tactic is seen as being more deadly than physical attacks. The narrative then lists out 
hypocrisies between what Obama says and what the US actually does in reality.   
 
Did he forget about the support that America was giving 
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Saddam (Hussein) while he was massacring Kurds? Did he 
forget about the million Iraqi children that died during the 
embargo and sanctions on Iraq? Did he forget about the 
oppression and murder of the Palestinians, which was made 
possible by the support and weaponry of America? Did he 
forget about the many tyrants that America has put into 




 The epistemic rationality here has to be studied in terms of its context. Iraqi 
children died as a result of shortages during the embargo. The fact there were shortages in 
Iraq because of the embargo is an epistemic fact to a degree. The fact that many Iraqi 
children died during this period is also an epistemic fact. The causality between the two is 
debated. But the message is intended for a Muslim audience that is already outraged by 
the earlier two empirical facts. Thus the instrumental rationality for connecting these two 
epistemically rational arguments is meant to leverage on this outrage to create a credible 
argument. But it is an outrage based on a reality that is a rationally plausible deduction 
based on the earlier two empirical facts.   
 
In the Jihad UnSpun Website, it was written, ―Exploiting the divisions among us 
has been the number one weapon that the enemies of Islam have successfully used 
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against us for the past 1200 years.‖ 641 This may be indicative of the actual instrumental 
rationality behind the highly quoted concept of Al wara Wal Bara concept if it is seen in 
a context that is less about social exclusion from non-Muslims but rather as a bulwark 
against a possible divide and conquer strategy being used on Muslims.  When Awlaki 
quotes an actually RAND report that advocates this strategy of divide et impera, it only 
further justifies the instrumental rationality behind the Islamic concept of Al Wara Wal 
Bara as it is used in extremist narratives.   
 
 Corroboration can also come in the form of lesser know historical facts. Take this 
article entitled Al-Faluja that appeared in the website Jerusalamites. 
 
Within days of the Egyptian forces‘ departure, the Israeli 
invaders dashed to the village and embarked on beating and 
robbing the civilians. United Nations observers at the scene 
reported attempts of rapes. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett 
personally reprimanded the Israeli army‘s chief of staff for 
the acts committed by the Israeli soldiers against the 
population. He said that in addition to overt violence, the 
army conducted a ―whispering propaganda‖ campaign 
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among the Arabs [of al-Faluja], threatening them with 
attacks and acts of vengeance by the army, which the 
civilian authorities will be powerless to prevent. There is no 
doubt that there is a calculated action aimed at increasing 
the number of those going to the Hebron Hills as if of  their 
own free will, and if possible, to bring about the evacuation 
of the whole civilian population [of the pocket]. According 
to the Israeli historian BennyMorris the decision to cause 
the exodus of the ― Faluja pocket‖ population was probably 




  Here there is apparent historical corroboration of Israeli aggression against 
Muslims by the Israeli foreign minister himself. Much of the information is corroborated 
by Western sources although we see very few Western resources that openly talk about 
such incidents. Even though there is epistemic rationality in this narrative, it lacks 
visibility. The sheer lack of visibility of the alternate account of events also might reduce 
its perceived credibility or actually work in its favour if it is viewed by any counter 
culture (Muslim extremists in this case) as representing suppressed information.  But this 
does not discount the fact that the information is rationally constructed.  
An extremist narrative becomes extremely persuasive when epistemic and 
instrumental rationality is mixed with Wertrational or value/belief-oriented rationality or 
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affectual rationality (emotive logic)
643
. Most literature on extremist ideologies has not 
recognized this explosive mix.  To see an exemplification of this in a rather disturbing 
narrative, take the post shown below taken from the HUT forum. The links they provided 
in the forum are about IDF (Israeli Defense Force) snipers making t-shirts with pictures 
which are highly inflammatory and cruel. Some of these include a picture of a Palestinian 
woman crying over her dead child killed as a result of IDF actions with the slogan, 
―Should have used Durex.‖  Or of a sniper rifle crosshairs over a pregnant Palestinian 
woman with the slogan, ―One shot two kills.‖ This apparently has been corroborated in 
mainstream press and if one were to add some balance to the story the Israeli government 
had taken steps to reprimand the officers concerned.  But it was seen as only a placatory 





 The following comment then appeared 
646
, 
As a Muslim, when you read something like this it makes 
your blood boil but yet people still think the way to respond 
                                                 
643 Wertrational or value/belief-oriented rationality (e.g. religious beliefs) & Affectual rationality (determined by the 
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Wittich, Economy and society:  an outline of interpretive sociology. Vol. 3, (New York: Bedminster), 1968, 24-25.   
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is to send over a food parcel or two through organisations 
that don't even have legitimacy in  Islam anyway. 
 
 The ONLY solution to confront and eradicate these 
cowardly apes and pigs is for the armies of the Islamic 
State to fight them and cleanse Palestine of the ba*****s. 
 
Then a religious quote is brought in from the Quran:  
 
―The Unbelievers are protectors, one of another: Unless ye do this, (protect each other), 
there would be tumult and oppression on earth, and  great mischief. (Quran 8:73 )‖   
 
 There are a number of things happening here. One, the report is based on an actual 
incident that even the Israelis have admitted to. So there is epistemic rationality in this 
statement. Secondly, it is addressing Muslims who are already sympathetic to the 
Palestinian cause and who already are feeling disillusioned with activism. They see no 
viable and realisable effects as a result of their activism (e.g. sending aid etc.) and it 
certainly does not stop such atrocities from happening. The message being pitched to a 
particular social context is very clear. Namely, the enemy hates you to the core and does 
not recognise your humanity. Militancy is thus the only viable solution. The instrumental 
rationality behind this message is to justify this solution. Following this post, there are a 
lot of ad homineum arguments that vent the emotions this event generates and therby 




 Finally religious beliefs come in to corroborate and provide the Wertrational or 
value/belief-oriented rationality into the final mix. The most common form of 
corroboration in extremist Muslim narratives is still religious scriptures by virtue of the 
frequency of their use and visibility. The point to note about the use of religious quotes 
for corroboration is its directionality. It is not always a case of scripture saying something 
and thereafter corresponding action follows.  But rather the stance / assertions are made 
and scriptural evidence is found to support that stance / assertion. Be it predictions about 
why things are the way they are or about how much ‗the other‘ (Non-Muslims and West) 
hate you and finally divine punishment for not following al-Qaeda‘s religious stance. The 
observable effect or grievance is empirically provable and scripture is contextually used 
to corroborate this observation. The end result of this overall mix combining logic, 
emotion and religious corroboration is potent and very persuasive.  
 
 Consider finally, this quote by Osama Bin Laden that appeared in the website 
―Jihad Unspun‖,   ―They (the rulers) have oppressed and humiliate people, have made a 
mockery of their intellect,...”647 This phrase ―Mockery of their intellect‖ will appeal to 
anyone who feels that their ability to think rationally is not only unrecognised but also 
infantilised by any narrative that equates being critical to being ‗misguided.‘  The label of 
being the one to present a rational argument is now a status symbol and one that is fought 
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over by both sides of the spectrum. 
 
One of the best examples of epistemic and more importantly instrumental 
rationality in extremist writings can be seen in the seminal work of Abu Bakr Naji‘s ―The 
Management of Savagery.‖ In section seven of this work, he demonstrated a methodical 
process by which his study get propagated and how they intend to use violence 
strategically, (oil well attacks, kidnapping oil company leader etc) and then justify these 
issues to the masses by citing issues people at the grassroots are concerned with. This can 
be issues such as how the true value of their commodity (e.g. oil) is not being peculated 
down to the masses. 
 
  His writings recognise the importance of rational arguments. He highlights how 
Muslim youth are highly critical and need to be convinced outside of emotive arguments. 
He explains that even though their actions have a rational basis; the positive effects of 
such actions are reversed by ‗hostile‘ mainstream media.  
 
  In the stage of "the power of vexation and 
exhaustion", we need to polarize the elect among the youth 
of the Umma, and the best way to do that is through 
justifying the operations rationally and through the sharia. 
The highest degree of justification is to justify the act itself 
by itself. However, in the face of the hostile media it is 
difficult to create an operation which justifies itself, even if 
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we could do that when we reached the stage of (being able 
to) paralyze this media.  
 
Statements through audio or visual media prepare everyone 
for the operations before they are undertaken—without 
specification, naturally—and they are justified afterwards 
through a powerful, rational, sharia-based justification, 
which the addressed class heeds. These statements should 
be communicated to all of the people, not just to the elite. 
Most of the statements should include our general goals 
which are acceptable to the people, even if they are not 
stated explicitly: We fight in order to get rid of the enemies 
of the Umma and their agents who have destroyed the 
beliefs of the countries and plundered their wealth and 




 Such narrratives rely on ‗universal values‘ and acceptable goals which any reader 
can identify with. Fighting for freedom, against oppression, against exploitation etc is all 
part of an argument with an instrumental rationality aimed at achieving resonance with a 
thinking and discerning audience.  
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 Rational arguments are very difficult to counter unless equally credible and 
rational arguments are used to defeat it. Superficial arguments that simply reduce the 
problem to one of emotive elements, religious misinterpretations and misguided or 
peculiar rationality will continue to skim around the problem but never hit home. This is 
because they fail to recognise the rational construction of extremist narratives fearing that 
to do so might actually give it credibility. When in reality to give an intelligent and 
equally rational counter narrative to hard questions and dilemmas might be the best 



















IMPACT OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO 
COUNTER EXTREMIST MUSLIM NARRATIVES. 
 
Deradicalisation and the impact of our findings 
 
 Ashour described deradicalisation in terms of two principal components. One 
required a behavorial change in terms of the strategy and tactics of the group or 
individual. The other was at the ideological level. His study looked at decradicalisation 





 Ashour describes a three stage process for de-radicalisation that seems to work 
with some regional variations. The first process involves a rational choice and cost / 
benefit calculation on the part of the individual. This is very similar to the case of the JI 
detainee whose primary impetus for wanting to abandon the ideology had a lot to do 
with the life opportunites that he had lost as a result of his incarceration.
650
 The next 
process involves socialization and interaction with the ‗other‘ which results in the 
individual revising and updating their behavior. This would include exposure to other 
worldviews, perspectives and most importantly- experiences. The third process entails 
changing perceptions and inducements from the state.
651
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 Leadership played a major role as it was observed that de-radicalisation of 
extremist leaders as in the case of ‗Dr Fadl‘652 created a significant impact that led to de-
radicalisation of their followers. Ashour mentions how ―In general, a leadership with 
theological credentials, a history of ―struggle,‖ and a senior standing in the 
organization would exert considerable influence…‖653  But this is predicated on the 
central role played by charismatic leadership if it exists in the first place. In the absence 
of which, re-radicalisation has a lesser chance for success. 
654
 Inducements from the state 
played an equally major role as can be seen in the status of those who left the extremist 
world and are now collaborating with their respective states. Not only was there an 
improvement in their life but their de-radicalizing influence has been felt on other 
extremists who still remain.  Ashour goes on to state that the opposite of this- state 
repression supported ―the political strains approach and the hypostudy that in Muslim-
majority countries, repressive autocrats breed violent theocrats.‖655  
 
 Ashour emphasized the role of social interactions.
656
 His findings reveal that 
open discourse in the form of ‗debates‘ with reformed extremists or pro-regime religious 
scholars have yielded the best results with the leaders of such extremist Muslim groups 
rather than the followers. It is possible to deduce from this that the relative presence of 
an ‗ideal speech situation,‘ as described has better traction with more ‗educated‘ leaders 
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at the top of an extremist group‘s hierarchy. By ‗educated‘ this can also entail those with 
more experience in the worldview and operational realm of Muslim extremism. Having 
been exposed to such a long term experience and having full view of the ideology that it 
entails, such individuals are in a better position to discern and come to the realization 
that in totality the extremist narrative is flawed. Hence, this demonstrates the 
effectiveness of rational and open discourse in defeating extremist narratives and 
worldviews by presenting a more credible argument that comes across through the 
process of unbiased debate.  It stands to reason that such discourse may yield better 
results the closer they approximate the Habermasian ‗ideal speech situation.‘ 
 
 For those further down the Muslim extremist group hierarchy, it is possible that 
cost benefit calculations over the opportunity cost of remaining in an extremist 
organization might have a greater effect as demonstrated by the account of the JI 
extremist in the Suria TV Channel Interview. However, it would not be prudent to 
stratify deradicalisation approaches purely on the basis of the individual‘s position in the 
extremist organization. It is also possible that open rational discourse can work with 
those further down the hierarchy or utilitarian cost benefit calculations do affect those 
further up the hierarchy.  
 
 Therefore an overall approach that frames a case based on both instrumental and 
epistemic rationality has the potential to create a highly effective counter narrative. This 
requires being cognizant of the delineated extremist narrative themes based on the 
ideological, resonance and argumentation cluster that have been described.     
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 There is preponderance for epistemic rationality in narratives that reflect the 
themes in the ideological cluster. The narrative may leverage on universal values and 
accepted ideas. It may demonstrate empirically the biasness of mainstream media, 
highlight true but little known facts or prove the efficacy of extremist methods by 
presenting how they provide realizable results and viable solutions. The narrative may 
also show historical precedence to make one realize that they are in a position of 
supremacy by subscribing to the extremist worldview. Evidence is again provided to 
prove their claim to awaken the individual to deceptions and conspiracies. Finally these 
narratives may provide corroborative evidence to expose lackey Muslims and 
hypocritical leaders by highlighting the flaws in their arguments and actions. All of these 
themes from the ideological cluster have the potential to create a very persuasive 
argument that is coherent because it is predicated on epistemic rationality combined with 
deductive and inductive reasoning to reach plausible conclusions. 
 
 The resonance cluster is not totally devoid of rational arguments. There is a clear 
instrumental rationality in themes that poetically resonate the noble character of 
Jihadists. These attributres are vouched for by those who know them well. Besides the 
need to create outrage, there might be emperical demonstrations to make one come to the 
deductive conclusion that the enemy wants to change Islam and make it subservient. 
Miracles, wonders and prophecies of jihad and an emphasis on the solidarity and 
brotherhood behind the Jihadi culture are apparently proven experientially by those in it. 
The emphasis on being representatives of grassroots concerns the individual can identify 
with are likewise proven by highlighting shared outcomes and an articulate 
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understanding of key concerns. When the individual is made conscious that they can 
never fit in, it is usually corroborated with examples from actual incidents. Emphsising 
how a defeatist mentality is the self flaggerating source of their downfall gets proven by 
the empowerment one feels after reversing this mental attitude. Even their detachment 
from others gets a positive spin as they are now part of the Ghurraba (strangers) 
mentioned in Islamic scriptures. Therefore the sacrifice and choices they make 
subsequently is indicative of them being part of an elite and divinely blessed ―Chosen‖.  
This get its validation from mutual reinforcing ideas by those in this in-group who look 
to how traditionally the ‗chosen‘ have always been few and are always persecuted for 
their beliefs.  
 
 The argumentation cluster visibly demonstrates how themes in the ideological 
and resonance cluster are made more persuasive through the use of rational 
argumentation techniques. A theme can be made more persuasive by demonstrating the 
coherence and clarity of the argument and hence its rationality. This is also done by the 
tactical linking of epistemically rational arguments to create an overall deceptive but 
persuasive ignoratio elenchi argument. The narrative can make the rationality and truth 
of the argument very plain and clear through a process of simplification and 
reductionism. It may also resort to revealing empirically provable flaws in the 
opponent‘s argument instead. Finally it can be a purely rational argument that gives a 
highly corroborative empirical analysis with well built deductive or inductive reasoning 
to come to a logical conclusion.  Let us now revisit the diagram (fig. 1) that was 




Fig 1. Graphical illustration of the „logical structure‟ process that generates appeal for extremist 
Muslim ideologies and end state solutions. (Bidirectional arrows indicate the two way flow of influence 
and counter-influence.  
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Starting from the top, the internet narratives constituting discourse, web postings 
and ideological literature are influenced by other aeithilogies such as the social and 
psychological conditions of the reader‘s profile. All of which reinforce each other. 
Contemporary issues that create an impact in the lives of Muslims mutually reinforce 
these social psychological aetiologies. These constituent elements and factors in the 
persuation process are framed through the use of themes (Ideological and Resonance 
cluster) and argumentation logics. (Argumentation cluster) All of which are predicated in 
the first instance by the presence of a ‗Logical structure‘, which is the well spring from 
which rational arguments in the various themes described be they epistemic, instrumental, 
deductive or inductive originate.  
 
Therefore to construct an effective counternarrative on-line, it is vital that this 
‗logical structure‘ be taken into cognizance. This is done not with the intent to validate 
the arguments of extremists but to provide an effective counternarrative that is argued 
rationally and thus more persuasive. The last thing we should do, is to argue the matter in 
an infantilizing and superficial manner just for the sake of ensuring that nothing extrem-
ists say is validated.  On this matter of superficial arguments, Ashour says it best by citing 
how,  
 
A counter-narrative built for the American Ku Klux Klan 
should look quite different from one built to counter Al-
Qaeda‘s ideology, despite a few superficial parallels be-
tween them. Oversimplification, shallowness, and generic 
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counter-narratives should be avoided, as these invite suc-
cessful ―strike-backs.‖ The content of the message should 
also be attractive, admitting the validity of some or all of 
the grievances (depending on the case), offering alternative 
ways to address those grievances, in addition to highlight-





By highlighting evidence that demonstrates the existence of the ‗logical structure‘ 
in extremist Muslim narratives, this study emphsises the need to incorporate this missing 
link into present counter narratives and to factor the various themes described.   
 
A proposed framework to counter extremist Muslim Narratives 
 
To illustrate how the ‗logical structure‘ of extremist narratives can be defeated, 
let us take the sensitive issue of headscarves worn by Muslim women. This non-criminal 
act has been leveraged on by both extreme sides of the spectrum. The discourse on this 
might take the form of highly emotive arguments, religious citations, appeals to rights, 
the need for a common national identity, the propensity to create an insular mindset 
against secular society, going against social cohesion etc. Extremists will capitalise on 
this situation to purport their ideologies, linking this issue with many others and using all 
the other forms of arguments that were mentioned in this study. Ultimately such 
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arguments propose militant violence or leaving the entire mainstream social order. All 
other forms of arguments might explode the issue but at the heart of it all, it stems from a 
'logical structure‘ that the wearing of the headscarf by itself is not a criminal act. The 
question is over context and the answer is situational. 
 
The problem is that in many countries, this issue has been attacked on ideological 
and cultural grounds while forgetting that this issue in isolation is benign. But extremists 
will ride on this logical structure and link it with other forms of arguments to spiral the 
issue into multiple dimensions. To them, it is no longer about the headscarf; it is a war 
against Islam that can have only one form of response. So instead of countering the 
argument and attacking the issue itself, energies will be better spent in finding credible 
and viable alternatives. Both sides can maintain their stance and seek a middle ground 
where reason and co-operation, despite differences, can thrive. For instance, the state can 
maintain the ground that headscrafs cannot be allowed in secular schools but then help to 
make Madrasahs adopt mainstream education including elements of national education 
to a much greater degree. It must also work from the side of Muslims. They can carry on 
with their personal prerogative to move to a Madrasah, but the Madrasahs can take the 
initiative to implement programs that will make them collaborate with mainstream 
schools in joint projects (e.g. a common sports day, carnival, joint educational projects 
etc.) 
 
These viable alternatives more than anything will remove the bite from extremists 
who capitalise on the logical structure to explode an otherwise reasonable grievance or 
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request into something else entirely. It starts with actively recognising cogent and 
rationale arguments and not just humouring them at the surface. This should move onto 
promoting critical discourse to find the elusive middle ground.    
 
Extremist narratives present many choices for Muslims that would lead them 
eventually to the nightmarish world of militancy and terrorism. Recognizing the presence 
and critical role of the logical structure is a first step in implementing solutions that 
present rational counter arguments and realizable alternative choices that appeal to 
Muslims or anyone for that matter. This is ultimately aimed at bringing back extremist 
Muslims to the mainstream fold or to prevent Muslims from ever embarking on the road 
to extremism in the first place.  This entails making potential Muslim extremists realize 
that they are not ‗chosen‘ for a purpose they think is right but rather there are other 
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Annex A: Quranic Verses Often Cited in Extremist Narratives. 
 
1. Quran Verse 2, (Al-Baqara): 120 and its context is apparently found in Verse 2: 
40. ‗Never will the Jews and Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow 
their form of religion…‘  (This prior context is not explained clearly by Dr Is-
maeel, except that it is as a result of this.) Verse 2:40 – ‗O children of Israel! Call 
to mind the (special) favour which I bestowed upon you, and fulfil my covenant 
with you, and fear none but Me.‘ 
2. 658 Quran Verse 9, (At-Tawbah): 9-29, 73, 111, 123 - 
(9) : They have exchanged the signs of Allah for a small price and averted 
[people] from His way. Indeed, it was evil that they were doing. 
 
(12): And if they break their oaths after their treaty and defame your religion, 
then fight the leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them; 
[fight them that] they might cease. 
 
(13): Would you not fight a people who broke their oaths and determined to expel 
the Messenger, and they had begun [the attack upon] you the first time? Do you 
fear them? But Allah has more right that you should fear Him, if you are [truly] 
believers. 
 
(14): Fight them; Allah will punish them by your hands and will disgrace them 
and give you victory over them and satisfy the breasts of a believing people 
 
(29): Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not 
consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do 
not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] 
until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled. 
 
(73): O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh 
upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination. 
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 Sahih International translation. 
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(111): Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their 
properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause 
of Allah , so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in 
the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to his covenant than 
Allah ? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that 
which is the great attainment. 
 
 
(123): O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers 
and let them find in you harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous. 
 
3. 659 Quran Verse 5, (Al-Maaida): 51-52. –   
 
(51)―O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. 
They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you 
- then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing 
people. 
 
(52) So you see those in whose hearts is disease hastening into [association with] 
them, saying, "We are afraid a misfortune may strike us." But perhaps Allah will 
bring conquest or a decision from Him, and they will become, over what they have 
been concealing within themselves, regretful. 
 
4. Quran Verse 3, (Al-Imraan): 118 - ―you who believe! Take not as (your) Bitdnah 
(advisors, consultants, protectors, helpers, friends, etc.) those outside your reli-
gion (pagans, Jews, Christians, and hypocrites) since they will not fail to do their 
best to corrupt you. They desire to harm you severely.‖660 
5. Quran Verse 60, (Al-Mumtahinah): 1 – ‗O ye who believe! Take not my enemies 
and yours as friends (or protectors)….take them not as friends, holding secret 
converse of love (and friendship) with them… 
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 Sahih International translation. 
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 ―Tafsir of Al Quran‖, ummah.com discussion forums, 





6. Quran Verse 8, (Al-Anfaal): 60 - ‗Against them make ready your strength to the 
utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) 
the enemies…‘ 
7. Quran Verse 4 (An-Nisaa): 75 on Apathy against fighting. ‗And why should ye not 
fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and op-
pressed)? – Men, women, and children, whose cry is: ―Our Lord! Rescue us from 
this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will 
protect; and raise for us from thee one who will help!‘ 
 
8. Quran Verse 4, (An- Nisaa): 140 ‗…when ye hear the signs of Allah held in de-















Annex B: Web Clusters defined by Chen et al, University of Arizona, Artificial 
Intelligence lab 
 
1. Hizballah Cluster  
 
2. Palestinian Cluster  
 
3. Al Qaeda Cluster  
 
4. Caucasian Cluster  
 
5. Jihad Supporters  
 
6.  Hizb-Ut-Tahrir  
 

















Annex C: Categories used in the NEFA website: 
   
1. Translations/Transcriptions of Statements by Al-Qaida Leadership 
2. Translations/Transcriptions of Statements by Iraqi Insurgent Groups 
3. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Afghanistan 
4. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Chechnya 
5. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Europe 
6. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Israel/Palestinian 
Territories/Lebanon 
7. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: North Africa 
8. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Pakistan 
9. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Somalia 
10. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Yemen 
11. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Cyberterror 
12. Translations/Transcriptions of Documents from Terrorist Groups: Miscellaneous 

















2 Al -Ghurraba http://www.alghurabaa.org/ 
3 Al Imam http://www.al-imam.net/ 
4 
Al Muhaji-
roun www.muhajiroun.com (Website Closed) 
5 Ansar al- 
Mujahideen / 
Ansar A Ji-
had Network  
Arabic ForumMirrorsGerman ForumRSS Feeds 
 www.as-ansar.com/vbwww.ansarnet.info          www.ansar1.net 
https://www.ansarnet.info      
https://www.ansar1.netwww.de.ansar1.netAnsar AlJihad English 
















1. Ansar 1 
2. Gawaher 
3. HUT Forum 
4. Islamic Awakening 
5. MyIWC 









13 Free Gaza http://www.freegaza.org/ 
14 Gawaher http://www.gawaher.com/ 
15 Hidayatullah http://www.hidayatullah.com/ 
16 
Hizb Ut Ta-







Issue 1 : Summer 2010 
Issue 2:  Fall 2010 
Issue 3: Special Issue, Nov 2010, Operation Hemorrhage. 
Issue 4: Winter 2010. 
Issue 5: Spring 2011, ―The Tsunami of Change‖ – issue focusing 
on the ‗Arab Spring.‘ 
Issue 6: Summer 2011, Issue focused on Martyrs and Death of 
Osama Bin Laden. 
18 
Inshallahsha-
heed – Samir 
Khan‘s Blog http://inshallahshaheed.blogspot.com/ 












23 Islamicweb http://www.islamicweb.com 






26 Jihad Unspun http://www.jihadunspun.com/home.php 
































































 Youtube Video Title Author Remarks 
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concerned 
As - Sahab 
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Abdul Malik Al 
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4 Jihad is our Religion Anwar Al Aw-
laki 
 

















8 O Muslims Report for 
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10 Soldiers of Allah Anwar Al Aw-
laki 
 
11 The Battle for hearts and 
















14 Muslims for Life Soldiers of Al-
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15 Shaikh al-Albaanee On 




16 The Honor of a Single 
Muslim 
  





18 To the Muslim Youth Ayman Al 
Zawahiri 
 
19 WHAT ABOUT THAT 
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23 KhanQaida‟s Channel   





25 They will be defeated Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
26 Latest Interview Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 





28 The enemies of Allah Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
29 What is Jihad – A Mus-
lim Perspective 
Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
30 Book of Jihad Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
31 Brutality against Mus-
lims 
Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
32 Asbab Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
33 The Dust will never set-
tle 
Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
34 Mashari Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
35 State of the Ummah Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 
36 Allah is Preparing us for 
Victory 












38 Meaning of Jihad Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 





40 The battle of the hearts 
and minds 
Anwar al Al 
Awlaki 
 






























Annex E: Sample List of some of the major Muslim Extremist Ideological literature 
found on the Internet that were examined 
Title Ideologue Ideologue / Author / 
Source details  
1. Defense of the 
Muslim Lands: The First 
obligation after Iman. 
Abdullah Azzam Mentor of Osama Bin Laden / 
Internet 
2. Signs of ar-
Rahman in the Jihad in 
Afganistan 
Abdullah Azzam Mentor of Osama Bin Laden / 





Birmingham – England 
www.maktabah.net 
3. The Management 
of Savagery:  The Most 
Critical Stage Through 
Which the Ummah Will 
Pass 
Abu Bakr Naji He was a frequent contributor in 
the al-Qaeda magazine, Sawt al-











4. Oh hesitant one, 
it‘s an obligation. 
Abu Dujanah al-
Khurasani 
Inspire Issue 2 (Transcription), 
Fall 2010 
Actual Name: Humam Khalil Abu 
Mulal al-Balawi.  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126264
256099215443.html 
―Mr. Balawi, a doctor of Palestinian 
origin who had worked in a Palestinian 
refugee camp in Jordan, blew himself 
up on Dec. 30 (2009) at a C.I.A. base in 
Khost, in eastern Afghanistan near the 
Pakistani border. American officials 
have described him as a double agent 
who was taken onto the base in Afgha-
nistan because the C.I.A. hoped he 
might be able to deliver top members of 
Al Qaeda‘s network, according to 







5. Which is Better 
Martyrdom or victory? 
Abu Khowla Inspire Issue 4 Winter 2010 
6. The Beginning of 
the end. Audio reply. A 





Actual name: Omar Shafik 
Hammami, an American who 
went to join al-Shabaab in 
Somalia 
7. Why did I choose 
al-Qaeda. Part 1, 2 & 3. 
 Abu Musab al-Awlaki Inspire Issue 4, 5 & 6 
8. The Schools of 
Jihad. 
9. The open fronts 
and individual initiative. 
10. The military 
theory of Open fronts. 
11. Indivdual 
Terrorism Jihad.  
12. Conditions for the 
resistance to use 
individual Jihad 
 
Abu Musab al-Suri Inspire 1, 2, 4, 5 & 6 
―…his real name is Mustafa Setmariam 
Nasar. He became involved in politics 
at the University of Aleppo, where he 
studied engineering. Later, he moved to 
Jordan, where he joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood…‖ 
 
Moved to Spain, where he got married, 
then onto Afganistan where he met 
OBL and became part of the Al-Qaeda 
inner council. Helped establish the 
terrorist cell that played a role in the 
















14. Transcript of the 
video: Why do we wage 




Ansar 1 Web  Forum. 
15. Its either Jihad or 
Disgrace so choose. 
Abu Yahya al-Libi Inspire Issue 6, high ranking 
official and top strategist for Al-
Qaeda, one of those who escaped 
from Bagram airbase in 





16. The Middle Path Abu Yahya al-Libi Inspire Issue 5 
426 
 
and the Enemy‘s plot. 
17. Know that Jihad is 
your duty. 
Adam Gadahn Inspire Issue 4, An American 
senior operative in al-Qaeda, 
actual name Adam Pearlman.  
18. 44 ways of 
supporting Jihad, 
Anwar Al Awlaki Available in the al-Ghurraba 
website.  
The prominent American 
ideologue within al-Qaeda. Said 
to have inspired the Fort Hood 
Shooter (2009), Maj. Nidal 
Hassan, Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the bomber who 
hid explosives in his underwear 
on board a TWA flight (2009) 
and the Times Square Bomber 
(2010), Faisal Shahzad.  
19. A  call to Jihad Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube 
20. Allah is preparing 
us for victory 
Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube 
16. Allah is preparing 
us for Victory 
Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube 
21. It‘s a war against 
Islam 
Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube, also 
available on al-Ghurraba website 
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22. Jihad is our 
religion 
 Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube 
23. The Battle of 
Hearts and Mind 
Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube, also 
available on Kavkaz.com 
24. The Prize awaiting 
the Shahid 
Anwar Al Awlaki Inspire Issue 2 (Transcription) 
25. Weapons of the 
end Times 
Anwar Al Awlaki Video Lecture on Youtube 
26. The short and long 
term plans after Protests 
& The overlooked 
Backdrop 
Ayman al-Zawahiri Inspire Issue 5, Present Leader of 
Al-Qaeda.  
27. Prepare Yourself Feiz Muhammad Video Lecture on Youtube, 
Australian Extremist Muslim 
Preacher.  
28. Al-Saud: lodging a 
criminal 
Ibrahim al-Rubaish Inspire Issue 5, Actual name: 
Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad 
Arbaysh,  
Formerly incarcerated in 
Guantanamo bay then transferred 
to Saudi Arabia. He escaped and 
is now supposedly a religious 








34. Interview: ''All 
that is happening 




Source: Prague Watchdog  
Kavkaz Center 
 
35.  ―Interview with 
the Sheikh Abu 
Baker Ba‘ashir 
Regarding 
Obama‘s Speech to 
the Islamic World, 





Jihad Voice in Nusantara: 
36. Interview : ''The 
aim of war is 
defined. It became 






―The interview was led by the 
independent journalist of Vakha 
Khasanaov. 
 




37. If Jihad Suddenly 
Stopped 
Kavkaz Center JamaatShariat.com 
Kavkaz Center 
29. The Oppresors 
End. 
Muhammad ibn Abd 
al Qadir al Murshedi 
Inspire Issue 5 
30. Until we taste 
what Hamzah ibn Abdul 
Muttalib tasted. 
Osama Bin Laden Inspire 2 (Transcription)  
31. The Central Issue. Samir Khan Inspire Issue 4, Prominent Cyber 
Jihadist from the US who left for 
Yemen and is now part of AQAP 
and its media arm, al-Malahim 
media. He is the principal author 










Abu 'Umar, known 
commonly as Abu 
Qataadah al-
Sallafiah Jadeedah website, also 






34. The West 
Should ban the Niqab 
covering its real face. 





35. Sheikh Qaradawi's 
Jumu'ah Khutbah: 
"I am a Terrorist" 
"If everyone who defends his 
land, and dies defending his 
sacred symbols is considered a 
terrorist, then I wish to be at 
the forefront of the terrorists." 
By Dr. Hasan Ali Daba 
Sheikh Qaradawi ―Jihad Unspun‖ Website. He is 
included as some of his views are 
sympathetic of Palestenian 
Suicide Bombings but condemns 
outright terrorism.  His 
controversial views are bordering 
on extremism and are also cited 












Annex F: Geographical and movement type clusters for extremist Muslim narratives 
Webclus
ter 














Chechnyan Cluster / 
Africa  




























































































































     




     
11` „Inspire‟ – 
the English 





























Annex G: Definition & coding rule for the themes 





Ideological The narrative makes reference to widely 
accepted ideas from academia, mainstream 
political discourse, or from prominent 
personalities that are accepted by the 





Ideological The narrative emphasizes, alludes or appeals 
to values or concepts that are considered 
universal. Values: e.g.: courage, camaraderie, 
dedication etc.  Concepts: e.g.: Freedom of 





Ideological The narrative corroborates with examples of 
hypocrisy or biasness in media reports by 
Western sources or those issued by the state. 
It will also highlight instances when 
alternative perspectives are suppressed or 
information is hidden to give an incomplete 
picture of the issue / event.  
4 ―True but 
little 
Ideological The narrative intends to ‗shock‘ the reader to 
an unknown or little publicized piece of 





information is suppressed, made less visible 






Ideological The narrative cites how past actions or plans 
have failed or have suggested solutions that 
are not feasible or realizable. It then proposes 
a counter argument in which the practicality 
and real world viability of the proposed 







Ideological The narrative presents an alternate scenario, 
or interpretation of events that the reader has 
not considered before.  It will highlight the 
‗real‘ intentions of the ‗official‘ narrative that 







Ideological The narrative emphasizes on the 
downtrodden state of the targeted group. Or 
the reader is awakened to the idea that he or 
she is actually superior to their oppressors. It 
can also remind the readers of a past in 






Ideological A carefully constructed rational argument 
with empirical corroboration to prove the 
conspiracy. It will also detail the steps taken 
to hide the conspiracy and what the guilty 






Ideological The narrative will show evidence as to how 
mainstream, state sanctioned Muslim leaders 
or those in positions of authority and power 
conform to official lines, never critique or 
question the official line or support Western 
political actions that have incited Muslims at 





Resonance The narrative either targets a prominent 
extremist Muslim ideologue, a Jihadist figure 
(from Islam‘s classical past or from 
contemporary times) or Jihadists in general. 
The qualities range from personal attributes 
like humility and honesty to traits exhibited 
by their actions, either in battle or in 
everyday life.  
11 ―They want 
to Change 
Islam to be 
Resonance The narrative espouses incidents and issues 
in which the West or the state is seen to 







and practiced. Instances when a passive form 
of Islam is accepted and propagated while 
any form of critique or resistance is deemed 






Resonance The Jihadist culture encompassing elements 
such as camaraderie, the excitement and 
experience of battle are narrated. Mystical 
elements that happen before, during and after 
the battles are described.  
13 ―Prophecy.‖ 
 
Resonance Prophecy relates to what is said in Islamic 
scriptures being used to explain past, current 
and future events and issues. There is usually 






Resonance The narrative recognizes and highlights 
issues concerning everyday Muslims or 
describes how populist support from the 
people is given to Jihadists.  
15 ―You can 
never fit 
in.‖ 
Resonance The narrative describes instances where 
attempts to conform to secular society have 
failed despite genuine attempts to integrate. 
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 It will emphasize how much Muslims are 
hated by non- 
Muslims and how entrenched it is.  It may 
also describe how this hate is manifested in 
polices affecting Muslims.  




Resonance The narrative describes how Muslims are 
actually powerful enough to change their 
status quo. It is slated to be very encouraging 
and will show instances of how the West or 
the state has created a situation where the 
Muslim will feel inferior and not capable of 
going against them. The narrative may also 
cite how peaceful co-existence, conformance 







Resonance The narrative relates to the Islamic concept 
of the stranger who is an outcast due to his 
faith and conviction. It will relate to how this 
estranged individual is actually in a better 
position as God favors him or her for the 
conviction to stand up for one‘s beliefs and 
isolate oneself from mainstream society if 





Resonance The narrative describes how one is or will be 
imbued with exceptional qualities for 
choosing to take the path of resistance. It will 
highlight how ‗special‘ and fortunate this 
individual is. The hardshiops one will face 
for being part of the chosen may also be 
narrated along with the final reward for being 
steadfast in one‘s beliefs. The narrative may 
also appeal to one‘s sense of moral duty and 
altruism as there is no one to help the 
downtrodden Muslim and only someone 
special will be chosen or choose to do 
something about it.  




Argumentation The narrative may be framed to appear both 
simple and coherent in its logic and 
argument, uncompromising despite 
pressures, little or no ambiguity in 
identifying the causes or in the objectives to 
be met and finally leveraging on clear and 
valid issues while providing seemingly 
concrete solutions. The narrative may also 














Argumentation The narrative is constructed by using a series 
of accepted, corroborative or empirical facts 
to lead to a conclusion that is not the actual 
state of events but more the end state or 






Argumentation The narrative reduces the argument to its 
‗bare bones‘  to show how at the simplistic 
level it is proven to be true and therefore the 
more complex issue is likewise true. 
Analogies are the most common mechanisms 
used in this argumentation theme.  




and this is 
Argumentation The narrative captures the common or likely 
criticism to be leveled against it and address 
it directly or resorts to creating a 
corroborated rational argument against the 


























Argumentation A purely rational argument in the narrative 
that is clear in its final objective, has logical 
steps coherently described to meet them and 
has empirical or corroborative evidence to 
back up claims.  
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''All that is happening today is a mirage'' (interview with a 
Chechen Mujahid) 
Publication time: 21 April 
2009, 12:08  
Prague Watchdog edi-
tion published an inter-
view with one of the 
Mujahideen command-
ers of the Caucasus 
Emirate, Abdul-Malik. 
The interview was 
translated from Che-
chen into Russian, and 
from Russian into Eng-
lish.  
Prague Watchdog: Do you think that it's normal for Chechens to be killing 
Chechens?  
Abdul-Malik: We really didn't want this kind of war, and at first we did eve-
rything we could to avoid it. But the Russians are pushing the Kadyrovites 
onto the front line and conducting ambushes against us. The Kadyrovites 
are themselves trying every means of gaining favour with the Russians. I 
warned the man whom I killed. But he did not listen; instead he mobilized 
and started shooting at us. His cousin is here with us. And he says that this 
policeman almost took pride in the fact that he was able to earn his living by 
fighting the insurgents in the forest.  
We had nowhere to go. And we started a war with them. Why? On the bat-
tlefield it is the Chechen whom we face. In Russian uniform. That is, a Rus-
 
Saad Minkailov: ''The aim of 
war is defined. It became 
clear who oppose who'' 
 
Message from the Emir Abu 
Usman to the parents of 
apostates, and a response 
to Kadyrov's lie 
 
Emir Dokka Abu Usman: 
''this year will be our 
offensive year'' 
 
''All that is happening today 
is a mirage'' (interview with 
a Chechen Mujahid) 
 
Prague Watchdog: an 
interview with Chechen 
Mujahid 
 
Emir Sayfullah gave 
interview to the Jamestown 
Foundation 
 
The 'mop-up' of Europe 
(interview with Magomed 
Ocherhadji) 
 
Emir Supyan: ''Before 
declaring the Caucasus 
Emirate, more important 
words were said…'' 
 
Amir Dokka Abu Usman, 
Sheikh Sayeed Abu Saad 
address Muslims in Gimry 
village 
 
Mullah Mohammad Hasan 
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sian, only with Chechen nationality - but he's our enemy. In Russian uni-
form, with a Russian weapon in his hands, he went against his people and 
his religion. Therefore both our religion and our customs tell us that it's our 
duty to fight him. That's the only way they can be stopped. I repeat, we al-
ways warn them and urge them to give up their jobs.  
A year ago I personally asked this man to resign from the police. And he 
sent a reply: "Try to make me!" That is why Allah used our hands to take his 
life away. From afar it is difficult to understand. To us here on the spot it is 
all obvious. These people persecute us day and night, without a break. That 
is why we conduct our operations against them. We have no choice. They 
fight us just like the Russians do, with the Russians' weapons and vehicles. 
We have to respond. Anyone who fights in a war will understand this only 
too well.  
I would like to say that we haven't violated anything that is connected with 
the traditions of the Chechen people, the requirements of Islam. We stand 
firm on this. They are the ones who are the violators.  
PW: But after all, you didn't kill him on the battlefield, but dragged him from 
his home and shot him. Is that consistent with Islamic law?  
A.-M.: Today whoever takes up arms to defend the Russian government 
and shoots at us - they can be killed. That is our starting point. He shot a lot 
of our people, I know that for a fact. But even in these conditions we say, as 
we did before, that we will not touch a single one of those who are willing to 
give up their job and stay at home. But there are those who continue to fight 
with us, and even more furiously than the Russians themselves. They are 
the ones who won't allow the war to end. If it weren't for, the war would have 
stopped.  
PW: The homes of insurgents are burned down, their relatives are harassed 
and persecuted. What effect does that have on your people?  
A.-M.: For two years now they've been persecuting our relatives, day and 
night. We never touch their relatives, only them. We seek justice and retri-
bution. All that we do is in harmony with our religion. But they burn homes, 
they punish our sisters, our mothers, our brothers. That way they seek to 
influence us, to weaken our hearts. But we know what we are moving to-
wards. They try to harm us in every way they can. They want to destroy our 
spirit. But by the will of Allah we will stand on the path of Islam. We will 
strengthen Islam and broaden it. We believe in it.  
PW: Many of Chechnya's civilians are pleased at what the authorities are 
doing: the authorities are building homes, they constructed the largest mos-
que in Europe, they're improving people's lives. Don't you see any changes 
for the better?  
A.-M.: Kadyrov brings Tyson to Chechnya, and he'll be bringing Michael 
Jackson. Then it will be some artistes, some Arabs. Why? He's conducting 
a policy of the stick and carrot.. Beat the man, beat him and beat him, then 
throw him a piece of bread. He thinks that's the way to deal with people, but 
it's all just temporary. I swear, even the Muslim prayers they're allowed to 
Talking Peace & Not 
Attacking Women with Acid 
 
Sheikh Sayeed of Buriatia: 
''How I went to Jihad and 
what I have seen here'' 
 
Imam Anwar al-Awlaki 
reflects on ''vacation from 
this world'' 
 
''Two ideologies can never 
get along peacefully on the 
same territory'' 
 
Dokka Umarov: ''A great 
deal of purification of the 
ranks of the Mujahideen is 
going on'' 
 
Zakhar Abukhanov tells 





hold today will be banned tomorrow. For no one in Chechnya today can fol-
low the ways of the Prophet. Young people complain to us that they're being 
told at home not to go to the mosques. They're even being taken out of the 
mosques. And all the rest is just for show, there's nothing to it... If they were 
truly supportive of Islam, do you think we'd be against it? No, of course we 
wouldn't.  
And all this show is being paid for by our oil. The republic doesn't even get 
10 percent of the oil revenues. So why do we take their bait? They're grab-
bing all the oil and throwing us handouts. Telling us meanwhile that "Russia 
feeds us". No, it doesn't. Today, if it wasn't for the mujahideen they'd be 
able to send us into exile as they did in 1944. We have to remember that. 
They're the people who tormented our fathers, and now they're tormenting 
us. So everything that Kadyrov does is hypocrisy. It's just that they have 
control of information, of television. And they can deceive people. And our 
people are very willing to believe what they're told on TV. There is almost no 
one left in Chechnya who is able to openly speak the truth. Everything is 
under the thumb of the authorities. Even religion is interpreted in the way 
they want.  
If we had an independent state, our oil would pay for a fine standard of liv-
ing. That's why we've taken the path of struggle - so we can have our state, 
so that the Muslims can live in peace. All that is happening today is a mi-
rage. And it will pass.. Allah is testing the Muslims.  
PW: But many Chechens support the authorities. You say that you're fight-
ing for the people's happiness. The people praise Kadyrov. Perhaps you 
haven't noticed that you've moved away from the people and lost contact 
with it?  
A.-M.: I can quote a hadith. Ali's son was going to Iraq. He asked those 
whom he met: "What is happening there?" They replied: "The hearts of all 
the people of Iraq are with you, but their swords are turned against you." 
What does that mean? The hearts of the people of Chechnya are with us. 
They have all told us that. They love us, but they love us in their hearts. If 
they talk about it openly, they'll be persecuted. They are all living under a 
very heavy yoke of oppression. You just have to lift your head and you're 
crushed. So they're afraid. They have no weapons - they're civilians. What 
can they do? They have to stay silent. I don't blame them, because I under-
stand. I live here and see it all. The people are oppressed, as in the days of 
Stalin. Nothing can be said openly. But in reality, people respect us and 
support us. If that were not the case, we wouldn't have so many people 
coming to join us. And they come in their multitudes. They see the injustice 
of the authorities and they come to us. But if any one of them says a word in 
support of us, tomorrow he will find himself in a basement in Khosi-Yurt, and 
he'll be tortured.  
PW: Who is doing the fighting today? What sort of people are they, how 
many of them are there - what is their age, their social status, their level of 
education? What does an insurgent look like?  
A.-M.: I can talk about myself. Two years ago I arrived here from Austria. I 
had a good life there, didn't want for anything. But I gave it all up and came 
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back when I realized a lot of things. Although people may not believe it, 
there are a great many insurgents. They sincerely believe in Allah. And all 
the talk about how they have taken this path in search of money is a lie. 
Does one earn money by dying? What do I need money for if I can die to-
day? Money won't help me when I stand before Allah. It will only help my 
deeds.  
If I had wanted to earn money, I'd have looked for it elsewhere. After all, the 
world is a big place, you can live anywhere. But that's not the life we are 
looking for. We seek Allah's blessing in the next world. We want to streng-
then Islam. What we have done today will help us tomorrow. Why? If we are 
victorious today, the Muslims will be free. They will be able to freely practice 
their faith. Each person will have all the rights that are given to him by Allah. 
And we will die on that path. Allah will give us paradise. We believe that. 
Inshallah! Those who have social and financial problems will not come to 
us. They will yield to the munafiqs. And there they will find a way to resolve 
their issues. But we seek advantage from Allah. And Allah willing, we will 
find it. Allah gives everyone what they seek.  
Allah said that no one on his path will be left without benefit - either he will 
be victorious or he will receive paradise after he dies. We have this choice. 
If we are victorious, we will be open for the Muslims. We will not be criminal 
for them. If a criminal appears among us, we have the power to stop him. 
And we will not let the others do evil. We shall be for justice. Many things 
have been cleared up in comparison with the first war. And they go on being 
cleared up. After all, at each moment we stand before death.  
Of our ranks I will say this: among us there are young and old, there are 
doctors, construction workers, graduates of institutes and universities. We 
have a program of Islamic studies and international current affairs. We know 
what we want. I am 30 years old. A time for life. But this, the best time of my 
life, I have devoted to Islam and the strengthening of the Word of Allah. And 
Allah will not forsake me! This I believe! 
 




print version    |    email article  
  
  
Copyright © 1420-1429 Hjr. "Kavkaz-Center" News Agency  
The reprint without prior permission is violation of international legislation of the webmaster:  
click here to contact us 










1) Narrative summary: Killing of Russian collaborators who attack the militants- 
They are taken from their houses and shot. Citing culture and Islamic law to justify. 
Explaining that it is because of them that the war continues. They fight them even more 
than they fight the Russians do. They will not harm those who turn their backs on the 
Russians. 
 
2) Key text and phrases examined:  
“PW: Many of Chechnya's civilians are pleased at what the authorities are doing: the 
authorities are building homes, they constructed the largest mosque in Europe, they're 
improving people's lives. Don't you see any changes for the better?  
A.-M.: Kadyrov brings Tyson to Chechnya, and he'll be bringing Michael Jackson. Then 
it will be some artistes, some Arabs. Why? He's conducting a policy of the stick and car-
rot.. Beat the man, beat him and beat him, then throw him a piece of bread. He 
thinks that's the way to deal with people, but it's all just temporary. I swear, even the 
Muslim prayers they're allowed to hold today will be banned tomorrow. For no one in 
Chechnya today can follow the ways of the Prophet. Young people complain to us that 
they're being told at home not to go to the mosques. They're even being taken out of the 
mosques. And all the rest is just for show, there's nothing to it... If they were truly sup-
portive of Islam, do you think we'd be against it? No, of course we wouldn't.  
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And all this show is being paid for by our oil. The republic doesn't even get 10 percent of 
the oil revenues. So why do we take their bait? They're grabbing all the oil and throwing 
us handouts. Telling us meanwhile that "Russia feeds us". No, it doesn't. Today, if it 
wasn't for the mujahideen they'd be able to send us into exile as they did in 1944. We 
have to remember that. They're the people who tormented our fathers, and now they're 
tormenting us. So everything that Kadyrov does is hypocrisy. It's just that they have 
control of information, of television. And they can deceive people. And our people are 
very willing to believe what they're told on TV. There is almost no one left in Chechnya 
who is able to openly speak the truth. Everything is under the thumb of the authorities. 
Even religion is interpreted in the way they want.  
If we had an independent state, our oil would pay for a fine standard of living. That's 
why we've taken the path of struggle - so we can have our state, so that the Muslims 
can live in peace. All that is happening today is a mirage. And it will pass.. Allah is test-
ing the Muslims.‖ 
3) First key message: Collaborators are worse! The comfort that the state throws are 
but scraps to keep the masses quiet.  The initial religious grievance of not being allowed 
to go to mosques then goes into more material issues of how the Russians are siphoning 
off Chechnya oil. Recurring theme of Media control in the hands of the state so people 
believe what they are being told hence not resisting the govt in masses.  Hypocrisy and 
misguidance and illusion fed by the state. Material issues are a key grievance. Religion in 
the background. But it gives the theological support to their actions.  
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4) Second key message: Claims people give illusion of support to the state as they 
are dependant on it and fear persecution.   
 
5) Third key message: Kills assumption of econ. deprivation. Says these (econ 
deprived) would not turn to them but to the state for help. Cites in contrast they only 
depend on God. Moral highground argument. They do it not for the money but to please 
God.  
 
Those who come are usually well endowed and financially independent/ able. He 
also cites how they are well educated as well. He is alluding to their altruism in leaving a 
life of normalcy and comfort to come fight in the Jihad.  
 
6) Other Imp Points to note:  Source: Prague Watchdog (interviewer) is apparently 
an independent source. Clearly defined purpose for the struggle and what can be done 
with the oil. Rational construction of argument to bring in empirical and corroborative 
evidence ―The republic doesn't even get 10 percent of the oil revenues.‖ . Also use of 
analogies to counter argument that the people are benefiting from the state so why fight 
them? ―Kadyrov brings Tyson to Chechnya, and he'll be bringing Michael Jackson. Then 
it will be some artistes, some Arabs. Why? He's conducting a policy of the stick and car-
rot.. Beat the man, beat him and beat him, then throw him a piece of bread. He thinks 




7) Thematic and arguementation categories seen in narrative:  
a. Key Theme: ―Seeing past the ruse – creating consciousness.‖ – What the Rus-
sians are actually up to.  
b. ―Biasness of Mainstream Media.‖ – Russian control of the media resulting in the 
Chechnyan militants looking bad. Citing of empirical fact that Russians and pro 
Russian Chechnyan state do control the media.  
c. ―They want to Change Islam to be subservient and passive.‖ – How Russians will 
slowly want to control the way Islam is practiced and is entrenched as they see it 
as a threat. ―Even religion is interpreted in the way they want.‖ Corroboration by 
experiential occurance at the grassroots. ―Young people complain to us that 
they're being told at home not to go to the mosques. They're even being taken out 
of the mosques.‖ 
d. ―Lackey Muslims and Hypocritical leaders.‖ – Russian Collaborators. 
e. ―Noble Character of the Jihadist.‖ – Willinng to forsake a life of comfort and ma-
terial wealth seeking for a greater cause.  
f. ―Reductionism.‖ (Rational argument)- Use of anologies.  
g. ―Clarity of purpose.‖ (Rational Argument)- Propose a clear solution of why they 





Annex I: “Millat Ibraheem” by Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
1) Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi :―Born in Nablus; one of the most influential jihadi 
ideologues. He is currently in jail in Jordan. While in prison in the 1990s, he mentored Abu 
Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, for which he came to the attention of the West. He studied the works of earlier 
Salafi writers and thinkers and traveled through Saudi Arabia, where he developed a view of Salafi 
ideology akin to the Saudi Salafis, yet with endorsements for jihad and armed resistance to tyrannic-
al rule.” See, "Militant Ideology Atlas | Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/militant-ideology-atlas (accessed November 28, 
2011).  
 
2) ―To start off on this subject, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (fakkAllahu 
Asra) wrote in his magnificent book, ―Millat Ibraheem‖ that the enemies of Allah 
can be broken down into two categories: 
1. The non-Muslim 
2. The non-Muslim that fights Islam 
 
We will tackle the first category and in our next post we will discuss the second, 
inshAllah. Both of these, undoubtedly, are the enemies of Allah. Some may ask the 
question, ―Why are the non-Muslims the enemy of Allah when they are innocent 
and haven‘t killed anyone or haven‘t done any injustice?‖ To answer this, we turn 




 َلا َّيَُنبٰي ُهُظَِعي َُوهَو ِِهنْبلا ُناَمْقُل َلاَق ِْذإَو  ٌميِظَع ٌمْلُظَل َكْر ِّشلٱ َِّنإ ِ َّللَِّٲب ِْكرْشُت 
Behold, Luqman said to his son by way of instruction: ―O my son! Join not in 
worship (others) with Allah: for false worship is indeed the greatest injustice.‖ 
(Luqman: 13) 
 
The crime of a non-Muslim is that they have done Shirk; even if they are Jews, 
Christians, Hindus, and so on. The crime of Shirk is much greater than the crime 
of murder since Shirk is a sin that can never be forgiven as Allah said, 
 
 َنوُد اَم ُِرفَْغيَو ِِهب َكَرُْشي نَأ ُِرفَْغي َلا َ َّللَّٱ َِّنإ   امِْثإ ٰىَرَتْفٱ ِدَقَف ِ َّللَِّٲب ِْكرُْشي هَمَو ُءآََشي هَِمل َِللَذ   اميِظَع 
Verily, Allah does not forgive that anything should be associated with Him, and 
forgives what is besides that to whomsoever He pleases; and whoever associates 
anything with Allah, he devises indeed a great sin. (an-Nisa: 48)... 
 
Every single non-Muslim is like an awful stench and every single practicing 
believer is like a beautiful perfumed smell. When one stays inside a blacksmith 
shop for a few hours, they eventually smell terrible; and this is the parable of the 
Kafir. They can easily influence you into evil by their smiles, laughs, jokes, and 
talks with you and eventually what happens is that you don‘t feel like showing 
your animosity and hatred towards them for their Shirk; and this is a great sin for 
not hating what Allah hates. This is why many Scholars don‘t allow working 
under a Kafir since it would be extremely difficult to continue that job if one is a 
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Mu‘min. This is another reason that makes Hijrah fard al ‗ayn on all Muslims; 
because you can‘t practice your Deen properly!... 
 
To reiterate, every single non-Muslim is an enemy of Allah and a Kafir. And 
anyone who denies this by saying that they are not Kafir, even though their 
creed is clear that they are Kafir, then he is Kafir himself since he doesn‘t 
believe the statements of Allah‘s Anger of Shirk. We will discuss this issue further 
much later down the line, inshAllah. And whosoever is tolerant of what Allah 
hates, then how can that person even be called a Muslim?!” author cited this 
post which appeared in the "The Ignored Puzzle Pieces of Knowledge" extremist 
Muslim website forum; see : "Irritating Du'aas. - Page 2 - English Sabla, post 
entry dated 02-10-07, 04:46 PM.", English Sabla,  
http://www.englishsabla.com/forum/showthread.php?p=948673 (accessed 












Annex J: Dr Saeed Ismaeel, "Muslim and Non-Muslim Relation." 
Dr Saeed Ismaeel, "Muslim and Non-Muslim Relation." Religious Rehabilitation 
Group . www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/Muslim_non-Muslim_Relations.pdf (accessed August 26, 
2011). 
―The context of this verse begins from verse (5: 12) in which Allah, glorified be 
He, tells the story of some Jews and Christians who rejected and mocked their prophet 
and plotted against Islam. So, the reference is not to all Jews or all Christians, but only 
to those who participated in or approved these evil deeds. The context, sometimes, is not 
included in the text but exists in the reason or the specific event behind the revelation of 
the verse or the judgment. And without referring to the event itself the verse cannot be 
interpreted properly, such as in the case of the verse which reads: {Soon We shall cast 
terror into the hearts of the unbelievers, because they worshipped other things with Al-
lah, for which He had sent no authority. Their abode will be Fire, and evil will be the 
home of the wrong doers.}( Glorious Quraan, 3: 151.) Although the reason for the men-
tioned threat seems to be sufficiently declared in the verse, the complete meaning is not 
clear till we read from verse (3: 139), where the description and the comment on the bat-
tle of Uhud begins. In other words, the threat was given not just because they worshipped 
other things with Allah, but because of their aggressive acts against the Muslims. Simi-
larly, when we look at the following verses without their contexts, they seem to be passing 
generalized judgment. 
 
These verses read: {Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with you unless you 
follow their religion...}( Glorious Quraan, 2: 120 and its context begins from verse 2: 
40.) and {Even if you bring to the People of the Book all signs, they would not follow 
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your Qiblah or religion...}( Glorious Quraan, 2: 145 and it is a continuation of verse 2: 
120.) If we try to understand those two verses without their contexts, we will certainly 
end up with accusing the Glorious Quraan of contradiction. The generalized meaning of 
these verses contradicts numerous verses, Prophetic Traditions, legal opinions of the 
majority of Muslim jurists and valid historical reports. All of which assure the existence 
of the neutral non-Muslims, the supportive, or those who accepted Islam among the 
People of the Book.‖  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
